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CONTENTS

A Commentary	PAGE I
The Great Tradition of the Chinese People	4
By E. R. Hughes	
Nicolas Berdyaev and the West	17
By J. M. Cameron	
Jaime Balmes—1810-1848	29
By Robert Sencourt	
Understanding Latin America	44
By Edward Sarmiento	
'Human Rights' in the New Constitutions of France and Italy	57
By Barbara Barclay Carter	
The Other Germany	75
By Robert d'Harcourt (Translated by Frank Macmillan)	
The Presuppositions of Physical Science	91
By E. F. Caldin	
'The Waste Land' Revisited	106
By Derek Traversi	
'The Wreck of the Deutschland'	124
By Francis Ryan	

200

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Taylor*

CONTENTS—Continued

Book Reviews

	PAGE
<i>The State in Catholic Thought</i>	by J. Messner 142
<i>Decadence</i>	by George O'Brien 149
<i>Aesthetic Experience in Religion</i>	by Illtyd Trethowan 152
<i>Human Destiny</i>	by A. C. Crombie 155
<i>Is Evolution Proved?</i>	by P. C. Fothergill 157
<i>Catholic Art and Culture</i>	by Nicolette Gray 159
<i>The Architectural Setting of Anglican Worship</i>	
<i>Post-War Church Building</i>	
<i>Of the Atmosphere of a Church</i>	by Peter F. Anson 161
<i>A Portrait of Horace</i>	by J. B. Sandeman 165
<i>St. Francis of Assisi: The Legends and Lauds</i>	by Edward Hutton 167
<i>Swift</i>	by Martin Turnell 169
<i>Poor Scholar</i>	by Terence de Vere White 171
<i>Men and Saints</i>	by Robert Speaight 172
<i>The Classical Moment</i>	by Frank Macmillan 175
<i>Westminster Retrospect</i>	by Edward Hutton 178
<i>German and Austrian Publications</i>	by Edward Quinn 181
Correspondence	186

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NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

E. R. HUGHES, Reader in Chinese Religion and Philosophy at Oxford, 1934-1948, is the author of *Chinese Philosophy in Classical Times* (Everymans Library, 1942), and other works.

J. M. CAMERON is Lecturer in the Departments of Philosophy and Extra-Mural Studies at the University of Leeds, and the author of *Scrutiny of Marxism*.

ROBERT SENCOURT is the author of a number of books on Spanish subjects, including *Spain's Uncertain Crown*, *Carmelite and Poet* (a life of St. John of the Cross), as well as of *The Consecration of Genius* and books of biography and literary history.

EDWARD SARMIENTO is Reader in Spanish and Latin American Studies at King's College, University of Durham, and is the author of studies of Gracian, Spanish Baroque, Unamuno, etc.

BARBARA BARCLAY CARTER is Editor of *People and Freedom*, and author of *Italy Speaks* and other works.

ROBERT d'HARCOURT, a member of the French Academy, is Professor of German Literature at the *Institut Catholique* in Paris, and the author of many books on German philosophy, literature and religion.

E. F. CALDIN is Lecturer in Chemistry at the University of Leeds.

D. A. TRAVERSI is Director of the British Institute, Barcelona, and the author of *Approach to Shakespeare* and other works.

FR. FRANCIS RYAN is Professor of English at St. Patrick's College, Thurles.

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A COMMENTARY

AS this issue goes to press, there is great talk of Western Union, with the corollary, not always acknowledged, that the West in this connexion extends only a short distance beyond the Channel, leaves out of account that great country from which sprang its one-time Emperor, Charles V, and is mainly anxious about its supply-line across the Atlantic: a cheshire-cat kind of West, with little left save the expression. The difficulty about locating it is not lessened when the West, to many minds, turns out to be anywhere where toothpaste and tanks and typewriters are to be found.

This is not intended as a cynical dismissal of the true conception, but rather to emphasize the fact that physical distances and material achievements are not the boundaries and focal points of what we call the West. We mean something which, by its achievement, has overcome both space and time, and has implanted a scale of values in the mind and heart of men which has stripped layer after layer of prejudice and passion from men to reveal to them their basic principles, their essence, their very reason for existence. The West, in a word, means Christianity, or it means nothing and nowhere. But the terms are not synonymous: Christianity does not mean the West. It is like a mining shaft sunk deep at a particular point, but whose galleries and ramifications may lead far out under the sea-bed. At those depths any vein may be found—rich, packed, concentrated, waiting only for a spark to release its energies. When that happens, in a soul or in a social group, there is no longer West and East: the points of the compass make the sign of the Cross.

It was, indeed, the reading of a remarkable book, *Ways of Confucius and of Christ*, the autobiography of a former Foreign Minister of China who is now a Benedictine monk in Belgium, which led us to ask the Reader in Chinese Religion and Philosophy at Oxford to contribute the article which opens this number. It is in accord with THE DUBLIN tradition to invite non-Catholic specialists in

particular fields to give the benefit of their learning. He certainly gives it and, in addition, shows his own evident sympathies, due, no doubt, in some measure to a close family bond with a nun in the overseas mission-field in China. His article is not intended to do more than reveal a region where the West, as a geographical or political term, loses all significance, but where, as a spiritual reality, it may yet find its selfhood.

The next article discusses a philosopher who, on another plane, attempted to bridge the traditions of East and West in Europe. Mr. Cameron has come up from Marxism by a different route. His treatment is by no means a panegyric, but it is a well-deserved tribute, nevertheless, to the man who shared in the Catholic intellectual renaissance in Paris in the 'twenties with *Le Nouveau Moyen Age*.

Although this journal is not entirely haphazard, it is not edited or written to a special thesis, except the implicit one that coherence and consistency may be found in the widest variety of research: conflicts are stultifying, but contrasts are the very stuff of creative thought. There is plenty of material, certainly, in the contrast between the Russian who died in 1948 and the Spaniard who died in 1848. Today, Jaime Balmes is hardly known in this country, but it would be a fascinating task to trace out his inheritance and how it has been developed without acknowledgment, or even knowledge, by Catholic thinkers since his day. By coincidence, it was after discussing his article with Mr. Sencourt that the first English edition of his work, *Protestantism and Catholicity, compared in their effects on the civilization of Europe*, came unexpectedly to hand. It bears the imprint of the founding-publisher of this journal: James Burns, 1849. Today, a hundred years later, the Author's Preface still has a contemporary ring:

Among the many and important evils which have been the necessary result of the profound revolutions of modern times, there appears a good extremely valuable to science, and which will probably have a beneficial influence on the human race,—I mean the love of studies having for their object man and society. The shocks have been so rude, that the earth has, as it were, opened under our feet; and the human mind, which, full of pride and haughtiness, but lately advanced on a triumphal car amid acclamations and cries of victory, has been alarmed and stopped in its career. Absorbed by an important thought, overcome by a profound reflection, it has asked itself, 'What am I? whence do I come? what is my destination?' Religious questions have regained their high importance;

and when they might have been supposed to have been scattered by the breath of indifference, or almost annihilated by the astonishing development of material interests, by the progress of the natural and exact sciences, by the continually increasing ardour of political debates,—we have seen that, so far from having been stifled by the immense weight which seemed to have overwhelmed them, they have reappeared on a sudden in all their magnitude, in their gigantic form, predominant over society, and reaching from the heavens to the abyss.

The transition from Balmes to the Spanish American Empire in its decline is an easy one, and readers will find themselves coming with still less difficulty to the contemporary political scene. We may safely leave them to make their own reflections on the documents from France, Italy and Germany here quoted. The analysis of a people's constitution will not show the fevers to which they may be subject, the sickness and even the death to which they may come. At the time of writing, there is some return of steadiness in the political pulse both of France and Italy, and some chance that 'Human Rights' may assert themselves in fact.

The concluding articles on science and literature speak for themselves. This journal particularly welcomes the opportunity it has been given of commemorating the honour of the Order of Merit recently bestowed on Mr. Eliot by printing a most able and revealing analysis of his best-known poem. In establishing its connexion with his later work it leads the mind far beyond the range of a literary excursion.

THE EDITOR

THE GREAT TRADITION OF THE CHINESE PEOPLE

By E. R. HUGHES

TO Catholics the Great Tradition of the Christian Church is a very real thing, so integral to the Christian religion that they cannot think of it without it being clothed in its traditional garments. The common-sense of this point of view would seem to have a profound depth of truth to it because, when all is said and done, it is sufficiently obvious that man is both of this world and another. As the common expression has it, he stands with one foot in time and one in eternity—a good enough analogue in one way, since man has got two feet, but not good in another, since man whether as individual or in the mass certainly does not stay poised on two feet but is constantly in motion. As a matter of fact the relation of the two intertwining parts of his nature is impossible to define, as we may see in the pages of the Angelic Doctor's writings. And the same difficulty emerges when we examine the Great Tradition of any non-Christian culture. It is so clearly of this world worldly, and yet at the same time reaching out into God's infinity-eternity. But precisely where does its synthesis break down?

The Jesuit Fathers in China in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries were much engaged with this problem. They were very much aware of what the new discoveries in astronomy had done to the old notions of east and west, so that Matteo Ricci was prepared to make his Chinese map of the world with the meridian in China. Yet for them there was one central spot in this terrestrial globe, namely Rome, and one supreme point in world history, the birth of Jesus Christ. The easy thing for them to have said was what the Franciscan and Dominican missionaries tended to affirm, that everything in the Chinese tradition was of Satan and must be discarded. Ricci and those who thought with him agreed that in Taoist and Buddhist religious beliefs and practices this was the case, but they could not allow this judgement to apply

to 'the Scholars' Religion'. The more they studied that the more it seemed to them directed to the worship of the One God, and so suited to be a *propaideia* to the Christian faith. The question is what their scholar converts, men like Hsü Kuang-chi and Li Chi-tao, really made of the space-time problem, and all the Mediterranean-basin appurtenances of the Christian Tradition. How could these be made to square with their own Chinese philosophy of history? What did God think about the two traditions? Where was Confucius to be placed in relation to the Western Saviour of mankind?

I have no desire to attempt an answer to these questions either on behalf of those earlier converts—some of whose writings are extant today—or on behalf of myself. But, having some sympathy with the early Jesuit attempt to understand, I venture, diffidently enough, on this outline of the Chinese Great Tradition in its rudimentary and, later, more developed phases. I deal with Confucius first, reliably dated (to within a year or two) as 551 to 479 B.C. He was not, whatever later ages thought of him, of the aristocracy, and his career began with the charge of a state granary. In course of time, however, he became known as a man learned in the traditional rituals and able to give illuminating answers to questions concerning moral obligation. There were new and disruptive forces at work in society, and, although our information about Confucius is by no means as good as we should like, it is yet sufficiently clear and consistent to show him as a man of exceptional integrity, hating the low-level and bogus morality of his day, criticizing much that passed as good religion, but entirely convinced as to the moral order in the universe. Twice he went into voluntary exile on a point of conscience, and on the second occasion he sacrificed his high office in Lu State and had to endure the dangers and privations of fourteen years of wandering from one state to another. Throughout this period he was continually buoyed up by the feeling that 'Heaven' had given him a special commission to uphold the cause of true human living. It must suffice to say that, although he looked back to the old-established feudal institutions of Chou as containing the secret of social well-being, yet he was sensitive—in unique fashion for his day—to the claims of the common man. Thus he was not only conservative but revolutionary, rendering the Chinese people the inestimable service of discovering the individual in society, and proclaiming an individual ethic under Heaven. He died a dis-

appointed man, but he left an inner ring of disciples completely convinced that their Master was right.

In one sense this was the beginning of the Confucian tradition. In another sense it was not. Embedded in the Confucian tradition lie the old tribal animisms, the old conviction that by means of good divining-techniques a man could guard himself, his family and state, to some extent at any rate, against calamity, and find the way to prosperous happiness. This pagan state of mind was never wholly eradicated in spite of Confucius' protest. At that time legend and myth opened up a long vista of past ages. Confucius himself believed in the existence of sage kings who under the direct inspiration of Heaven had been able to raise the people from savagery to civilization, from the state where a man clawed his food from anyone weaker to the state where he served his aged relatives first, being content with what they left.

It is these sage kings who constitute one of the most characteristic features of the Great Tradition. The sage king cycle—as distinct from the earliest forms of the legends and myths—stood for an achieved Utopia in days long past. As the true-blue Confucianist came to say, the sage king had but to sit on his throne and let his robes fall in order about him, and all men were at peace in his dominions. This he achieved, not by force but by the sheer majesty of his all-embracing love and justice and wisdom, the hall-mark of the sublime spiritual power in him. From the possible recurrence of these ages of peace and plenty there arose, some two hundred years after Confucius, a regular philosophy of history, complete with a cosmological foundation. Since by the alternating operation of Yin and Yang, the two modes of cosmic energy, everything in the world continued in a state of flux, the physico-chemical constituents of nature, namely, water, fire, wood, metal and earth, must have their times of ascendancy and decline. Hence, when a sage ruled, he did so by virtue of earth, simultaneously mystically conceived as the Bountiful Provider for man. In course of time, however, the sage died, and an inferior age of water virtue ensued. And so on down the scale of social failure until the nadir was reached with an age of blood and iron. Then it was time for a new sage king to arise, to inaugurate a new regime of kindly earth.

This mechanistic idea of history, powerful though it was, was not the only or even the dominant strand in the tradition as it grew. The Chinese have for long ages had a constant predilection for

using analogues for summing up the nature of things, and one of their favourite analogues has been that taken from weaving. The design has a warp and a woof. So while the Five Physical Forces in operation may be taken as the woof, the warp, that constituent part which first determines the nature of a design, is to be found in *T'ien* (Heaven). *T'ien* is in control of the sun and the moon and the stars in their courses, so that in due time come each of the four seasons. *T'ien* co-operates with *Ti* (earth), so that the soil brings forth its increase. *T'ien* also inspires men, commissions the great and the good to work for the well-being of the ordinary man, and so, as one Confucianist mystic put it, 'to lay the great foundations of society and recognize the transforming and nourishing processes of Heaven and Earth.' In other words, in the Great Tradition 'Heaven', 'Earth', and 'Man' can and do form a trinity of beneficent power. Admitted that there are passages in which *T'ien* and *Ti* together quite plainly denote the visible heavens and the solid earth on which man stands, but in the earliest literature there are many passages in which *T'ien* can have nothing but a highly sublimated meaning, denoting a controlling power in the universe which exercises a beneficent will towards man, which is able 'to put down the mighty from their seat and exalt the humble and meek.' This is clear, as clear as is the necessity for not confusing *T'ien* with the Christian conception of 'God'. *T'ien* is a beneficent will, but in the main Chinese tradition it is not personalized. Confucius could and did pray to Heaven, and so have many and many Confucianists since. At times even, as also in certain passages of the Scriptures, *T'ien* is addressed as '*Shang Ti*' (Ruler on High); but Chinese sensitiveness to the sublime impartiality of *T'ien* has clearly made them chary of attributing overmuch personality to the Ultimate Reality and over-ruling Will in the Universe. This is the more significant, since in Han times, when the emperors more and more tried to arrogate theocratic powers for the throne, the term *Shang Ti* was in use.

This being the strong tendency in the tradition, it is not surprising that the Confucianists' praying is not of a supplicatory nature. A man does not ask for anything from Heaven, though he will confess his sins. He merely reports the particular state of affairs in which he believes Heaven is interested, and leaves it to Heaven to decide whether reward or punishment are merited. This is characteristic of the great rite which, from time immemorial, has been performed once a year by the reigning king or

emperor on behalf of his people at the great circular Altar of Heaven. After due fasting sacrifice was made of grain, meats and silk, and then a report was read, dealing with the events of the past years. This was done at dawn at the winter solstice, and a similar ritual was observed at a square Altar of Earth at the summer solstice. It is difficult to believe that some intention of supplication does not lie behind these rituals, but they are in fact much more natural sacraments—if such a term may be used—in which the Son of Heaven, by his performance of solemn symbolic acts, was regarded as putting himself and his people in accord with the great transforming and nourishing powers of Heaven and Earth. If it be called magic, it is a very sublimated form of magic.

This high note is also struck in the ancestor worship which is so integral a part of the Great Tradition. On the one hand the beginnings of that worship were clearly on the same low level of superstitious fear as is found in other primitive cults. Ancestors were given offerings of food because otherwise they might bring calamity on their descendants. But during the first millenium B.C. a great sublimation took place, and the principle of Filial Piety became current, first preached among the aristocracy of the different state courts, but later extending its influence through all ranks of society. The keynote of this principle is its insistence that, since a man owes his life to his father and mother, that life entails one paramount duty, namely service of his parents. Here Confucius had a word to say. Filial piety must be more than a mere service of the parents' physical needs or of pious remembrance of them after their death. It must express an undying sense of gratitude to them and a readiness to sacrifice one's selfish desires for the good of the family. It is doubtful whether Confucius' idea of right filial piety went as far as did the ideas of some of his followers; and there is plenty of evidence that statesmen tended to exalt the duty of loyalty to the Emperor as higher than that of filial piety. But the extreme filial pietists won in this contest as to the categorical imperative for man. In the terms of their social dogma the prime function of the sovereign ('Son of Heaven') was so to live the life of filial duty in the royal family that all the sons in the kingdom might catch the infection of it and themselves become truly filial. Not only sons but also daughters-in-law, for they would follow the example of the sovereign's consort. In this direct fashion, with the spirit of family harmony permeating all

parts of the country from its centre, all the problems of government might be expected to solve themselves. This was to go much further than any belief and ritual of ordinary ancestor worship. It introduced into the life of the ordinary man and woman on the peasant or artisan level an element of high spiritual purpose, and, what has never been properly appreciated by western students of China, a strain of poetry into the daily round and common task. The service of parents could not be properly accomplished in a grudging spirit of meting out so much in return for so much in the way of benefits received. The service was to be rendered beautifully, with an artistic finish to it. And, as the stories of the 'Twenty-Four Filial Sons' show, this outlet for moral endeavour was so intimately related to the order of nature that where outstanding filial piety manifested itself nature itself might set the seal on the deed by working some homely miracle.

It is but a step, therefore, in the mind of the Chinese traditionalist, from the family to the state. The state is but a vastly enlarged family, and, as we have seen, the characteristic virtue of family life, moral persuasion, is the prime element in the traditional philosophy of the state. The Son of Heaven is—or at any rate should be—'the father and mother of his people', and so also with the officials appointed to represent him. If he fails to live up to his high calling, then, as the essay writers so often say, 'he loses that by which he is the Son of Heaven.' That being so, oppression of the people is a sin against the heavenly commission he has received, and Heaven will in the last resort manifest its displeasure by calamities such as flood and famine, or rebellion and foreign invasion. But this insistence on a beneficent paternalism must not blind us to the strongly autocratic side to the exercise of royal authority. The sovereign with his wise and worthy ministers knew much better than his ignorant subjects what was good for them as a whole. It was their duty 'to tremble and obey', as the time-honoured phrase put it. If they did not, they could easily become dubbed as 'prickly', recalcitrant members of the 'great family', and so for the good of the whole body be 'hoed out of the way'.

Again we strike on a feature of the Chinese tradition which has been very much ignored by western students, namely the function of penal law. It is true that the Chinese people, having passed in the third century B.C. through a period of ruthless totalitarian government, in their revolt against this centralized legalist state have ever since had a holy horror of the letter of the law. But that

did not entail the discarding of legal compulsion. All through their subsequent history the law codes were there in use. Every new dynasty reaffirmed them, and the trained law officers of the Crown were a very real part of the machinery of government. The real Confucianist position was put by the famous ninth-century protagonist of the faith of their fathers, Han Yü. In one of his famous essays he pointed out that their Chinese tradition contained three theories as to human nature: one that it had a congenital tendency to goodness, another that it had a reverse tendency, the third that at birth a man was morally indetermined. From this Han Yü drew the conclusion that there were three classes of people, one so naturally good, the other so naturally bad, that they could not be changed. The intermediate class was the strategically important one, because it could be trained to be good. The practical conclusion was that the state must have suitable institutions for extirpating the bad, and for giving sharp warnings to moral waverers. But the equally practical attitude of the Confucianist tradition was that, if an emperor depended in the main part for his power on force, he was *ipso facto* a bad emperor. He might be so bad a ruler that instead of encouraging all sons to be filial he so upset the economy of the community that it became impossible for sons to feed their parents. In that case he was clearly reprobate, abandoned by Heaven, and could rightly be dethroned in favour of one who showed signs of being able to bring peace and order.

The Tradition emerges to view as a combination of convictions which seem to cut across our Western classification of ethical outlook. It is both markedly idealistic and markedly realistic. Whereas on the one hand the Western tradition has grown largely from our belief in a personal God, Ruler of Heaven and Earth and all things visible and invisible, Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, rewarder of the just and punisher of the unjust, so on the other hand it has been a simple and easy proceeding for the Westerner to accept certain abstract ethical ideals as embodying the ultimate norm of human behaviour. Lists of these abstractions occur in the New Testament, and they were reinforced by Catholic teaching; so that we have, for example, the 'Cardinal Virtues' and the 'Deadly Sins'. With our virtues to speak for us and our sins to condemn us, we have to appear at the judgement seat of God. The Chinese also evolved their series of abstract ethical notions, in some respects the same as ours, many of them showing

high refinement of spiritual discrimination. But in the last resort their code is based on five concrete relationships; that of parent and child, elder and younger brother, husband and wife, friend and friend, king and minister. (The order is given differently in different places in the Classics, but that of parent and child always comes first.) These have been continually designated as emanating from *T'ien* and as being *ch'ang*, a very revealing term since it means 'applying universally in all generations'. In other words, the Five Relationships are part of what we call 'the Laws of Nature', constituting in their totality a basic main *differentia* of the human race from animals. In this connexion it is hardly just to criticize the code on the ground that the individual is sunk in the social unit, being conceived of as having no existence apart from his function as a son, a father, etc. That very individual thing, friendship, which is pre-eminently outside the family and the state, is also stressed.

This stress on the individual is also clear in the case of the special virtue which Confucius is said to have discovered and taught so assiduously. That virtue is represented by '*jen*', the term which has caused translators so much difficulty. It is not the Christian '*caritas*', though in course of time it came to mean something very like that; but in Confucius' mouth it would seem to reveal his discovery of the individual as existing in his own right, as an end in himself. As has already been noted, Confucius' generation was one in which the old *mores* were being assailed and the individual was being forced by new conditions to think for himself. In these conditions Confucius put his finger on the need for a virtue of one man treating his fellow man as he would be treated himself. (The character for '*jen*' is made up of 'man' and 'two' and originally meant a good member of the clan. I translate it 'man-to-man-ness'.) The positive content of this ethical ideal—it is not negative as missionaries tend to urge—is complemented by another ideal, that of *yi*, which varies in meaning from 'justice' and 'fair-dealing' to the vague 'righteousness' (the *dikaioσύνη* of the New Testament). *Yi* to Confucius was negative, for it was urged as the right attitude to the evil man who injures you.

One of the most significant lists of moral ideals is that in the expression 'the Five Constants' (*ch'ang*, cp. above). These are: *jen*, *yi*, courtesy (as exemplified in ritual behaviour), knowledge or understanding, and trustworthiness. The last three take a surprisingly prominent place in the Tradition. With regard to ritual

courtesy, as is well enough known, the ethical code was also a code of manners. The interesting thing is that the Confucianist philosopher Hsun Ch'ing (third century B.C.) was never included in the Confucian Canon, but his emphasis on training in ritual as an essential part of moral education did become very much part of the Tradition. The Chinese attitude to ritual has to be recognized as one in which justice is done to the sacramental principle. Acts of ritual are to the Chinese sacramental acts, and this is apparent even in what we should expect to be wholly secular, the rituals connected with war. 'Knowledge', 'understanding', wisdom, as an ethical ideal may be strange to us in spite of our Greek heritage. To the Chinese it is only natural, the more so because the content of important knowledge was in the first place in relation to man's duty to Heaven and Earth and man. 'Trustworthiness' figures often as the characteristic virtue in friendship, but it is also recognized as the indispensable cement of society, particularly as between a ruler and his people. It is also used with special reference to truth-speaking, but it must be confessed that, in the struggle between the conflicting claims of courtesy and this virtue, the Tradition condones the wrapping-up of the unpleasant truth in very mollifactory disguises.

Here in rough impressionistic form is the Chinese Great Tradition. It requires the addition of three facts of history if it is not to be misunderstood.

(1) This Great Tradition is by no means the work only of Confucius and successive generations of his followers. As, in the Hellenic world of the Eastern Mediterranean, society broke out of its ancestral moulds and there was an uprush of individual philosophizing which is one of the great treasures of our Western culture, so, in the Yellow River Basin in East Asia roughly about the same time, there was a similar movement. For myself I tend to describe it as the individual discovering undreamt-of powers of reasoning in himself, and in his efforts to express himself discovering the amazing possibilities of language-communication. The upshot in both areas was a succession of highly individual thinkers each with a philosophy of his own. In China Confucius came at the beginning of this epoch and, in spite of the reverence the Chinese came to pay him, he was a very simple philosopher as compared with some of the thinkers who came after him. When we come to the making of the *Ju Chiao* (Confucianism), the state religion at the end of the second century B.C., it was a very

different collection of beliefs and practices from anything that Confucius envisaged. Mo Ti, for example (fifth century B.C.) and his followers had strengthened its appreciation of the common man, and the Legalists had given it a more decisive appreciation of the place of law. But the deepest infiltrating influence of all came from the Taoist school of thought. It may be said that the earliest Confucianists had very little sense for metaphysical problems. The Book of Chuang Tzû and the Book of Lao Tzû (*Tao Tê Ching*), the two chief Taoist scriptures, show that these renouncers of society and all its prizes had that sense, and that the late Chou and Han Confucianists learned much from them. Thus, with in addition half a dozen divisions among the disciples of Confucius' disciples as to what 'the Master' chiefly emphasized in his teaching, it is clear that the impressive edifice of religious beliefs, individual moral culture, social observances, principles of government, rationalization of rituals and divining oracles, moral judgements on past events, which the Han court Confucianists presented to the Chinese people of the ages to come, was not built on one plan nor indeed on one foundation. Yet Confucianist tenets became the chief constituent in the Great Tradition. Its sacred books, at first four Scriptures, then five, and finally thirteen, recognized as a Canon, came quickly to be regarded as the basis of authority. When the Emperor came to call for scholars to join the great hierarchy of officials who ruled as his deputies throughout the country, it was men who could prove that they were thoroughly versed in the 'Scriptures' who were chosen. Thus there grew up that sacred trade union of scholars whose glory and whose livelihood were derived from their scripture learning.

(2) The second event which must not be ignored was the intrusion of Buddhism from India and West Asia. It took nearly two hundred years to establish itself, but when it did succeed in doing so it came to exert a very far-reaching influence. There were times in the sixth and seventh centuries when it looked almost as if it might supersede the indigenous faiths of Confucianism and Taoism. To Catholics it must be of the deepest interest, if only because Buddhism achieved what the Taoist contemplatives had failed to achieve, namely the exaltation of the contemplative life under community rule and order. That came to be its chief challenge to Confucianism, for nothing the Confucianist teachers could say prevented large numbers of both men and women seeking their personal salvation without regard to their families.

They sought a higher life, one dedicated at whatever cost of austere renunciation to attaining a completely other-worldly beatitude. Nevertheless the Chinese Great Tradition laid its hand on popular Buddhism and made it subservient to the family interest. There was no tradition of services for the dead in Indian Buddhism, but they became a marked feature in Chinese Buddhism—some say by the Buddhists taking a leaf out of the Nestorian Christians' book. However that may be, it is an established fact that as time went on the narrow Hinayana salvationism was not enough for the main body of Buddhist believers. They required something richer in religious and romantic appeal. Hence the emergence of the Mahayana faith, with its idealized Buddha superimposed on the Buddha of history, with its colourful Bodhisattvas joining with the Buddha in opening paradise to all mankind. On top of this came Ch'an (Zen) Buddhism, with its doctrine of contemplation, a revulsion against all sacraments and rituals and 'dead works' of merit. The believer had only to have faith and wait for the moment of illumination; when it came, he knew, and then he was saved, and nothing could destroy his salvation. In the end the high tide of Buddhist influence receded, and apart from a few noble monasteries in which simple living was combined with high thinking it became a rather commercialized institution for relieving people from their fear of the hereafter. In the main it is outside the Great Tradition, and yet it left its mark on Chinese society as a port of refuge where Confucianism failed to satisfy certain needs of the human soul.

(3) The Sung era (A.D. 960-1279) was by no means a time of peace for the Chinese people and their rulers, yet during those centuries there was a great revival of confidence in the faith of their fathers. So it may rightly be described, for the leaders of this revival so regarded their work. Actually, however, they were reinterpreting the original traditions as found in certain scriptures with a quite new series of emphases. For one thing, the teachings of Confucius himself were elucidated with considerably more rational acumen. For another, the cosmic forces as tradition had envisaged them were reduced to schematic forms, with an emphasis on mathematical reason. But the most significant change came with the men who saw everything and every class of thing functioning by virtue of its own organic principle (*li*). The totality of these *li* constituted reality, and it was possible for man by a prolonged exercise of mental discipline to arrive at

knowledge of this reality. Thus the ancient Confucian emphasis on action, as also on history and its lessons, was pushed rather into the background, and a more philosophical, as also more rationalistic, belief took its place. These neo-Confucianists swore by the ancient scriptures as much as any of the scholars of earlier ages, but they read into them much which they had learned from Taoism and Buddhism. Their movement may be taken as an assertion that there was no need to be a Taoist or a Buddhist and swallow all their outlandish tenets: the Confucianist Way was really the highway for man by which he could become integrated with the great whole of the universe.

It was this Sung reinterpretation of Confucianism which was dominant in the years when the Jesuit missionaries succeeded in making their way into China and in reaching the capital. Its distinctive tenets were the accepted orthodoxy of that time, as they continued to be for another three centuries. In one sense, therefore, that orthodoxy may be taken as embodying the Great Tradition of the Chinese people in its final phase before the inrush of Western science and Western nationalism. Yet in another and very real sense it is not the last word in this matter. From the fifteenth century to the present time there have been voices raised questioning it, and today the searching techniques of historical criticism dig deeper and deeper into the lessons of the past. Both Chinese and foreign scholars come to see how much more varied the ethnical components of the Chinese race are, and how great has been the interplay of divergent philosophies in its history. With this has come a new readiness to reinterpret the Tradition in ways which take into account the other great traditions in the world.¹

In conclusion, how much of this age-old culture can survive the exigent test of China's nationhood in the modern world? It seems generally agreed that there must at least be partial industrialization in China, if she is to attain to a reasonable standard of living. Such a change, with the herding of people in industrial centres to feed the factories, might conceivably mean the death of old traditions, particularly if a rabidly Bolshevik government were in control. In this connexion the position and aims of the Chinese Communist Party are very puzzling. It has in many ways given good evidence

¹ In this field the devoted scholars of the Catholic University in Peiping have won recognition even among the more religiously sceptical scholars in China. They have demonstrated that ripe scholarship and a rational judgement are not incompatible with a Christian faith.

of being Chinese first and Communist only second. Yet the bitterness of the present conflict seems to be driving the leaders more and more to the Russian forms of extremism, including dislike of Christianity. The same attitude of criticism must be maintained towards the Central Government, with its mechanical drift towards Nazi methods of administration. Its victory over its enemies might give a better chance for the old family virtues and the reverence for *T'ien* to survive and achieve new vitality; but I very much doubt it. The truth is, I think, that the old intellectual compromises of the Tradition are not feasible for intelligent men and women in the light of new knowledge, so that the scholar class cannot be the guardian and exponent of the Tradition as it used to be. If the politicians try to take the scholars' place as guardians, as indeed they are trying to do today, their loyalty to tradition is immediately clear as prostituting a spiritual value to material ends. The last word—under God—is with the peasant, inarticulate, superstitious and pagan-minded in religion, and yet conscious of the Power and the Will behind the march of the seasons. He is of the same blood as those peasants of the seventeenth century who were converted to Catholic Christianity, and whose sons and grandsons and great-grandsons in the eighteenth century, when all priests were banned from China, yet continued to practise their religious duties as best they could, and were found carrying on when the foreign priests returned a century later.

NICOLAS BERDYAEV AND THE WEST¹

By J. M. CAMERON

ONE day during the German occupation of France, Nicolas Berdyaev found himself seated on the same bench together with a young German soldier. He asked the young soldier where he came from. Koenigsberg, was the reply. Berdyaev thereupon congratulated him on his fellow-citizenship with Germany's most illustrious philosopher. This produced a puzzled stare; for the young German had never heard of Immanuel Kant. One wonders whether throughout the vast empire of Stalin there was the slightest movement in the minds and hearts of Russians on hearing the news of the death of Berdyaev, if indeed the news was even known; or whether the name Berdyaev meant to the mass of young Russians any more than the name of Immanuel Kant to the young German. It is an indication of the bleakness of the Soviet *régime* that, as early as 1922, one of the most distinguished Russian philosophers should have been expelled and condemned, like so many Russian exiles of the nineteenth century, to do his work, first in Berlin, then in Paris, far from his own country.

We are too close to Berdyaev's work to attempt anything like a final estimate of its value and significance. Nevertheless, as a philosopher and a theologian, as an interpreter of Russian culture, and as a writer who kept at the centre of his thought the problem of the tension between the individual person and the vast, impersonal, social and intellectual structures of our time—a tension the poignancy of which is felt by all in some degree—he was remarkable, and even a partial and provisional estimate of his achievement may be useful. His thought is entangled with the whole movement of thought labelled, rather enigmatically, *personalism*; at one extreme his doctrines touch those of Heidegger and Jaspers and must be classified as Existentialist; at another extreme, especially perhaps in his social doctrines and in his view

¹ Nicolas Berdyaev died at Clamart, near Paris, on 23rd March, 1948. R.I.P.

of the vocation of the Christian man in our day, his thought is close to that of M. Maritain, whose general metaphysical and theological position Berdyaev all the same repudiated with some vehemence. As an interpreter of Russia to the West he had a great reputation in both France and Britain, a reputation which, at least in the field of theology, somewhat unfairly overshadowed the work of such theologians as the late Father Bulgakov, who was perhaps more representative of the general standpoint of the Orthodox Russians in exile. As, year after year, the strange prophetic works issued from the house at Clamart, one wondered at times what his readers in this country were making of this dark rhetoric. Berdyaev was never an easy writer, at least for those accustomed to a dry Western style of exposition, with its habit of definition and articulation in terms of the Aristotelian logic. The definition of his concepts is the entire context in which they are employed. The movement of the argument follows an entirely personal dialectic for which there are no obvious models. The many allusions to ancient and modern philosophers and mystics, and to Russian thinkers for the most part little known in the West, lay a considerable burden even upon those of wide reading in philosophy and related subjects. Most difficult of all, perhaps, Berdyaev does not argue with the reader or strive to bring about an intellectual conviction: he declares a doctrine; and to learn from him means plunging beneath the flood of his rhetoric in the hope that when one comes once more to the surface one will have had an experience upon which one can reflect with profit. Perhaps some among his readers enjoy the mysteriousness of it all, resembling those patrons of the circulating libraries who return, say, Mr. Charles Morgan's *The Fountain* with the rather bemused feeling that something of immense importance has been said, though what precisely has been said is uncertain: at any rate, it was certainly edifying and improving. This is not to deny Berdyaev's gifts or the importance of his thought, but simply to indicate one possible reason for the size of his public.

As I shall try to show, much of Berdyaev's thought rests upon a partial failure to grasp the inward thought of Catholic philosophers and theologians. In this he resembles other thinkers, Bulgakov and Dr. Lampert, for example, among the Orthodox exiles. But the partial failure of Berdyaev and others may be a consequence of our own failures in exposition, of an inability on our part to separate essentials from inessentials, to give to the

structure of Catholic truth an adequate (so far as this is humanly possible) and truly Catholic exposition. A part of the usefulness of examining Berdyaev's work may lie in its being a kind of distorting mirror within which we see ourselves as we really appear to others, rather than as we are, or so we hope, in ourselves; and we may derive from this examination, which is thus a species of self-examination, a standpoint for self-criticism which may have many uses, not least in helping us towards a greater ability to present our doctrine in more winning terms to the separated Christians of the East, and to those Protestants (including those Anglicans who find the world of Orthodox theology more congenial than that of Western theology) who share the same fundamental misconceptions.

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Before we deal with Berdyaev's philosophical thought, we may gain a more complete picture of his work by first examining his rôle as an interpreter of Russia to the West. All his works, not only those devoted explicitly to Russian problems, contain illuminating comments on Russian affairs; and some of his interpretations are of great value to us when we attempt to weigh the significance of developments in Russian internal and foreign policy.

Berdyaev was and remained a member of the Russian intelligentsia. In the West there is no true intelligentsia. This class was the product of peculiarly Russian conditions, not a class in the Marxian sense, but a grouping which shared certain spiritual characteristics. 'The intelligentsia reminds one . . . of a monastic order or sect, with its own very intolerant ethics, its own obligatory outlook on life, with its own manners and customs and even its own particular physical appearance. . . .' The Russian intelligentsia did not profess a single doctrine. Perhaps the one thing its members had in common—certainly it is central in Berdyaev's own thought—was a preoccupation with the problems of suffering and evil. It is this which gives Dostoevsky's work its influence over almost all the non-Marxist members of the Russian intelligentsia. (The enmity of the Marxist intelligentsia is understandable, for in *The Possessed* Dostoevsky portrayed the Bolsheviks before they existed.) In all Berdyaev's books we find frequent references to *The Legend of the Grand Inquisitor* and to Ivan Karamazov's problem of 'the tears of a child': the problem of freedom and, intimately connected with it, the problem of suffering, in particular the

problem of the suffering of the innocent. In Berdyaev's view, the root of atheism in such a thinker as Belinsky was emotional and moral rather than intellectual, and the same is in part true of the atheism of the Bolsheviks. Where, as with Dostoevsky and Berdyaev himself, the atheist solution is rejected, there is an attempt to solve the problem by projecting tragedy and suffering within the interior life of the Godhead, not by a revival of the Patripassian heresy, but by suggesting that the suffering of Christ upon the Cross is the earthly representation of an eternal event in the life of the Blessed Trinity. There is a trace of this view in the writings of Léon Bloy, and this may be one of the reasons why Berdyaev found Bloy, of all modern Catholic writers, the most sympathetic.

Much in the practice, the style, so to speak, of the Bolshevik *régime* Berdyaev explains in terms of the Russian past rather than in terms of Marxism as it stands. Marxism in Western Europe rapidly became 'revisionist', that is, the most radical elements in the theory were soon eliminated and the Marxist parties were content to think of the day of revolution as indefinitely postponed. The same tendency was to be found among the Mensheviks in Russia; but Marxism as it was assimilated to the Russian tradition was Bolshevism. Bolshevism is the fusion of two Messianic conceptions: that of the Messianic proletariat which is to deliver mankind from the ancient burden of suffering and injustice; and that of the Messianic nation, Russia, with Moscow, as the capital city of the world revolution, inheriting the tradition of Moscow as the third and final Rome. The test of membership in the Russian community has always, Berdyaev argues, been that of orthodoxy, and here again the Bolsheviks have inherited the ancient attitude. Theories such as Marxism, which are in the atmosphere of the West taken in a limited sense and given only a pragmatic value were, and are, in Russia given an absolute value and developed with a crazy totalitarian logic. Superficially the atheism of the Bolsheviks, like that of their teacher Marx, depends ideologically upon Western secularism; but it has a passion, a fanaticism, on the whole absent from atheism in the West—a passion and a fanaticism springing from the transformation of materialism from a philosophical hypothesis into an orthodoxy. It may be, therefore, that when, for example, Andrei Zhdanov pontificates on the moral significance of style in music and poetry he is that most terrifying and portentous of figures in world politics: a member of the

nineteenth-century Russian intelligentsia disposing of the power of the State, and determined to use this power for the transformation of men and institutions in accordance with an hypothesis entertained as an orthodoxy.

It may be objected that this way of looking at Bolshevism fails to account for its being an international and not a purely Russian movement. If Berdyaev is right the answer to this objection is that it is in fact a Russian and not an international movement. The Communist parties of the West are so many offshoots of Byzantinism, as much examples of the cultural penetration of the West by Russia as Peter the Great was of the cultural penetration of Russia by the West. And it is noteworthy that the Communist parties, large and small, of the countries of Western Europe do appear to display Russian characteristics, from a Byzantine style in their thinking and feeling to an unpunctuality and dilatoriness in their day-to-day affairs that strike many observers as authentically Russian. If the Communist parties have their Bazarovs and Stavrogins, they also have their Oblomovs.

Although the Russian contribution to culture and politics is today negative, it may nevertheless in the future be a positive contribution to the solution of our problems. Much in the Russian character is a consequence of Russia's having escaped the two great experiences of modern times: the Renaissance, and the Reformation and Counter-Reformation. This may explain the lack of feeling for the fate of individual persons; but the corresponding and counter-balancing Western fault is a lack of feeling for the community. This the Russians have in excess. To a future synthesis of individualism and community-feeling the Russians may have much to contribute in the new Middle Ages that are, if Berdyaev is right, close upon us.

Although Berdyaev had a deep feeling for his own country and hoped that in time to come it would do something towards the building of a new Christendom, he was never a Slavophil and never shared Dostoevsky's belief that Russia was a Messianic nation with something to give to the West but nothing to receive from it. What is in some ways his best book, *The Meaning of History*, a relatively early work founded upon lectures delivered in Moscow in 1919-20 before he was sent into exile, is largely concerned with the problem of the West which Berdyaev rightly saw to be central in our period.

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The Russian intelligentsia of the nineteenth century was greatly concerned with the philosophy of history and Berdyaev has contributed much to the illumination and definition of the problems arising out of it. His contribution in this field is all the more precious because it is a field that has been neglected by Christian thinkers in the West, so much so that one is tempted to think that little work has been done since St. Augustine wrote *The City of God*. Whereas Christian thinkers, especially in recent years, have laboriously and with much success traversed the ground of epistemology and metaphysics in the light of the developments in these subjects since Descartes, the rich territory, from Vico to Collingwood in our own day, of the philosophy of history has not been worked over with the same diligence.

The philosophy of history was important to Berdyaev because he believed that it was above all in historical, rather than in scientific or metaphysical thinking, that human thought went farthest and deepest. Historical knowledge is a kind of *anamnesis* in which man, who is 'a sort of microcosm in which the whole world of reality and all the great historical epochs combine and coexist', fetches up from the depths of the spirit the human past and, as well, 'celestial history', that which is symbolized by the great cosmic myths and by those dogmas of the Church which express in symbolic form the mysteries of the Divine Life and human destiny. A philosophy of history is made possible only by Christianity; for Christianity is the discovery of freedom, something of which the Greeks were entirely ignorant. In consequence of this ignorance the Greeks built up a world-picture in terms of the universal and general, missing the concreteness and particularity of historical life, the agonizing importance of decision, the mysterious claim of freedom; and it is not surprising that they were continually driven to think of the temporal process as cyclical and repetitive. The entry of God into time in the particularity of the unique God-Man suddenly lights up the historical process, and makes us see it as historical for the first time—though there is a continual drift, especially in the West, back towards the unhistorical Greek view of cosmic and human development. All views (that of Leibniz, for example) which assert that reality as a whole is balanced and harmonious, and that what appear to be elements of dramatic tension and suffering are due simply to a partial outlook, represent for Berdyaev a shedding of the peculiar insight of the Christian consciousness and a drifting back to the

pre-Christian view of the Greeks. Tension and tragedy are at the heart of reality: otherwise life would be only a game the end of which was predetermined.

While there is a kind of atavism enticing us back to the un-historical consciousness of the Greeks, the most resolute modern act of rebellion against the historical is the Materialist Conception of History. This is at the same time the completion and the *reductio ad absurdum* of the principles of the Enlightenment. The Enlightenment systematically discredited the spiritual content of tradition, and Marxism only carries this to its bitter conclusion. (Of course, even Marxism does not in fact dispense with mystery, and in particular it is through and through eschatological.) In this way Marxism assists negatively in driving man into a dilemma within which he has to choose: he can choose nihilism, or he can choose to re-establish communication with those depths of his own personality out of which he can draw, in mythical and symbolic form, knowledge concerning his own nature and destiny.

Christianity made historical thinking possible by enabling man to break out of the closed circle of Greek thought. It also liberated man from the power of the demons, from the cosmic forces to which he was bound in paganism. This leads, first, to the Christian humanism which is, in Berdyaev's judgement, the supreme Christian achievement so far: the spirit which breathes in the art of Giotto and the Franciscan *Canticle of the Sun*. But there is in this Christian humanism an immanent dynamic, driving man on to a secular humanism which, splendid as it may be in the work of a Leonardo and a Michaelangelo, is nevertheless superficial and full of peril for the human spirit. Nature becomes 'de-animated', a kind of stage-scenery against which the human drama is played. This nature is that which we encounter in the science of Galileo and Newton, and the contradiction between human freedom and nature conceived as a mechanically-determined system is expressed philosophically in the Kantian division of things into *phenomena*, transparent to human cognition, and *noumena*, which cannot be the object of cognition but only the presuppositions of moral and religious feeling. We are reminded here of the picture of the world of nature in terms of the so-called primary qualities alone, discussed by A. N. Whitehead in *Science and the Modern World*; and Berdyaev independently makes the same point—that the romantic movement was an attempt once again to inject into nature those quasi-organic powers and motions banished from the world

by the Newtonian physics. From the Christian standpoint, what is serious is the loss of a message prominent in the New Testament, though often overlooked: that the scheme of Redemption embraces the entire creation, that the process initiated in time by the Incarnation is the redemption of the Cosmos as well as of mankind, that Christ is the King of Creation as well as the Head of redeemed humanity. This is coming to be recognized more widely in the West (see, for example, the Collect for the Feast of Christ the King), but the truth of it is not felt so deeply as in the Christian East, perhaps because there the influence of humanism and of the scientific revolution has been more superficial.

The tragedy of our period is that man has lost the clue to the knowledge of his own nature and thus runs into two dangers. One is that he may once again fall into servitude to the demons, as in the ancient world. (Berdyayev warned Europe of this danger as early as 1920, long before the rise of German National-Socialism.) The other, perhaps more urgent in the West and in Soviet Russia too, is that he may be enslaved by the new technical forces of the age of machinery. Just as Christianity once rescued man from the power of the demons, so now its positive task is to guard man from new and more terrible servitudes. It can do this because the knowledge of God which Christianity alone can bring enables man to know himself. 'The paradox holds true that man reveals and affirms himself only when he submits himself to a supernatural principle which becomes the content of his life. His repudiation of it, on the other hand, only leads to his perdition. . . .' And again: 'To affirm himself, and preserve the source of his creative energy, man must affirm God as well. He must affirm the image of God within him. . . . But when the human personality will admit no authority but itself, it disintegrates, allowing the intrusion of the lowest natural elements which consume it.'

The idea of historical progress Berdyayev considers trivial, as much in its Christian forms as in its more naïve and secularized forms. History is a tragedy, it will always be marked by tension and suffering. Judged by the criterion of what ought to be, history is of necessity a failure; but it is a 'sacred failure', since every moment of pain and unresolved tension is a summons to man to recognize that he has a destiny beyond history. But although all theories of progressive improvement are to be rejected, history is eschatological, as even a false philosophy of history like that of Marxism is compelled to admit. The end of history does not lie

within history itself; the Kingdom of God is at once the consummation and the abolition of the agony of the historical process.

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In all his work Berdyaev shows himself sensitive to what he considers the excessive rationalism of Catholic philosophers and theologians. In his earlier work his criticisms are made firmly, but they show a sense of balance. In his later work (in *Slavery and Freedom*, for example) there is at times a certain loss of balance. The tone is shriller, and the argument is more shot through with torment and rebellion. He seems totally to deny the possibility of a valid metaphysics. All metaphysical schemes, all ontologies, are forms of *objectivization*. For the later Berdyaev, as for Kierkegaard, truth lies in subjectivity, and God is infinite subjectivity. Reality is concrete and personal, a Divine-Human communion of persons. All generalization, all that is impersonal and universal, as in metaphysics and the natural sciences, is falsification of a reality which is concrete and for ever inexpressible in terms of concepts, transparent only to the eyes of love. Although Berdyaev was never a Platonist and came to consider all Platonism, including that of Solovyev, simply one more example of objectivization, he resembles Plato in one respect: he believes that whatever is deepest in human life can be spoken about only in the language of myth, only symbolically. Any use of the symbol as the first term in a process of formal logic is bound to lead to falsehood and absurdity; and precisely this, in Berdyaev's view, is the error of much Catholic theology. It treats symbols and mysteries as concepts transparent to the human reason, and in this way materializes the Faith, petrifies it, reduces it to a mechanical system.

Objectivization has its most ruinous consequences in the doctrine of God. Sociomorphism, itself the outcome of objectivization in our thinking about society, leads to a radical misconception of the Divine Nature. God is, for sociomorphic thought, a supreme ruler standing in the same relation to his creation as a tyrant to a servile society. Men are thought to be puppets, slaves, and not free persons, the idea of punishment is externalized, and power rather than love becomes the essential relationship between God and man. The Aristotelian metaphysics, another way of objectivization, brings about very much the same result. The Divine Nature is conceived as immobile, a frozen perfection, and thus both the eternal self-giving which is the interior life of the Blessed Trinity,

and the Divine self-giving in the Incarnation and the Redemption, are implicitly denied. (God for Berdyaev is always the *coincidentia oppositorum*, if we must think conceptually of the Divine Nature.) Thomist theology, it is argued, never rids itself of Aristotelianism. Even in *Freedom and the Spirit*, one of his most beautiful works, he can write that 'St. Thomas Aquinas . . . completely rejected freedom, for which his scholasticism leaves no place whatever'; and in *Slavery and Freedom* his verdict is even harsher.

One can see very well what it is that troubles Berdyaev. A rationalistic theology devitalizes Christianity, locks it away in a cupboard, and fails to establish an existential relationship between the person and the mysteries of faith. A typical statement is: 'The dogma of the consubstantiality of the Father and the Son is not a doctrine, but the expression of a mystical fact indispensable to my life.' Whatever the Faith may be, it is certainly not a collection of logically integrated propositions. This urge to rid theology of a brittle rationalism underlies what is perhaps the most unsatisfactory feature of Berdyaev's theology, his doctrine of God. Time and again he returns with longing and with a half-conviction to Boehme's doctrine of the *Ungrund*, a dark void existing over against God, a 'mysterious and irrational world-principle' which the Logos illuminates, but which nevertheless seems to possess a certain right of resistance even to the Logos. As we have already seen, Berdyaev plants suffering and tragedy at the centre of the Divine Life, and holds that this is of the essence of Christian Faith. Certainly, these are deep matters, and superficial solutions tempt one in return to emphasize paradoxes in an extravagant fashion. Berdyaev did not see that all attempts to plant suffering or irrationality within the Godhead, or to set an *Ungrund* over against God, are themselves rationalistic in the highest degree, attempts to explain in terms of concepts drawn from human experience what must for ever escape and lie beyond these concepts. Everything that Berdyaev could have wanted in the way of humble and yet significant speech upon such a mystery can be found in some words once written by the late Dom John Chapman: "He cannot feel"; but in God's infinite Perfection is the exemplar of all that we know as perfect, only in a higher way. So, in His Impassibility, is all that is perfect in *wounded love*. In His fullness, Love is not an abstraction, but Love in the concrete; Love hypostatic, Love including all acts and passions of Love.' This is not 'Western' or 'Eastern' theology: it is Christian theology.

It would be easy to multiply quotations from Western theologians to show that Berdyaev misunderstood much and was often unjust. The fact remains that Berdyaev and other Eastern Christians misunderstand so persistently that we must conclude that there is at least a ground for their misunderstanding, if not a complete justification of it. I believe that the ground is to be found, not so much in what is said—if we disregard the feebleness of manuals and ephemeral pamphleteering—as in a certain atmosphere, a tone, a way of putting things, characteristic of much modern Catholic writing not of the first class. Theology ought to be written in such a way as to make it plain that the writer is as much on his knees as seated at his desk. At times theological writings convey, perhaps misleadingly, a most painful impression of jauntiness. Whatever may be under discussion, the Sacraments, the Church, the Incarnation, one is given, again perhaps misleadingly, the impression that the writer is dealing with objects that can be thought about in exactly the same way as botanical specimens or political constitutions, rather than with mysteries that stretch the human intellect to its limit, and then remain as inexhaustible in their mystery as before. Even expositions of the classic theologian of the West, St. Thomas Aquinas, can easily betray his spirit. How often is his *Quid deus est nescimus* noted and thereupon forgotten!

We of the West must be prepared readily to admit our faults, but we are entitled to say in return that any attempt on our part to find more acceptable language, and to redress over-emphases due to historical causes, presupposes in the Orthodox the *will* to understand. It is not clear that this will to understand is always there. I believe it is often present in Berdyaev. But what are we to say of the chapter on 'Western Theology' in Dr. Lampert's *The Divine Realm*? Such radical misunderstandings would have been pardonable fifty years ago. Now the misunderstanding appears culpable, and denotes not so much a failure to understand as a lack of the desire to understand.

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Unlike Solovyev, Berdyaev never found his way even to the threshold of the Church. And yet we hesitate to place him in as remote a situation from the Church as a Schleiermacher or a Barth. In some ways he is a modern Origen who, heretic as he may have been, is nevertheless in many respects to be numbered

among the Fathers. It may also be salutary to reflect that even the greatest theologians, an Augustine, for example, are orthodox not in themselves, that is, if we consider their 'systems' as isolated creations, but only within the vast and complex structure of Catholic truth, a structure which has its own dynamic, the indwelling Life of the Holy Spirit, a structure never free from those tensions grounded in the limitations of human understanding, for ever polarized between the inadequacies of our conceptual thinking about the Divine Mysteries and the ineffable Nature of God Himself. Professor Gilson says very finely of our thinking about God:

Tous ces jugements vrais orientent donc notre entendement vers un même pôle, dont la direction nous est connue, mais que parce qu'il est à l'infini, nos forces naturelles ne nous permettent pas d'atteindre. Car ce n'est aucunement l'atteindre que de multiplier les propositions affirmatives qui le désignent, mais ce n'est ni parler pour rien, ni perdre notre peine, puisque c'est au moins nous tourner vers lui.

Could Berdyaev have recognized that here we have the authentic, the deepest, the central note of Catholic theology and philosophy, his thought would have been at least more balanced, more complete. That he failed to recognize this was his own loss. It may have been in some measure our responsibility.

JAIME BALMES

1810—1848

By ROBERT SENCOURT

LOYALTY to civic and national authority is an obvious duty of Christians: but in our present days of organized nationalism that may easily lead us to forget there are limits to what a Christian owes to a government; and it is the more complex for Catholics in a Protestant country at a time when Protestantism is degenerating into materialism. The Spanish philosopher Ramiro de Maeztù said that the effect of Protestantism on civilization would best be judged by the effect of the two great Protestant nations of Europe—Great Britain and Germany—upon one another. Now when, after destructive wars between them, one is utterly prostrate and the other has lost the momentum of her prosperity, we may well go back to the two philosophers Maeztù most admired—Don Juan Donoso Cortés and Don Jaime Luciano Balmes. For both foresaw the cataclysms of today, both saw a connexion between Protestantism and democracy, and each of these degenerating into Socialism. And the name of Balmes the more urgently invites our attention, not only because he was the greater of the two, but because Spain is this year celebrating the centenary of his death in July 1848.

Contrasting Balmes with Donoso Cortés, Menéndez y Pelayo says that Balmes has the Catalan mind, patient, methodical, decidedly more analytic than synthetic, lit by the torch of common-sense, always attached to the reality of things from which he gathered strength, like Antaeus from contact with the earth. He never makes a false step, never cuts short the procedures of dialectics, never offers images in the place of ideas, never allows an idea to be maintained without explaining it, never jumps the chains of connexions, ever walks on with a step assured. With him there is no danger of losing the way, because his special gifts are those of precision and certainty. He is not an elegant writer but a scrupulous one; while Donoso Cortés, on the other hand, was a controversial-

ist rather than a philosopher, and an orator rather than a controversialist. You cannot possibly take his pages for those of anyone else, and where he is none enters but kings. When he speaks or writes it is, as it were, by flashes of lightning.

Balmes and Donoso, continues Menéndez y Pelayo, accomplished different tasks, both equally necessary. Donoso, the man whose work was fire, strikes like the hammer as an ecclesiastic and doctrinaire; Balmes, the man of severe reasons and methods, without spark of style, but with the overwhelming weight of systematic certainty, inaugurated the rehabilitation of Spain's philosophy which seemed to be buried for ever in the sensual bog of the past; with the juice of new ideas he has renewed the sap in the tree of national culture, and thought out things on his own account at times when no one thought, neither on his own account nor on anyone else's; he looked the foreign systems full in the face and set his hand to the restoration of scholastic philosophy, a work which was never fully completed by other thinkers; and, more than any other, he made speculative studies popular in Spain, giving innumerable men an interest in them, and developing in them the germ of curiosity, without which no one can make progress in science. In one immortal book he set out the laws of practical logic; in another he vindicated the Catholic Church in regard to international civilization.

To a people prone to fall back into barbarism these two writers gave the bread of intellectual life. While men were tearing one another to pieces like wild beasts, these two made men look inwards. When politicians were crudely empirical, or drily utilitarian, these led him from such ways to study the great ideas which govern culture and society. Politics was to neither a mere science. These men set their hope in God, wrote not for their present hour, put little confidence in persons or in systems, set all their hopes on moral regeneration, on the infusion into life of the spirit. They made no compromise with error, nor yet with the injustice which was too often applauded and exalted. If they passed the political scene, it was as though they were pilgrims of another and a higher commonwealth. They might differ in details; in their essentials they came always together, and inevitably, because illumined by the same faith and fired by the same love and charity.

II

Balmes was a Catalan. He died in his native town of Vich, near Barcelona. There he lived the greater part of his youth, continuing his studies at the University of Cervera, where he advanced to take the degree of Doctor of Law. Shortly after the age of thirty he had become a figure not only Catalan but national; for with a singular eloquence, ease and individual energy he defended the Catholic position. In his range and enthusiasm he seemed like a Spanish successor of Chateaubriand or a Spanish precursor of Newman. In a Spain torn already by Carlist wars and the *pronunciamientos* of ambitious generals, in those violent days which marked the childhood of Queen Isabella II, he came forward to vindicate the Spanish and Catholic tradition against the excesses of its enemies. As Chateaubriand had revealed the worth and beauty of Catholic genius, so Balmes, with a swift and subtle union of thought and imagination, proclaimed the rights which men had been ignoring, and a case which was being too easily lost by default. There was in the minds of both Balmes and Chateaubriand the geniality and elevation which combine to inspire eloquence. Both rose on the wings of genius to a height so far above party passions that they inspired a general regard and respect. But of the two Balmes was far the nobler character. He lived the life of an ascetic and a priest. His exact and vigorous mind was strengthened and exalted by prayer and meditation. And these added their special addition to the tireless energy of his faculties—an energy which even today is a very general quality of the life of Spain, and not the least of its intellectual life.

There was in Balmes from the first a taste for the ranging and noble occupations both of mind and heart. At a time when intellectual power had weakened into convention he had a certain predilection for the depths and heights, and, with these, a sensibility to beauty which made his feelings more delicate and more intense. The life around him was too narrow for such a talent and genius. He ranged over the tendencies of civilization and the subtleties of philosophy. And as champion of the Catholic religion he restored to the Spaniards not only a confidence but an enthusiasm for those things which the richer nations of the nineteenth century were inclined to regard as the driftwood of faith's ebbing sea. The glow, the fervour, and the elevation of his genius marked his whole

personality; its attraction is still visible for us in two statues, one by Bover in the cloisters of Vich cathedral, the other by Alcoverro in the Ministry of Education at Madrid. Both show a man well built of leanness and vigour, with handsome features, which kept a look of thoughtful yet confident youth. The expression is marked by frankness and sincerity, and the whole figure bears an easy dignity. His pale face, they tell us, was not devoid of the hues of health, and his eyes had a deep searching gaze. Such was the man who, dying a hundred years ago at the age of thirty-eight, had already won the titles of the Chateaubriand and the Lamennais of Spain, whose name reminded the Catalans of Ramon Lull, and the Castilians of Vives, Vitoria and Suárez, the man whom Menéndez y Pelayo described as a grand and unique apparition in the Catalonia of his time.

III

Before Ferdinand VII died, in 1833, he abrogated the Salic law in favour of his baby daughter Isabel, thus depriving his brother, Don Carlos, of the throne. Isabel was placed in the guardianship of her young mother, Cristina, who promptly forfeited her rights to the regency by secretly marrying a corporal in her bodyguard, Don Fernando Muñoz. When Cristina's general, Espartero, defeated the Carlists the Regent made him Duke of the Victory. But hardly had she done so before, taking advantage of her secret marriage to Muñoz, he tried to dethrone her. 'I have made you a Duke,' was her comment, 'but I could not make you a gentleman,' and in 1842 the Regent was driven into exile with her husband. Spain depended for her stability on the girl Queen making a suitable marriage.

At this point Balmes came forward in beleaguered Barcelona as a political writer. To his periodical he gave a title which might be taken as the motto for all his work, *El Pensamiento de la Nación*. He had already summed up his political ideas in a short clear treatise called *Consideraciones Políticas*. It was his hope that the Queen would unify Spain by marrying the son of Don Carlos, the Count of Montemolin. But the truth was that the young man's chances were fatally compromised by his relatives; and the young Queen's mother, the *Reina Gobernadora*, was still more set against his Coburg rival: '*Les Anglais de la Revolution nous menacent*,' she

cried. And here Louis Philippe found his opportunity. He had good reason to believe, as he told Guizot, that the young Queen's first cousin, Don Francisco de Asís, the Duke of Cadiz, would have no children, and if his own son, the Duc de Montpensier, therefore married the Queen's younger sister, Doña Fernanda, the grandchildren of Louis Philippe might draw together the crowns of France and Spain. The *Reina Gobernadora* fell in with this unhappy proposal, and Spain passed perforce through a fresh succession of factions and disorders. When the marriage ceremony took place Balmes gave up *El Pensamiento*, disheartened, and devoted the two remaining years of his life to a final book on philosophy and a defence of the liberal policy of Pio Nono. That had been preceded in 1846 by *Filosofía Fundamental*, as that again by his book on *Protestantism Compared with Catholicism in its relation to European Civilization*. This, his most famous work, appeared in 1844.

In it, too, he sets out the political ideas of *El Pensamiento*. The three elements of a State are monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy. To each of these the Church gives soundness. She makes monarchy, not a despotism, but a centre of unity. She encourages an aristocracy of talent and function, and she teaches the people that though each man has his essential dignity, yet she does not encourage roughness and revolution for which the passions of the mob so easily clamour. And among these three orders moves in the spirit of adjustment and of charity a clergy drawn from all members of society. If there is not a strong Church, men quickly assert the authority of their own order, till it becomes absolute power.

IV

The book as a whole was both a defence of Spain's Catholic tradition and an argument against the themes of Thierry and Guizot; these, in pondering the issues of history and enlivening them with more interesting conceptions, had carried on a work initiated almost a hundred years earlier by Voltaire. But to Guizot, as to most Englishmen, the secret of progress was Protestantism. So wealthy were the Protestant nations, so great was their political power, so rapid had been the extension in that earlier age of mechanized transport, that their success seemed to many to provide an overwhelming evidence of the rightness of their ideas. It was to correct certain theses of Guizot that Balmes produced his

arguments in a book which was assessed by Menéndez y Pelayo as '*el primer libro español de este siglo*', the supreme Spanish work of the nineteenth century. It was a book hailed by the foremost Cardinals of the time, Pecci and Wiseman, and a favourite with the then Pope Pius IX.

Though Guizot was no sectarian propagandist, he had been inclined in his lectures on European civilization to regard the Reformation as an expansive movement of man's mind and liberty, and argued that it led not only to an emancipation of the spirit, but to the scientific and moral advancement of the nations professing it. Balmes opposed this with the thesis that for the freedom, civilization, and advancement of peoples the Church worked with a constant beneficence; Protestantism, he argued, had twisted awry the majestic growth of Christian civilization, both sacking the old world and invading the new. It had encouraged, not mitigated, the already dangerous ambitions of factions and of princes.

He analysed the motives of individualism and the feeling of personal dignity which Guizot considered characteristic of barbarians, and set it forth as the legitimate result of the Christian religion, operating on human nature, transforming it, and restoring man to his original dignity. And thence Balmes proceeded to show how the Church had first controlled, then abolished, slavery, had given stability to property, had defended the family and the marriage tie, had raised the status of women, had mitigated the rigours of poverty and misfortune, and had established the power of the state on the unshakable base of law and justice as gifts of heaven.

The arguments in favour of Catholicism take two main lines: that of referring to the main tendencies of civilization before the Reformation, and then of comparing the two religions and their influences on civilization; and civilization is composed of three elements, the individual, the family, and society.

It is in tracing the effects of religion on these that Balmes was most original. Never, he argued, was the dignity of the individual set so high as by the Catholic system, never was the family safeguarded so well, or the passion of love so carefully led into the paths of lasting happiness, and never was there so sound an influence upon the public conscience, for it carefully applied a morality, cordial, constant, and applicable to all the acts of our souls. The Church had made manners gentler, and encouraged philan-

thropy while restraining error and vice; religious institutions had been centres of civilization, education and beneficence, and not least the Church had guided, modified, and sustained the civil power.

He began by pointing out how marvellously Catholic thought combined the order of thought with health and variety. He compared the unifying power of the faith over widely varied minds to the sun in relation to the planets:—‘As globes of fire revolving in their vast orbits in the midst of immensity are yet always drawn to their centre by a mysterious attraction, that central force, which allows no aberration, takes from them nothing of their extent or the grandeur of their movement, but inundates them with light, while giving to their motion a more majestic regularity.’¹ Nor was that all. It is in the constitution of the human mind to accept the leadership of outstanding genius: why then cavil at the leadership of One who raised human genius and character to the scale of the Divine?

Balmes, by no means unjust to the Protestant successes, was well aware that in historical Protestantism there had been thought and vigour. As far as preaching was concerned, it was not that of supernatural authority, but that of men clothed in black who mount the pulpit every Sunday to preach reasonable things: yet he admitted that at least the Protestant peoples had continued to hear some fragments of the moral discourses contained in the sacred scriptures; they had before their eyes the edifying examples spread over the Old and New Testaments, and what is still more precious, they were reminded frequently of the life of Jesus Christ, ‘that admirable life, the model of all perfection which, even when considered from a human point of view, was acknowledged by all the purest holiness, the noblest code of morality that was ever seen, the realization of the finest ideals that philosophy has ever conceived or poetry imagined in its most brilliant dreams. This, we say, is useful and highly salutary.’²

He saw, furthermore, how England added a combination of political with commercial sagacity. She has made progress in the arts and sciences: she exercises immense power; she has extended her influence widely and applies it with extraordinary discretion. She has an instinctive knowledge of evil and dangers, and guards against them by able measures and compromises. ‘Her internal peace is not disturbed by the agitation and heat of disputes;

¹ *Protestantism*, Ch. III.

² *Protestantism*, Ch. XII.

although she may expect to encounter, sooner or later, difficulties and embarrassments, she enjoys in the meantime the tranquillity which is secured to her by her constitution, her manners, her riches: and above all by the ocean which surrounds her.¹ But Balmes saw also that there was in the grandeur of England a hidden subtlety of self-interest.

Placed in so advantageous a position, that nation watches the progress of others for the purpose of attaching them to her car with golden chains, if they are simple enough to listen to her flattery; at least, she attempts to hinder their advance when a noble independence is about to free them from her influence. Always attentive to her own aggrandisement by means of the arts and commerce, and by a policy essentially mercantile, she hides her self-interest under all sorts of disguises; and although religions and politics, when she has to do with another people, are quite indifferent to her, she knows how to make use of those powerful measures to make friends, to defeat her enemies, and to enclose all within the net of commerce which is always extending to all quarters of the world. Let it not be forgotten that there is no other nation which conceives its plans with so much principle, prepares them with so much prudence, executes them with so much ability and perseverance. She has been able to follow a regular political system both internal and external; and her politicians have been formed to the perfect science of government, constantly inheriting the experience and views of their predecessors.¹

And what is it that would save Spain or indeed give security to any nation?

The means of saving a nation by delivering it from interested protectors, of securing her real independence, are to be found in great and generous ideas deeply rooted in the people, in feelings engrained in their hearts by the action of time, by the influence of powerful institutions, by ancient manners and customs; in fine, in that unity of religious thought which makes a whole people as one man. Then the past is united with the present, the present is connected with the future; then arises in the mind that enthusiasm which is the source of great deeds, then is found disinterestedness, energy and constancy, because ideas are fixed and elevated, because hearts are great and generous.²

And though, owing to the combination of many subtle qualities in the English character, it had for centuries been able to combine Protestantism with the virtues inherent in the undivided Christian tradition, he must, as a Spaniard, insist how essential undivided Catholicism, in its solidity and fervour, was for natures so violent

¹ Protestantism, Ch. XII.

² Protestantism, Ch. XII.

and extreme as Spaniards are wont to be. Those who saw Spain in her last republic and its final cataclysm know how cogent are his warnings, and what revolt against the Church meant to Spain.

Then would resound in our ears, with a force constantly increasing, the fierce declamations which we have heard for several years; the vain threatenings of a party which are delirious because they are on the point of expiring. The aversion with which the country regards the pretended Reformation, we have no doubt, could be looked upon as rebellion; the pastorals of bishops as insidious persuasion; the fervent zeal of our priests as sedition; the unanimity of Catholics to preserve themselves from contagion would be denounced as a diabolical conspiracy devised by intolerance and party spirit, and executed by ignorance and fanaticism. And in the efforts of one party and the resistance of the other we should see enacted, in a greater or less degree, the scenes of times gone by. We must not forget that, with respect to religion in Spain, we cannot calculate on the coldness and indifference which other nations are displaying on a similar occasion. With the latter, religious feelings have lost much of their force, but in Spain they are still deep, lively and energetic; and if they were to come into open and avowed opposition to each other, the shock would be violent and general. Although we have witnessed lamentable scandals and even fearful catastrophes in religious matters, yet, up to this time, perverse intentions have always been concealed by a mask more or less transparent. Sometimes the attack has been made against somebody charged with political machinations, sometimes against certain classes of citizens who were charged with imaginary crimes. If, formerly, the revolution exceeded its bounds, it was said that it was impossible to restrain it; and thus the vexations, the insults and the outrages heaped up on all that was most grand upon earth were only the inevitable result and the work of a mob that nothing could restrain. There has always been more or less of a disguise; but if the dogmas of Catholicism were attacked and with *sang froid*; if the most important points of discipline were trodden under foot, if the most august mysteries were turned into ridicule and the most holy ceremonies treated with contempt; if church were raised against church and pulpit against pulpit, what would be the result? It is certain that minds would be very much exasperated, and if, as might be feared, alarming explosions did not ensue, at least religious controversy would assume a character so violent that we should believe ourselves carried back to the sixteenth century.¹

Catholicism is essential to the life of Spain, and to the traditions which the growth of populations has now made so important in Spanish America. On this tradition of religious unity Balmes speaks with an eloquence due to so impressive a fact in history:

¹ Protestantism, Ch. XII.

That unity which is identified with our habits, our customs, our manners, our laws; which guarded the cradle of our monarchy, in the caverns of Covadonga, and which was the emblem on our standard during a struggle of eight centuries against the formidable crescent. That unity which developed and illumined our civilization in times of greatest difficulty; that unity which followed our terrible *tercios* when they imposed silence upon Europe, which led our sailors when they discovered the New World and when for the first time they made the circuit of the world, that unity which sustained soldiers in their heroic exploits. . . . Will you consent to see dried up the most abundant fountains to which we can have recourse to revive our literature, to strengthen science, to reorganize legislation, to re-establish the spirit of nationality, to restore our glory and replace this nation in the high position which her virtues merit, by restoring to her the peace and happiness which she seeks with so much toil, and which her heart desires?¹

His second argument for the Church was that where dangers are portentous, where the crimes and miseries of men are appalling, there you need a solid church to weld past and future into a chain of triumphant beneficence. That was shown him first in the history of Spain; but he had also a prophetic sense of a doom impending over northern countries, when blind force gathered together by Russian despotism would turn 'that covetous and crafty look which characterizes the march of all invading Empires', and make an attempt on the independence of Europe.

For, like Donoso Cortés, Balmes had his prophetic moments. As the former foresaw the menace of a Russia which, even in its victory, was defeated by itself, so Balmes was prophetic in showing how sinister for itself would also be the power of a Germany which revolt from Christian order had already led astray.

The sin of nations sometimes fills up the measure of the patience of the Most High. The sound of human offences mounts to heaven and calls for vengeance; the Eternal in His fearful anger sends down fire upon the earth; then strikes the fatal hour in their secret and infinite resolves, and the son of perdition, who is to cover the world with mourning and desolation, appears. As the cataracts of heaven were formerly opened to sweep the human race from the face of the earth, so are the calamities which the God of Vengeance holds in reserve for the day of His anger poured forth from their urn and scattered over the world. The son of perdition raises his voice; that moment is marked by the beginning of the catastrophe. The spirit of evil moves over the whole face of the globe, bearing on his sable pinions the echo of that ominous voice. An incomprehensible giddi-

¹ Protestantism, Ch. XII.

ness takes possession of men's heads; the nations have eyes and see not, they have ears and hear not; in their delirium, the most frightful precipices appear to them sweet, peaceful and flowery paths; they call good evil, and evil good. They drink with fevered eagerness the poisoned cup; forgetfulness of all the past, ingratitude for all benefits seize all minds; the work of the genius of evil is consummated; the prince of rebellion shrinks away again from himself into the empire of darkness.¹

His work was continued after his death by Donoso in his *Essay on Catholicism, Liberalism and Socialism*; but there it inevitably took on a different flavour. There, in the glow of a genial and imaginative mind, the dangers of socialism and its power to sap the energies of the state were contrasted with that menacing consolidation of the Slav world which history, a hundred years later, has seen invited into key positions in Europe by the impatience of nations proclaiming socialism and democracy. Donoso foresaw this Slav invasion a hundred years ago, and with it general ruin. For he saw already that the Slav absolutism was too crude to prove salutary even to itself.

V

As for the philosophy of Balmes, it was a refutation of Locke, Hume, de Condillac, Kant, Fichte, Schelling, and Spinoza. He followed St. Thomas in saying that it is by the divine light that we see what we do see. He defended the thesis that there are no ontological distinctions between essence and existence. And he is—as opposed to the modern Thomist, M. Maritain—very favourable to Descartes, because he thought Descartes had been misinterpreted. For to Descartes the word 'think' did not merely mean 'reflect', it meant 'be conscious', and without consciousness how could any of us say anything? He is equally sympathetic to Leibnitz when considering extension and space; but, for a religious mind such as his, philosophy found itself completed and corrected by a divine light.

Original Sin is a mystery, but it explains the whole world; the Incarnation is a mystery, but it explains the traditions of the human race; faith is full of mysteries, but it satisfies one of the greatest necessities of reason; the history of creation is a mystery, but this mystery clears up chaos, throws light on the world and is the key to the history of mankind: Christianity is a collection of mysteries,

¹ Protestantism, Ch. XLII.

but these mysteries are connected by a secret union with all that is profound, grand, sublime, beautiful or tender in heaven or on earth; they are connected with the individual, with the family, with society, with God, with the understanding, with the heart, with languages, science and art. The investigator who rejects religion and even seeks means to oppose it finds it at the entrance, as at the outlet, of mystery: at the cradle of the child or at the shadow of the tomb, in time or in eternity; explaining everything by a word; listening unmoved to the wanderings of ignorance and the sarcasms of unbelief, waiting undisturbed till the unrolling ages shall acknowledge its truth as one which was established secure before time began its course.¹

Equally typical of Balmes and not less attractive is his chapter on the aspirations of the human soul. The soul, he says, echoing Bossuet's classic sermon on *La Mort*, is not satisfied with conceptions, nor yet with objects given in immediate intuition; it looks before and after; it seeks the light whose smile kindles the universe; it finds its highest pleasure in transcending its own faculties; for its activity is greater than its strength; and following both Wordsworth and St. John of the Cross, he tells us that it is through nature that we enter into communion with the Infinite. Sit on a lonely shore, and listen to the waves and wind; stand alone in the forest or the desert, watch in the silent night the stars tranquilly pursuing their appointed course through ages.

Without effort or labour of any kind, abandon yourself to the spontaneous movements of your soul and you will see how feelings spring upon it and move it in its very centre: how they exalt it above itself and absorb it in immensity. Its individuality vanishes from its own eyes as it feels the harmony presiding over the immense creation—that calm, grand, deep feeling which masters us at such a time has no relation to single things; it is the opening of the soul to the impulses of nature, as the flower opens to the morning sun; it is a divine attraction by which the Author of all things who created us raises us above the earth in which we live our short days. The heart and the understanding chime together: the one has a foretaste of what the other knows: and we perceive, in ways how different, that our faculties transcend our earthly orbit.²

Kindred to this is his eloquent definition of creative genius; while talent shows taste, discernment, and skill, and concentrated purpose, genius is not subject to the creator's will: it domineers over him and consumes his existence as a fire destroys

¹ *Filosofia*, Book III, Ch. XXXIII.

² *Op. cit.*, Ch. XVIII.

a cage; it is an instinct, spontaneous and grand, working in the innermost subtleties of the soul.¹

The philosophy of Balmes is summed up in the two works *El Cr terio* and *Filosof a Fundamental*. The first of these was translated into French and published in 1860 as *L'Art d'arriver au Vrai*. Its main argument was that which Newman in *The Grammar of Assent* applied to belief; that it is not by logic only that we arrive at truth, not by 'notional assents', as Newman called them, but by perceptions made vital by experience, and worked into the stuff of life. Example, therefore, must follow precept; and as to give an idea its full outline it must be related to previous experience, so to attain its full validity it must be thought out and related to feelings and to images, and warmed by passion. And yet, says Balmes, even so one must beware: for men of genius are often carried too far by their own * lan*:

The true poets, that is to say the men endowed by the Creator with a lofty intelligence, a powerful imagination, a soul of fire, are above all liable to be carried away by their own momentary impressions. They soar sometimes, doubtless, in the highest regions of thought; doubtless they are able to control their flight and to judge prudently; but one cannot deny that more than other men they need great will-power and reflection.²

The thought of Balmes always leads us beyond mere thought: and observe as we will, do we not soon find ourselves confronting mystery? Nature, he says, hides from us the greatest number of her secrets; the things which seem easiest to know still escape both their essence and their constituent principles. This universe, whose immensity startles our intelligence, we know not what it is; we do not know what our body is, or what the spirit which animates it; we are ourselves an enigma which only faith can solve. Men know that science in spite of all its efforts, in spite of the most scientific and careful analysis, has not been able up to now to grasp the phenomena which constitute life and impress us as life. They recognize that the most precious fruit of our enquiries, of our reflections, of every kind of toil, is a profound conviction of our weakness and ignorance; they admit that a sound philosophy, no less than religious faith, requires us to moderate our longings for knowledge and observation, and to distrust the energy and

¹ *Op. cit.*, Ch. XIX.

² *Cr terio*, Ch. XIX, 8.

luminance of our minds; they are forced in fact to recognize that what we learn from religion raises us, even as children, to regions which all the efforts of human wisdom, extended over several centuries, have not been able to attain.

If this is true of religion in general, how much truer, he insisted, is it of the Catholic religion! What is the alternative to accepting it? The speculations and questions of philosophy? or the controversy of innumerable sects, each arguing for itself? But, on the other hand, how many are the good reasons which faith can produce to her support! The needs of our hearts, our religious instincts, our needs as individuals, our needs as society, all are satisfied in Catholicism! The law it imposes on us is full of mildness; it is just and true as well as beneficent. He who fulfils it becomes like the angels. He approaches ideal beauty, and makes the highest poetry that man can dream a reality within himself. This law consoles us in our misfortunes; it gives us peace in times of difficulty; it closes our eyes in eternal rest; and the nearer we are to death the more certain and manifest is the truth of its power. Providence in its goodness has given faith's sweetest and most consoling inspirations to the borders of the tomb, to warn us, like heralds, that we are about to cross the threshold of eternity.¹

What, then, is the conclusion of *El Critério*?

The art of arriving at the truth is the first and most useful of all the arts; the one art which is really practical. The truth of things is the reality of things; truth in the understanding is the knowledge of that which is; truth in the will is straightforwardness; it is the acceptance of healthy ethical rules; truth in conduct is to act according to the laws of a right will. For him who seeks an end in life, truth is, with due regard to circumstances, decency and justice; in short, in the choice of means, truth is the morality of these means, and their aptitude to attain the end in view.

As there are different sorts of reality, so there are different sorts of truth, different ways of arriving at truth. We cannot consider all things in the same way: but should take each in the way we can best grasp it. Man is the master of many faculties; none is useless, none is bad in itself; but if we make bad use of them, if they seem useless or malign, the fault is ours. A sound logic takes into account the whole of man; for truth is related to man's every faculty; to develop one and neglect another is often to harm the first by paralysing the second. Man is a little world within himself. His faculties are many and diverse; he needs to harmonize them; but to harmonize means a due combination of all, and there is no due combination unless each is in its place and neither moves nor stops

¹ *Critério*, Ch. XXI, 15.

of itself. Man is a harp : his faculties are its chords ; if there are some of them which never come into play, the instrument is defective. It jars if a string is too taut, or is played by a clumsy hand.

Reason is cold, but it sees clear ; warm it, but do not obscure its clearness. The passions are blind, but they are instinct with energy ; give them direction and take advantage of their energy. With the understanding in subjection to truth, the will in subjection to moral law, the passions in subjection to the understanding and the will and all its faculties illuminated, directed and exalted by religion : here is man *par excellence*, man complete.¹

For him, therefore, reason, passion and imagination, all must function. And in thus restating the doctrine of the wholeness of man he took up the work which the order of the Spaniard Santo Dominigo had done some six centuries before. They had assimilated from Ibn Rushd and other Moslem metaphysicians of Cordoba the sublime speculations of Platonic Aristotelianism. It was to these Balmes turned the attention of Catalonians. He met them with that vigour of analysis, that subtlety of regard with which the philosopher scrutinizes the problem of existence, in the light of his own mind, and of those mysterious apprehensions which take the mind higher than itself into the ideal world. But even if he does so, he shows that this vigour is not in itself sufficient. He uses it rather to move from it to the realm of eloquence ; and there to point, as the greatest Dominican had done long since, to the fact that to discern the ultimate truth man must ask for further light, and must find it in that Word of Truth which is life ; for that Life is the Light of men. Only he who sees that Light sees truth, and sees Eternity.

Such was Balmes' vindication of his country and his Church. Such are the considerations which he put before Spain and Spanish America a hundred years before the disintegration of Protestant materialism had sharpened the points of his contentions. Such is the Spanish complement to the eloquence and philosophy of Newman, and his defence of the Catholic tradition against those tendencies of liberalism, now called democracy, which, as both Newman and Balmes foresaw, would, if uncorrected, lead their countries to weakness and disaster.

¹ *Cr  rio*, Ch. XIX.

UNDERSTANDING LATIN AMERICA

Sr. de Madariaga's Recent Work¹

By EDWARD SARMIENTO

IT is a surprising thing that one of the most interesting and instructive periods of modern history should, despite a vast accumulation of source material, be so inadequately investigated as the growth and development of Latin America. It is true that in the last century Prescott made the history of the Spanish conquest of America the theme of a series of classics which have remained unequalled if not up to date, and that many modern studies of other periods exist—Baudin's study on Inca socialism, C. K. Webster's *Britain and the Independence of Latin America* and the recent study by Diffie on *Latin American Civilization* are three titles that come to mind. But there is a lack of studies not only of single elements in the history of the Latin American nations, but of the general significance of their formation and emergence as a whole. Of the former group of subjects, religion, constitutional theory and the growth of Creole national feeling are perhaps the most important subjects, and something we have already on each, though not enough. It is to the latter group of studies that Sr. de Madariaga's new volumes are a most interesting contribution. It is difficult not to read these two solid volumes right through at a single sitting. Sr. de Madariaga's unerring instinct has seized on the essentials of his subject. The three centuries of colonial rule in Spanish America would be as tedious in straight narration as they were in fact—and this tedium of an insufficiently full and interesting life lived at such an immense distance, real and psychological, from the centres of culture is a vital factor in both the colonial and republican periods which does not seem to have been sufficiently noted.

¹ *The Rise of the Spanish American Empire.* (Hollis & Carter, 1947, pp. xix + 408. 21s.)
The Fall of the Spanish American Empire. (Hollis & Carter, 1947, pp. viii + 443. 21s.)

With great wisdom, the author of this study has provided an analysis of nuclear themes that penetrates to the very heart of the life of the Spanish Empire. Where he is slightly disappointing is in his polemical approach and in a certain selectiveness in his sympathies. Nevertheless this erudite work is a beginning. It is intended as a background to the author's forthcoming study of Simón Bolívar, and we shall await with interest his interpretation of this rich temperament—imaginative, intelligent, dramatic, skilled in the use of words, a military genius, passionate, ambiguous in religion yet firm in support of the Church and exemplary in his death, moulded through and through by the Creole life he was bred in. It is the analysis of this life that Sr. de Madariaga has now given us, and to analyse it is to write the history of the Empire.

The religious aspect of that history is perhaps the single element most full of problems and most enigmatic. Sr. Vicente Sierra, in his *Sentido misional de la conquista de América*,¹ and the contemporary Spanish school emphasize, perhaps unduly, the pure altruistic missionary impulse of Spain, almost to the exclusion of any other. It is true that the Spanish Crown and the official life of the country took religion very seriously, and in considering this religious zeal of the Spaniards there is no need to doubt their sincerity—though the contemporary English Catholics had some cause to doubt their wisdom. The modern Spaniard too easily assumes the complete success of the colonial missionaries, but it is obvious to the visitor to the scene of their labours, even if M. Ricard's and Mr. LaFarge's books were not there to corroborate it, that there are patches where Catholicism has not only not penetrated deeply, but has failed to move the indigenous rites—in Mexico, in Ecuador, where, apart from tribes who have never been touched, strange rites can be seen even in the churches. Everywhere, in Mexico and Peru and elsewhere, the plague of the *fiesta* is rife, useless for religion, detrimental to morals and ruinous economically for the peasant. The religious *mestizaje* of Peru has recently been described by Srta. Santolalla in an unpublished thesis for the Catholic University of Peru. In it she describes the genesis of false legends of 'miraculous' images, the attitude of the Indian peasant to them, the confusion of the Catholic and indigenous calendars, and the ease with which absurd marvels are believed and spread.

¹ Buenos Aires, 1944.
Vol. 221

She argues for a complete re-education in religion by the clergy. Here we touch on the main problem of both modern and colonial times: the insufficiency of the clergy, discussed in Fr. Considine's recent book, *Call for Forty Thousand*, which, like Walsh's *Church in Latin America*, discusses these problems frankly. It is only in our own time that Catholics, whether in Latin America or abroad, have begun to be disturbed by this state of affairs, not in time to prevent much scandalous comment on the part of Protestant missionaries. Sr. de Madariaga has something to say on this question, and much may be learned from him.

The Spanish Church in the sixteenth century was a great, noble and creative institution, as will abundantly appear hereafter. Yet in the course of time it deteriorated in the fatherland, and as economic (as well as spiritual) success accrued to the Church in the Indies, it fell from its original evangelical zeal and purity. Towards the middle of the sixteenth century, Don Antonio de Mendoza is still strongly in favour of the friars: 'without them very little can be achieved.' . . . But Don Francisco de Toledo, in 1569, sounds a different note. 'As for the spiritual government of yonder kingdom, Catholic Majesty, I found when I arrived that the priests and monks, bishops and prelates of all the orders, were the absolute lords of all spiritual affairs, and even in temporal affairs they hardly acknowledged any authority above theirs; and Your Majesty had a continuous expense in that, at the expense of your House, each Fleet conveyed to the Indies a great number of priests and monks ostensibly to preach and indoctrinate the Indians, while in actual fact many of them went just to enrich themselves at the expense of the Indians, shearing them of all they could in order to return wealthy.' The Viceroy enumerates the many abuses which priests and bishops committed against the natives, and how he stamped them out. (Vol. I, p. 143)

Sr. de Madariaga quotes (Vol. II, p. 36) examples of peninsular Spaniards in the Indies 'waging [a regular separatist campaign] against New World Spaniards . . . with the . . . aim . . . of keeping the plums of the Church for themselves. There was even a bishop in Mexico who refused to ordain Creoles till the Council of the Indies forced him to do so.'¹ Sr. Sierra, in his fourth chapter, considers the deficiencies of the mid-sixteenth century, and though he is, perhaps, complacent and anxious to vindicate Spain when, perhaps, there is no call to do so, admits the short-

¹ The word Creole means a Spaniard born in the Indies, not a person of mixed blood.

comings of the missionaries and the Church, and excuses them, mainly on the grounds of shortage of clergy and lack of training in missionary methods; and while it is not necessary to agree with him (p. 105) that these very defects were an advantage in the long run, since, by reaction, they only served to strengthen later zeal (for the point precisely is that these alternations succeeded each other throughout the colonial period, and the result today is still far from satisfactory), it must be conceded that much good was done and the difficulties as well as the temptations very serious.

Sr. de Madariaga (Vol. I, p. 290), in discussing what he calls 'factors of anarchy', says:

This Christian culture was the only common ground on which the three peoples—white, black, Indian—could meet. In the eyes of the monks, the spiritual union on this basis could be perfect. But this view unfortunately was a naïve distortion of reality under the beautiful delusion of a pious faith. Christianity could not penetrate the soul of Indians and blacks deep enough to achieve unity within a Christian fold; and as will be shown hereafter, the two coloured peoples remained for long—and the Indian still is to a large extent—in a kind of cultural twilight between Christianity and their respective ancestral beliefs.

This, as a generalization, is simply not true. Anyone who has mingled with a congregation in, say, the villages of Boyacá or at the shrine of Chiquinquirá, or knows something of the religion of pure Indians around Popayán or in some Ecuadorean groups, cannot agree that 'Christianity could not penetrate deep enough'. Nor would modern Protestant missionaries in Peru and Bolivia. The same goes for some areas where there is African admixture. The fact is that there is enormous variation.¹ In the history of the colonial period, what we want to know is what factors contributed to this unevenness in missionary success. The troubles of the nineteenth century are undoubtedly in some measure due to the decree, fatal for Latin America (whether Spanish or Portuguese), expelling the Jesuits. Sr. de Madariaga deals with this matter from a political point of view, for it had a share too in preparing

¹ But 'nor is it certain that the existence of Indians wholly conquered by the religion of Christ can be roundly denied', says Sr. de Madariaga in another place. (Vol. II, p. 57.) This is inadequate, but adds a further brush-stroke to the complete picture. It is very difficult to do justice to the author's opinions, as any one view is apt to be qualified in some other part of the book. Brilliant as the work is, the fact that a case is continually being built up makes the study of it fatiguing, and detracts from its value in the long run.

the way for independence. In the last century of the colonial period the Jesuits were far ahead of the other orders in every respect. Their removal left a gap in missionary endeavour and in education which it was hard to fill, and by the time they returned the one had often lapsed and the other fallen into the hands of the nineteenth-century secularists. The undue attachment of the orders to their property and the unwillingness of Rome, under the influence of the Holy Alliance, to fill the vacancies in the episcopates have something to answer for in the general decay of religion since the inauguration of the republic, as appears from Mr. LaFarge's most recent study in 'cultural twilight' in Guatemala, *Santa Eulalia*.¹ He tells us (p. xii) the following illuminating facts:

The breakdown of the Recent Indian culture with its heritage of Mayan survivals—the process of de-Indianization—is still only beginning in most of the Cuchumatán villages. During the present century, while the hold of the state became stronger, that of the church was weakened. The diocese of Los Altos was merged with that of Guatemala, and for a decade or more no priest was resident in these mountains. During this period the old ceremonial organization gained in power. Now, with the restoration of the diocese and the return of priests to Soloma and Jacaltenango, there is some tendency toward more orthodox Christianity. Meantime, a new element, the Protestant Evangelical missions, has entered the field, with disturbing results.

Although he is referring to a later period, the conditions are the same as in the nineteenth century, and the effects were the same. The Catholic Revival of the present century, the greater attention paid to Latin America by Rome, are, however, happier auguries. It is not fanciful to see in Latin America at present a stage in some ways comparable to that of Russia in the late eighteenth century. Far-seeing eyes can discern a century or two ahead the state of Latin America when population and wealth have risen to the height their horizontal space demands. The future of Latin America is a long-standing commonplace, if not a joke, but that is only because the future was obvious from the start and so has kept the world waiting longer. It is obviously necessary to preserve in Latin America the cultural and religious traditions Spain implanted (or Portugal allowed to grow) without disturbing their own way of developing them. Only the Latin Americans themselves can do it, but they are entitled to sympathetic interest from

¹ Chicago, 1947.

other countries where the significance of the question is understood.

The problem of the American Indian is another on which ultimately a cool judgement is needed. On this topic, Sr. de Madariaga is inclined to say that the Indian is an inferior being. It may of course be so; one is not committed to the opinion that all human stocks are, even potentially, equally well-endowed. But is there not some undue passion in, for example: 'The Chibcha of New Granada . . . were surrounded by savage and mutually independent hordes of cannibals and sodomites'? The latter word might also designate the Greeks. Certainly the Panche and other tribes were reputed to observe what would seem to have been ritual cannibalism, which is indeed a thing painful, but surely not shocking? As these particular uncivilized tribes, however, disappeared before the Spaniard, at least in their pure state, their cultural level has no bearing on those who remained under Spanish rule.¹

The *Bulletins* of the Bureau of American Ethnology (The Smithsonian Institution, Washington) yield a view of the American Indian that entitles us to suppose them more capable of advancement than Sr. de Madariaga seems at times to want us to believe. The *Handbook* on the South American Indians, the most recent of these publications, gives a very full and factual account of the Inca civilization and of that of all the other groups on the continent. Dr. Rowe's account in this volume of the Inca religion makes that given us by Sr. de Madariaga seem inadequate, for example, and in general we shall do better to go to the ethnologists and archaeologists for our information on the Indian. It is not altogether true to speak of the 'poverty-stricken quality of the design' of Indian art, as a visit to the Lima museums can demonstrate, or a study of the admirable illustrations of the *Handbook*. On the controversy of Inca confession rites, Dr. Rowe accepts their existence, while Sr. de Madariaga follows Garcilaso. But Garcilaso is unreliable on the pre-Spanish period; 'his accounts of Inca history and religion are entirely fanciful', is Dr. Rowe's verdict. This author, by the way (p. 395), gives an admirable

¹ Diffie, in *Latin American Civilization* (Harrisburg, 1945), expresses a similar view about the achievement of the American Indian, but with greater moderation. There has been a tendency to exaggerate that achievement among modern historians. Diffie gives a balanced objective account of Indian cultures. On the subject of non-ritualistic cannibalism, he stresses the fact that the food supplies of the American continents, especially animal, were very scanty before the conquest. He wisely does not attempt to draw any conclusion with regard to the native character and mentality.

summary of the sixteenth-century conversions and of the problems facing later missionaries. Sr. de Madariaga places great insistence on the Indian drink question. He grants the failure of the authorities after the conquest to cope with this question; 'The heavy responsibility of the Spanish State and system is therefore patent.' (Vol. II, p. 54) (One may remark that this heavy responsibility weighs on the Republican governments too, in not improving the intoxicant in the first place and in deriving revenue from its sale in the second. It is said that in Nariño, a department of Colombia, something has been done in this direction, but the present writer has no factual confirmation of this.) 'But the point now at issue is the natural proclivity of the Indians to drink.' (*loc. cit.*) There is a certain superficiality here which we shall have occasion to comment on again presently. In the first place, however, there are Protestant missions in Bolivia and at Yuquiyauyo in Northern Peru where this problem has been combated. The word 'solved' is not appropriate, because total abstinence has become the rule in these areas, and it is doubtful in the extreme whether this is a wise measure. But it at least disposes of the 'natural proclivity'. Secondly, this is what we read on alcoholism in the American *Handbook* already quoted:

One result of these solutions to the problem of leisure was vastly to increase the Indian consumption of alcohol. Drunkenness . . . was more common in colonial times than in antiquity, when it had been restricted to ceremonial occasions. (p. 394)

The root of the evil was the 'solutions to the problem of leisure' referred to:

The inability and the reluctance of the Indians to perform the required amounts of work incited the colonists to punitive measures, which further increased Indian unwillingness, bringing in turn even sterner punishments. The Spaniards do not seem to have comprehended that, for the Indian, no work was worth doing which was not infused by ceremonial symbolism. . . . All work was punctuated by ritual and festival occasions; work itself was ceremonially performed. . . . In Christian life, work and worship were separate concepts. The day of rest evoked no response from the Indian whose understanding of leisure was in terms of ceremonial exercises. . . . For the great reformer, Viceroy Toledo, this problem of 'psychological unemployment' never presented itself. To the administrator, the real problem was quite different, and it had a

double aspect: to educate the Indians to systematic habits of work, and to regulate the extravagant demands made upon their labour by private parties.

A similar reserve must be shown towards Sr. de Madariaga's generalization on the numbers of the population. (Vol. I, pp. 326-7) Even the figures he gives show extremely little increase of population for the colonial period, less than half a million, excluding the *mestizos*. But the figures for Peru bear little relation to those shown on p. 334 of the *Handbook*, concerning which Mr. Kubler, the author of the section, says: '[they] reveal a movement of population density characterized by unrelieved loss.' The whole subject as treated in various sections of the *Handbook* will repay study, but will not support Sr. de Madariaga in his contention that 'this all-important test of a political and social system—what becomes of the human beings who live under it—is decidedly favourable to Spanish rule.' (Vol. I, p. 327) In this, at least, the Republics will stand scrutiny.¹

On the negro, Sr. de Madariaga has some interesting comments, and the following paragraph is worth quoting:

These men [Negroes], who for their enjoyment staged two Spanish classic plays in a small provincial city down the coast of Peru, were thoroughly absorbed into the Spanish life and culture of the Indies. Nothing suggests that they lived under an inner tension similar to that which made the *mestizos* so taut and so shift. Like the *mestizos* they were a hybrid type of men; but unlike the *mestizos* they had no earth, no tradition on which to draw in order to load the activity of the white blood with the resentment of the native. Their negro blood came to add vigour and turbulence to the active urge of the white. But this vigour and this turbulence were there, so to speak, in their own right, and sought no common aim as such. The Blacks had suffered and were still suffering daily wrongs almost as abominable as those the Indian had undergone. But whereas out of the wrongs done to the Indians the White within the *mestizo* could and did build a collective wrong done to the Indian as a whole, the Black within the mulatto had no special collective grievance to hand over to the White

¹ Diffie (*op. cit.*), who is by no means concerned to stress the evils resulting from the Conquest, but holds a very even balance, gives figures which do not support this view that there were large numbers of Indians at the end of the Colonial period (which Sr. de Madariaga takes from an article in *Tierra Firme*, a Madrid review, by Sr. A. Rosenblat), but he thinks the decrease is both exaggerated and that it had begun before the arrival of the Spaniards. A fair judgement probably is that decrease had set in, but was accelerated by the Conquest and colonization, and that its proportions have been exaggerated, especially in calculations about the original numbers of inhabitants just before the arrival of the Conquistadores.

within him, for the Blacks were but individuals cut off from their native soil, while the Indians were a people arrested and deflected in their development by the onrush of the Whites; and so, while the sufferings of the Indians acquired a political significance and a collective impetus in the heart of the *mestizos*, the sufferings of the black slaves remained past and inert like a dust of nameless memories.

This brings out very well the instinctual cohesion of the one and the state of *diaspora* of the other. The Spanish Empire would seem at first sight to be a subject made for the pen of Sr. de Madariaga—the brilliant and penetrating as well as very diverting theorist of *Englishmen, Frenchmen, Spaniards*. For here we have Spaniards, Indians and Negroes, and we have an excellent opportunity to compare Spaniards as colonizers with the English, the French and even others. But on reflection, the material is seen to be not so apt. The Creole undergoes a sea-change, and differs profoundly from his peninsular cousin, old prejudices drop and new ones take their place; Sr. de Madariaga, in spite of the subtle analysis in Vol. II, Chapter III, desires to treat him as an old Spaniard in his political reactions. The analysis is too subtle possibly, because, for example, the opposition between the man of the sword and the man of law, described as ‘one of the sturdiest psychological features taken over by the Spaniards to the Indies’, holds throughout Europe; while the observations on the Creoles’ vanity for titles and distinctions need not be confined to them, and the suggestion of Ulloa and Jorge Juan that the Crown should devise some honorary distinctions to win which ‘the persons of greatest lustre would vie with each other’ throws a light on just one of the greatest defects of Spanish life as compared with that of England, at least in the past, the skill in harnessing talent for public service by means of natural and valuable human vanities; and one of the hardest things in the Republics has been and is to find such stimuli and create the idea of public service—they could do worse than take over the *légion d’honneur* idea. Sr. de Madariaga’s powers as a ‘characterist’ are taxed to straining-point by the addition to the three races of three inter-races, and the refinements of his analysis tend to become far-fetched; one reflects with relief that, after all, the inhabitants of the Indies are just human beings. The comparisons with English colonization are not unnecessary, but a trifle insistent. The reputation Spain has, and which it is now in so many quarters desired to remove, is not altogether undeserved, though we must

grant it has been too much and somewhat hypocritically exaggerated. In all this race-characterology, fascinating and amusing as it is, there is a disagreeable and fatalistic basis of materialism. 'Ultimately, of course, the roots of the evil will be found to lie in the national character. It is vain for "Spaniards" of all nations to try to shift their historic responsibility on to Fate.' (Vol. I, p. 281) But what else is the 'psychic substance . . . the same or similar enough to make up an historical unit within the larger galaxy of mankind', which Sr. de Madariaga postulates for the Spanish-speaking peoples, but a form of Fate? 'What the long view of history makes clear is that even the greatest men fall into the general patterns which their respective peoples design on the canvas of time.' As a philosophy of history, perhaps there is more to be said for the smug piety of Longfellow's *Psalm* than for this curious mother-fixation.

The core of Sr. de Madariaga's thesis is that in the case of the Spanish American area the movement for independence is one with the turbulent movements of the preceding three hundred years, and at bottom conforms to a race pattern derived from Spain. Speaking of a disturbance at the very beginning of Peruvian history, Sr. de Madariaga (Vol. II, p. 142) quotes Garcilaso: "The fatherland is already liberated, since the tyrant is in jail!" Bolívar breathes already in those words.' Chapter XI dwells a good deal on the same theme. But it is highly arguable, and the core of any study on this subject should reveal just how far there is any affinity, and why, in that case, independence did not come sooner. Ideas are more important than blood, and the chapters on the influence of France and the United States and the spread of Freemasonry (as a vehicle for ideas) are more illuminating. What we seek to have expounded is the differences between Creole and Peninsular that, for all their common qualities, led to so profound a change as the separation of the colonies and the alteration in their destiny that this change has brought about. Two elements are underestimated by Sr. de Madariaga: the rebellions immediately prior to the great war of independence—he devotes a single chapter to a selection of these numerous risings—and the question of eighteenth-century immigration, which he does not discuss. Sr. Daniel Valcárcel has given an interesting survey¹ of Peruvian native rebellions, treated with obvious sympathy for the Indian point of view, and ranging himself very decidedly on one of the two sides

¹ *Rebeliones indígenas*, Lima, 1946.

of the conflict, political and cultural, that runs through Peruvian life today. Naturally his account differs from that of Sr. de Madariaga's. One is not inclined to accept either without further investigation. Similarly with the New Granadan *Comunero* movement; one of the most important of the precursor movements, it is given very little space in the *Fall*.

"These natives prefer the name of Americans to that of Creoles. Since the peace of Versailles, and particularly since 1789, one often hears them say with pride: 'I am not a *Spaniard*, I am an *American*'; words which reveal the effect of a long resentment" . . . The other effect of this change of attitude was also noted by Humboldt. "They prefer foreigners of other lands to Spaniards"—a feature which to this day has remained ingrained in many Spanish Americans.' (Vol. II, p. 195) The immigration of the eighteenth century may account partly for this; it was numerous, it differed from earlier influxes of population in being mercantile and, of course, belonging to an epoch when the respect for the crown and the attachment to the Spanish way of life was much weakened even in the home country. Possibly some of the anti-Spanish attitude in the colonies was due to the new attitude of the newer colonists. A point not made so far by historians.

The general view that the Indies were looked upon on the whole as existing for the benefit of the home country cannot in the long run be gainsaid. Dr. López de Mesa, in his deeply interesting study, *Disertación sociológica*,¹ mainly concerned with analysing the roots of Colombian nationality, grants all that Sr. de Madariaga could desire, in his chapter on the 'Fundamental Error of the Colony', which he regards as economic. But the drain of precious metals from the Empire disturbed the psychology of the Spaniards, the colonists, the natives, and introduced the African. It led to the neglect of the land; it corrupted the Church. It is difficult to close one's eyes to this aspect of the problem. One of the most valuable studies of the period we possess, J. H. Parry's *The Spanish Theory of Empire in the Sixteenth Century*,² draws our attention to another result, the absence of constitutional law and tradition.

That assumption of sovereignty was made, in practice, at the beginning of the colonial era, when the Crown began to issue colonial decrees which (unlike mediaeval legislation) made no pretence of being declaratory, and which neither received nor

¹ Bogota, 1939.

² Cambridge, 1940.

required any constitutional consent. These Cédulas, far from being limited by an existing system of rights, avowedly created new rights and abolished supposedly established ones. Much of this legislation was, in intention at least, enlightened according to the standards of the time; much, in the first sixty years, was based upon the opinions of some of the best thinkers and theologians in Spain; much again, upon reasonably accurate reports of colonial conditions and requirements. All, however, was arbitrary, sanctioned by the royal will alone, tempered only by the difficulties of enforcement at a distance. The New Laws of 1542, the various Ordenanzas sobre Descubrimiento, and above all the great Colonial Code—the ‘Recopilación de Leyes de las Indias’—form the most impressive of all monuments to an absolute imperial sovereignty based upon the formal assumption that the Indies were the private estate of the rulers of Castile. (p. 71)

Yet ‘At no point do we see emerge a sense that the Indies are for Spain. The Indies are for the Indies, and in the main everything done by Church and State, whether good or bad in its actual results, was done from the point of view of the Indies themselves,’ says Sr. de Madariaga. (Vol. I, pp. 58–9) It is a half-truth rather than the whole truth, and it cannot stand as a statement for the ultimate result of the relations between Spain and her Indies. The examples of economic legislation in support of his view which follow are not altogether convincing.

The crucial fact is that ultimately the Spanish Americans (altogether apart from the other races and mixtures) felt themselves different, and desired independence of their peninsular rulers. What we want to know is what happened to bring this about, and in what the difference consists. Sr. Arciniegas, in his thoughtful study, *Este pueblo de América*,¹ sees it simply as the desire for freedom and an instinct pressing forward to democracy:

There is no more repressed emotion than that of the seventeenth century in America. None there who can utter his truth, and all who inhabit this land are unbalanced. The Spaniard is no longer a Spaniard; that Spaniard lost in the rocky wastes, who is but the murmur of the little cities, is a fugitive from Spain who scarcely remembers his own land. The desire to emancipate himself urged him to this side of the Atlantic, and though in appearance he is the master, the weight of the King’s representative weighs upon him. The Spaniard, in reality, is with the underdog. Already language has made a distinction, and he is called ‘Creole’ or ‘nabab’ to raise a barrier between him and the parasitic bureaucracy. When that man who is now rooted in America left Spain, he left behind his

¹ Mexico, 1945.

friends, his family. His soul was half emptied. Like a tonic, adventure sped him on during the long nights of travel; then the emotions of struggle gradually silenced his inner voices. But the very upheavals of these spiritual changes led him by the hand towards the cherishing of an illusion: freedom. (pp. 72-3)

This is interesting as a revelation of change, and as one result of change, but it is too much an interpretation after the event. Even so, it must be freedom for something that the new American man aspires to. At bottom, the question is: What is it that happens to the spirit of colonial peoples? And is it certain that it is any more than that community of childhood and adolescent memories and of the conditions of adult happiness knit people together, however outwardly diverse, and bind them against the outsider?

'HUMAN RIGHTS' IN THE NEW CONSTITUTIONS OF FRANCE AND ITALY

By BARBARA BARCLAY CARTER

TODAY, when the Economic and Social Council of U.N.O. is engaged on the unrewarding task of attempting to produce a Charter of Human Rights that will win at least the nominal assent of all Member States, in spite of irreconcilable incompatibilities, it is interesting to compare the approach to the establishment of human rights in the new Constitutions of France and Italy.

The French Constitution, after a first draft had been rejected by Referendum on 5 May, 1946, was approved by the Constituent Assembly on 29 September, the same year, and came into force after its acceptance in the Referendum of 13 October. The Italian Constitution, which, though providing for Referenda, was not made the object of one, came into force on 1st January, 1948. The two Constitutions present such close parallels as to throw their divergences into particular relief. Both are inspired by a political philosophy which welcomes the emancipation of the working classes as the logical sequence to that of the middle classes, the achievement of the Liberalism of the last century. Both seek to guarantee the extension of democracy from the political to the social plane. Both have been worked out during the period of tripartite dominance, of Christian-Democrats, Socialists and Communists, which was so striking a feature in post-war Europe. Both, therefore, show the attempt to reconcile opposing conceptions.

In France, debates on the Constitution resolved themselves mainly into a battle between M.R.P. and Communists, with the Socialists frequently acting as mediators. Christian-Democracy has evolved a clearly defined school of political thought, elaborated through the studies of Catholic sociologists; the international congresses of the last century (notably, those of Liège in the 'sixties and Malines from the 'seventies onwards, when Cardinal Gibbons

and Cardinal Manning were prominent supporters of the movement), the papal Social Encyclicals, with the epoch-making pronouncement on Christian Democracy on the Christmas-Eve of 1944, and the yearly *Semaines Sociales* in France in the present century, as well as by the experiences of what before the war were known as the 'democratic parties of Christian inspiration'. Main features of Christian-Democratic doctrine are the stress laid on 'human personality', in both its individual and collective manifestations; a consequent insistence on the collective rights and functions of social groups intermediate between the individual and the State (the family, county, region, university, trade-union, class, etc.), as well as on the rights of the Church or churches; a clear differentiation between the State and the national community, of which the State is only the organized political expression; a jealous defence of liberty and liberties against State encroachments, while admitting the intervention of the State in the economic and social field within certain limits; and the furtherance of administrative decentralization and local autonomies in accordance with the principle which the present Pope has defined as the 'principle of subsidiarity'—that tasks which can be efficiently performed by a smaller, particular body should not be transferred to a larger and general one. This conception (which Americans will recognize as akin in many aspects to that of Jefferson) contrasts both with the atomic individualism of the Liberalism which had shaped the political structure both of France and of pre-Fascist Italy, and with the Marxist conception of the primacy of the economic, the uniformity of a classless society, and the increasing concentration of powers in the State.

The French M.R.P. rejects the designation of 'Christian-Democratic party' as carrying a taint of confessionalism, but its Christian-Democratic origins are unmistakable. In the French Constituent Assembly, the forces of M.R.P. and Communists were so evenly balanced that an alliance of Communists and Socialists was assured of predominance. It was thus that the first Draft Constitution of 19 April, 1946, was approved in spite of M.R.P. opposition. The modifications introduced after its rejection in the Referendum—notably the restoration of a rather shadowy second Chamber and the conferment of slightly greater powers on the President of the Republic—can be accounted M.R.P. successes. But the result of the sharp antithesis was to render impossible boldness of innovation from either side and thus to give plasmative

force to the mere weight of precedent: the French Constitution of 1946 has indeed been described as 'before all else a revised and in no wise improved edition of that of 1875.'¹

In Italy, on the other hand, not only were the Christian-Democrats the definitely preponderant force in the Constituent Assembly, but many of their basic conceptions found support in other groups. The Mazzinian tradition presented itself as a national heritage, overshadowing, even for many Socialists, that of Marx; Liberal thought was able, through the personal authority of its exponents, to exert an influence out of proportion to their exiguous number, and Communism showed itself far less rigid than in France. The existence of a number of vital trends to be reconciled, with their points of agreement and disagreement leading to kaleidoscopic groupings and regroupings, slowed down progress in debate, but ultimately made an innovating synthesis the easier. 'In the effort to achieve liberty in stable fashion', said the President of the drafting Committee, Signor Ruini, in his report to the Constituent Assembly on 6 February, 1947, 'and to anchor it to a sphere of higher values, profound currents have converged: from the democratic ones, faithful to the "immortal principles" and the liberals invoking the "religion of liberty", to the grand Christian inspiration which claims to itself the eternal fount of those principles and to the impulse of renewal which moves from the Manifesto of the Communists and which, in order to combat the exploitation of one class by another, goes back to the liberation of man from the yoke of man, that is, to his inalienable rights.'

While the French Constitution concentrates on parliamentary structure, conceiving the advance of democracy in increased powers for the National Assembly which is made the sole source of law, the Italian Constitution—in reaction against the aberrations of Fascism and seeking to reknit not only the threads broken at its advent, but also those of the Risorgimento, discarded by the unitary kingdom—lays special emphasis on the safeguarding of liberty, and establishes a variety of institutions (two Chambers with equal competence, regional assemblies, right of initiative, referenda) to assure the vital participation of the people as a whole in the authority of the State. Ruini quotes Mazzini's dictum: 'The State is not the arbiter of all, but is operative liberty for all, in a world which, whatever others may say, is athirst for authority.'

¹ Professor Bernard Lavergne, *Res Publica*, 'Que Penser de la Constitution Française?' 5 November, 1946.

II

In the rejected French Draft Constitution of 5 May, an attempt had been made to reframe a Declaration of the Rights of Man, brought up to date. The result showed such confusion of thought and style as to stir satiric comment on all sides, and the authors of the new Constitution were glad enough to content themselves with a confirming reference in the Preamble to the original Declaration, adding a summary of rights representing the new aspirations of the present day.

The principles thus summarily enunciated in the French Preamble reflect a new political and social *Weltanschauung* common to the greater part of Western Europe. They appear, more elaborately worked out in a real 'Bill of Rights', as Part I of the Italian Constitution, which, in Ruini's words, 'presents itself, in a certain sense, as a new and intermediate type which, while historically informed by concrete and present realities, seeks to attach itself to the ideal principles on the basis of which Italian democracy has risen again and is moving towards new forms.' Side by side with innovating, even revolutionary trends, may be discerned a paramount endeavour to define and conserve those social values that appear threatened by the *Zeitgeist* of the modern world. Stress is laid in the Italian text on the fact that 'Liberty means responsibility. Nor can the rights of liberty be dissociated from the duties of solidarity' (a stress wholly in the Mazzinian tradition). Thus the Italian 'Bill of Rights' presents itself as a First Section devoted to the 'Rights and Duties of the Citizen', in the civil, ethico-social, economic and political fields.

The French Preamble reads as follows :

On the morrow of the victory won by the free peoples over the régimes that sought to enslave and degrade the human person, the French people proclaims anew that every human being, without distinction of race, religion or belief, possesses inalienable and sacred rights. It solemnly reaffirms the rights and liberties of the man and the citizen consecrated by the Declaration of Rights of 1789 and the fundamental principles recognized by the laws of the Republic.

It proclaims in addition, as particularly necessary in our time, the following political, economic and social principles :

The law guarantees to woman, in every domain, rights equal to those of man.

HUMAN RIGHTS IN FRANCE AND ITALY 61

Any man persecuted because of his action in favour of liberty has right of asylum in the territories of the Republic.

Everyone has the duty and right of obtaining employment. No one shall suffer detriment in his work or employment because of his origins, opinions or beliefs.

Every man may defend his rights and interests by trade-union action and belong to the trade-union of his choice.

The right to strike shall be exercised within the framework of the laws regulating it.

Every worker shall share in the determination of conditions of work as well as in the management of undertakings through the intermediation of his delegates.

Every asset, every enterprise, of which the working possesses or acquires the character of a national public service, or of a *de facto* monopoly, must become the property of the collectivity.

The nation shall assure to the individual and to the family the conditions necessary for their development.

It guarantees to all, especially to the child, the mother and the old worker, protection of health, material security, rest and leisure. Every human being who, through his age, his physical or mental state, or the economic situation, finds himself incapable of working, has the right to obtain from the collectivity decent means of existence.

The nation proclaims the solidarity and equality of all the French in the face of the burdens resulting from the national calamities.

The nation guarantees the equal access of the child and the adult to instruction, professional training and culture. The organization of gratuitous and laic public teaching at all grades is a duty of the State.

The French Republic, faithful to its traditions, conforms to the rules of international public law. It will undertake no war with aims of conquest and will never employ its forces against the liberty of any people.

Subject to reciprocity, France consents to the limitations of sovereignty necessary for the organization and defence of peace.

The three concluding items deal with the status of France's overseas possessions, as integral parts of what is designated 'The French Union'.¹

¹ 'France forms with the overseas peoples a Union founded on equality of rights and duties, without distinction of race or religion.'

'The French Union is composed of nations and peoples that place in common or co-ordinate their resources and efforts to develop their respective civilizations, increase their prosperity and assure their security.'

'Faithful to her traditional mission, France intends to lead the peoples of whom she has assumed charge to freedom to administer themselves and to manage their own affairs democratically; repudiating all systems of colonization founded on arbitrary action, she guarantees to all equal access to public functions and the individual or collective exercise of the rights and liberties proclaimed or confirmed above.'

The Italians, lacking, as Ruini's report notes, the French precedents and Republican tradition and having suffered the ravages of Fascism considerably longer, felt the need not only for a detailed formulation of basic rights and duties but an indication, in the Constitution itself, of the criteria that the law must follow to assure their practical validity.

In the Italian Constitution, in an introductory section headed 'General Provisions', Arts. 2 and 3 read as follows:

Art. 2. The Republic recognizes and guarantees the inviolable rights of man, both as an individual and in the social formations in which his personality unfolds itself, and calls for the fulfilment of the duties of political, economic and social solidarity.

Art. 3. Citizens, without distinction of sex, race, language, social conditions, religion or political opinions, have equal social dignity and are equal before the law.

It is the task of the Republic to remove the obstacles of an economic and social order that limit in practice the liberty and equality of citizens, impede the complete development of human personality and the effectual participation of all workers in the political, economic and social organization of Italy.

Section I of the First Part of the Constitution, which follows seven Articles of 'General Provisions', deals with the specific Rights and Duties of Citizens in Civil Relationships. Art. 8 proclaims the inviolability of *personal freedom*, forbidding any form whatever of detention, inspection or search save as authorized by the judicial authority in accordance with the law.¹ In exceptional cases, the police may take action without prior authorization, but their action must be communicated to the judicial authority within 48 hours. 'All physical or moral violence' to those under arrest is forbidden, as is the arrest of anyone but the actual suspect. (It was a Fascist custom to arrest relatives or associates of those accused.)

The *inviolability of the domicile* receives a similar guarantee (Art. 9). The *freedom and secrecy of correspondence* and of every form of communication is guaranteed and may be limited only on a judicial warrant in cases of pending criminal proceedings (Art. 10). The right of citizens to *freedom of movement* within the country is assured, and may be limited only in accordance with the law, for health or security reasons, but in no case from political motives. All citizens shall have the right to leave the country and return (Art. 11).

¹ Cf. *Declaration of the Rights of Man*, 7: 'No-one may be accused, imprisoned or detained save in the cases and with the formalities by law prescribed.'

As in the French Preamble, 'the foreigner who is debarred from effective exercise of the rights deriving from democratic liberties guaranteed by the Italian Constitution' has *right of asylum* in Italian territory (Art. 12).

Art. 13 guarantees to all the *right to hold peaceable meetings*, public or private, the authorities reserving only the right to forbid open-air meetings if it can be proved that they are likely to disturb the peace. Art. 14 assures the *right of association* for lawful ends, while forbidding secret societies and those 'which pursue, even indirectly, political aims through organizations of a military character'.

Freedom of religion is assured in Art. 15, where it is laid down that all have the right to free profession of their religious faith, to make propaganda for it and to perform private or public acts of worship, so long as immoral rites are not involved. Denominations other than the Catholic (whose relations with the State are defined in the famous Art. 7 confirming the Lateran Pacts) shall have the right to organize according to their own Statutes, their relations with the State to be regulated by law on the basis of an understanding with their representatives. Art. 16 (countering a pre-Fascist system) assures religious associations and institutions a legal and fiscal parity with secular bodies.

Freedom of opinion,¹ expressed by word, writing or 'any other means', is amply dealt with in Art. 17, which establishes that 'The press cannot be subjected to authorization or censorship'. Sequestration can only be carried out in the case of offences defined by law, on a specific warrant from the judicial authority.² The law may compel the periodical press to make known the sources of its finance. Indecent publications and spectacles are prohibited.

Arts. 17-20 are specifically directed against a recurrence of Fascist abuses, establishing that no one may be deprived of legal capacity, citizenship or name for political motives, or subjected to exactions not provided for by law, or denied the right of recourse to law or of defence, or removed from the jurisdiction of his natural judge, or subjected to security measures save in cases defined by the law. Art. 20 also reaffirms the basic juridical principle recognized in the *Declaration of the Rights of Man* of 1789: 'No one can be

¹ *Declaration of the Rights of Man*, 10, 11. 'No-one must be molested for his opinions, even religious opinions, so long as their expression does not disturb public order. . . . Every citizen may speak, write and print freely, subject to answering for abuse of this liberty in the cases determined by law.'

² In cases of exceptional emergency, the police may confiscate publications without prior authorization, but must seek this authorization within 24 hours. The addition of this exception was hotly contested.

punished save in virtue of a law in force before the commission of the [incriminated] act.'

Four important juridical and penological principles follow in Art. 21 :

Penal responsibility is personal.

The accused shall not be deemed guilty till final sentence.

Penalties must seek the re-education of the person sentenced, and may not consist of treatment contrary to the sense of humanity.

The death penalty shall not be admitted save in the cases foreseen by the military laws of war.

It is plain that Beccaria's heritage is potent in Italy today.

Art. 22 establishes the personal responsibility of State officials and the civil responsibility of the State for actions infringing the rights of citizens.

Section II of Part I of the Italian Constitution, headed 'Ethico-Social Relations', gives significant expression to the spirit in which the structure of Italian society is conceived, with characteristic blending of principles of conservation and innovation. Here a subtle distinction between the inspiration of the new Italy and France becomes apparent.

The rôle of the *Family* as the basic social group is emphasized in three articles, which declare that :

The Republic recognizes the family as a natural society founded on matrimony.

Matrimony shall entail the moral and juridical equality of the spouses, demanded by the unity of the family. (Art. 23)

(The original draft guaranteed the 'indissolubility of matrimony', making a divorce-law constitutionally impossible, but this provision was outvoted in the Constituent Assembly.)

It is the duty and right of parents to feed, educate and bring up the children, even those born out of wedlock. In case of incapacity, the law shall provide for the fulfilment of these tasks.

The law shall assure to children born out of wedlock all juridical and social protection compatible with the rights of members of the lawful family.

The law shall establish the norms and limits for the tracing of paternity. (Art. 24)

HUMAN RIGHTS IN FRANCE AND ITALY 65

The Republic shall facilitate the formation of the family and the fulfilment of its duties, through opportune economic measures and other forms of social welfare (*providenze*), with especial regard to numerous families.

It shall provide for the protection of motherhood, childhood and youth, favouring institutions necessary to this end. (Art. 25)

In France, the Christian-Democratic currents were unable to achieve more than the mention of the family in the brief item: 'The nation shall assure to the individual and to the family the conditions necessary to their development.'

Art. 26 proclaims the duty of the Republic to protect *health*, guaranteeing free treatment to the indigent. An additional clause declares that

No-one can be compelled to undergo a given form of treatment save as may be disposed by law, which however may not violate the limits imposed by respect of human personality.

It is in Art. 27, on education, that the difference between the French and Italian outlook becomes most marked. The French tradition of laicism, and of the 'duty of the State' to organize free, secular instruction of all grades remains unimpaired. The Italians give specific recognition to the private (i.e. in great majority religious) schools, and reaffirm the ancient autonomy of the university—both measures for which the M.R.P. in France fought in vain. Article 27, in fact, after affirming that 'Art and Science shall be free and freely taught', and the duty of the State to organize education through its own schools, specifies the right of private bodies or persons to open schools and adds:

The law in fixing the rights and obligations of non-State schools asking for parification must assure to them full liberty and to their pupils an equivalent scholastic treatment to that given to pupils of State institutions.

A State Examination is prescribed for entry to the various types of school, for graduation and for professional diplomas, as a further guarantee of equal opportunity for pupils from both types of school. A battle that had been going on since the formation of United Italy is thus finally won—though, as Don Sturzo has pointed out in a recent study, the constitutional provisions may lead either to the reconquest of freedom of the school or to intensified State monopoly.

It is urgent, he notes (it is a view strongly advocated also in France, where the tradition of centralized State control is still more rigid), to ensure the liberty not only of the Catholic schools, but of the whole educational system.¹

A clause of which the final text represented an agreement between Christian-Democrats, Socialists and Communists, authorizes universities and other higher-education bodies to frame their own, autonomous statutes, within the limits allowed by law.

It is further laid down (in Art. 28) that primary education, covering at least eight years, shall be compulsory and free of charge. Here the French Preamble goes considerably further, for it speaks of free education 'at all grades'. The Italian text, affirming the right to the highest-grade education of those 'capable and deserving' of it, regardless of financial considerations, lays down that the Republic shall assure the exercise of this right by scholarships, family allowances and other forms of assistance.

The concluding Article of this Section has aroused some derision among jurists with strict views on what a Constitution should contain. It proclaims that artistic and historical monuments, whoever their owners, shall be protected by the State, and that 'it is also the task of the State to preserve the landscape'.

* * *

Economic Relationships are the theme of Section III of the Italian Constitution. Arts. 30, 31, 32 and 34 deal with the rights of the worker in terms that are sometimes rather the expression of aspirations, the definition of an ideal goal, than the establishment of principles that can be given immediate realization.

The Republic shall provide for the *protection of all forms of labour*, it shall promote agreements with international organizations for the establishment of the rights of labour; it shall recognize freedom of emigration, subject to obligations defined by the law in the general interest, and shall exercise a guardianship over Italian labour abroad (Art. 30).

As in France, the *right to work* of every citizen is affirmed; conditions must be promoted that will render this right effective. At the same time it is the duty of every citizen to contribute, according to his capacities, to the material or spiritual development of

¹ See *Sophia* (International Review of Philosophy and History of Philosophy), Padua, January-March, 1948.

society (Art. 31). A clause making such a contribution a condition for the exercise of political rights was rejected by the Assembly.

The worker has the right to payment proportionate to the quantity and quality of his work, and in all cases adequate to ensure a decent living for himself and his family; he has also the right, which he may not renounce, to a weekly rest-day and to yearly paid holidays. A minimum age for paid employment shall be the subject of special legislative protection, applying the principle of equal pay for equal work (Art. 32).

As in the French Preamble, to every citizen unable to work and without means of subsistence is attributed the right to maintenance and social relief. The State shall install or co-ordinate institutions ensuring adequate means of livelihood to all workers overtaken by accidents, sickness, disablement, old age or involuntary unemployment, and rehabilitation or special training for the maimed, or those suffering from other disabilities. At the same time the freedom of private assistance is guaranteed.

Art. 33 proclaims the *rights of the working woman* to be the same as those of men, with the principle (which has papal endorsement, but for which British feminists are still striving in vain) of equal pay for equal work. It adds that 'conditions of labour must allow her the fulfilment of her essential family function. The law shall ensure to mother and child the same adequate protection.'

Trade-union rights are the subject of Art. 35, which declares that 'Syndical organization shall be free.' Trade-unions shall be subject to no obligation other than registration, for which they must qualify by democratic organization. By registration, they acquire legal recognition as corporate bodies (*personalità giuridica*); through a unitary representation, proportionally determined, they may make collective labour contracts that shall be binding on all concerned in the categories to which these refer. Here, the affirmation in the French Preamble that 'Every man can defend his rights and interests by trade-union action and belong to the trade union of his choice', underlined the persistence of two major organizations, the C.F.T.C. (*Confédération Française des Travailleurs Chrétiens*) and the C.G.T. (*Confédération Générale du Travail*, under Communist and Socialist aegis; non-Communists have since broken away from it, forming a third organization, 'Force Ouvrière'). The Italian text reflects the situation created by the Rome Pact of June 1944, when the Socialist, Christian and Communist unions amalgamated into a single movement, whose officers are elected

by proportional representation, so as to give due value to the diverse component tendencies. The wording, however, guarantees the representation of these currents even were this unity to prove transient. The *right to strike* is defined in the same terms as in the French text: 'The right to strike shall be exercised within the ambit of the law regulating it.' An original bare affirmation that 'all workers have the right to strike' was thus modified, in both cases.

The right of the workers to a *say in management*—a claim that is one of the most significant and characteristic features of the economic orientation of post-war Europe—is more guardedly affirmed in the Italian text than in the French. Where the latter declares unequivocally that every worker, through his delegates, shall participate in management, as well as in determining conditions of work, Art. 43 of the Italian Constitution reads as follows:

For the economic and social elevation of labour, and in harmony with the requirements of production, the Republic recognizes the right of workers to collaborate, in the manner and within the limits established by the laws, in the management of undertakings.

* * *

On questions of *Property* and the scope of *socialisation* the Italian text is of particular interest. Art. 37 proclaims:

Private economic initiative shall be free. It may not be exercised in conflict with social utility, or in a manner endangering security, liberty and human dignity.

The law may establish programmes and controls to ensure the co-ordination of private economic activity for social ends.

Private property, defined in the *Declaration of the Rights of Man* (which in many aspects today stands for conservation) as 'a sacred and inviolable right', is recognized and guaranteed in like fashion in the following article, within limits, to be determined by law, that shall 'ensure its social function and make it accessible to all'. The law may authorize expropriation, for reasons of general interest, on payment of compensation (Art. 38).

The powerful current in France that insists on the distinction between 'socialization' and 'statalization', rejecting the latter, failed to secure the crystallization of its view in the Constitution. In Italy, even a large section of Socialists no longer considers nationalization a panacea for economic ills. Where the French Preamble affirms simply that every asset or enterprise with the character of a public service or de facto monopoly must 'become the property of the collectivity', the Italian Art. 39 reads as follows:

... the law may reserve, or transfer by indemnified expropriation, to the State, to public bodies, or to communities of workers and users, given undertakings or categories of undertakings dealing with essential public services or sources of [electrical] power or holding a monopolistic position, when they have a character of pre-eminent general interest.

The two subsequent articles are inspired by the perennial Italian exigency (which raised problems in the time of Caesar) of *agrarian reform*.

In order to ensure the rational exploitation of the soil, equitable social relationships shall be established; the law shall impose obligations and ties on private landed property, fix the limits of its extension appropriate to the various agricultural regions and zones, enforce and promote the transformation of the *latifondia* and the reconstitution of productive units, and promote land-reclamation and the vocational elevation of the labourers. (Art. 40)

The Republic shall promote and assist small and medium-sized holdings. (Art. 41)

The value set on cooperatives, evident in the reference, in Art. 39, to 'communities of workers and users', is further brought out in Art. 42, in which

The Republic recognizes the social function of co-operation of a mutual benefit character without ends of private speculation.

Its increase is to be encouraged by appropriate legislation. An additional clause to Art. 43 (already cited) provides for the protection and development of the artisan industry, so characteristic of Italian economy.

Finally, setting the hall-mark on an economic conception equally removed from State Socialism and collectivism as from the

plutocratic concentrations of unrestrained capitalism, and seeking the distribution of private property rather than its minimization, Art. 44 proclaims the duty of the Republic *to encourage thrift, to safeguard savings-deposits and facilitate their employment in the purchase of the home or directly cultivated land, as well as in 'direct or indirect share-investment in the great productive complexuses of the country'*. The issue of loans and credits is also made subject to State-coordination and control.

Section IV, on Political Relationships, concludes the 'Bill of Rights' portion of the Italian Constitution, developing items touched upon partly in the *Declaration of the Rights of Man* of 1789, partly in Section I of the French text. Art. 45, like the French Arts. 3 and 4, establishes the principle of universal suffrage for both sexes at the age of majority, declaring that the vote shall be free, equal and secret. The Italian text adds that the exercise of the vote 'is a civic duty', and that the right to vote can be limited only by civil incapacity, or in consequence of an 'irrevocable penal sentence or in case of moral unworthiness indicated by law'.

Art. 46 affirms the right of every citizen to petition Parliament for legislative measures 'or expressing needs of a general order' (the new Constitution makes provision for the right of initiative), and Art. 47 proclaims the right of all

freely to unite in parties so as to co-operate by democratic methods in determining the national policy.

Art. 48 (recalling point 6 of the 1789 Declaration) declares that all citizens of either sex shall have equal access to electoral charges or public offices, where—a traditional Italian formula—it is their duty to 'fulfil in discipline and honour the functions entrusted to them', taking oath as prescribed by law. They shall be guaranteed the time necessary for the fulfilment of public duties, and the resumption of their normal employment when their term of office is ended.

Art. 49 deals with the Armed Forces (Point 12 in the French Declaration of 1789). The defence of the fatherland is declared to be 'the citizen's sacred duty'. Military service is made compulsory, within the limits established by law. It shall prejudice neither employment, nor the exercise of political rights. 'The organization of the Armed Forces shall be informed by the democratic spirit of the Italian Republic.'

Art. 50 proclaims the duty of loyalty to the Republic and of respect for the Constitution and the laws.

Finally, Art. 51, corresponding to Point 13 in the *Declaration of the Rights of Man* and to a generic phrase in the French Preamble, lays down that:

All are bound to contribute to public expenses in proportion to their capacity. The tax system shall be based on criteria of progressive increase (*progressività*).

III

An Introductory Section in the Italian Constitution consists, as has been noted, of 'General Provisions'. It is here, in Arts. 5 and 6, that we find a parallel declaration to that in the French Preamble, where the French Republic proclaims its fidelity to the rules of 'international public law', abjures wars of conquest and the employment of its forces 'against the liberty of any people', and undertakes, subject to reciprocity, to accept 'limitations of sovereignty necessary for the organization and defence of peace'.

The Italian juridical system shall conform to the norms of international law generally recognized. (Art. 5)

Italy repudiates war as an instrument of conquest and of offence against the liberties of other peoples, and as a means of resolution of international controversies; and agrees in conditions of parity to the limitations of sovereignty necessary for an international organization that will assure peace and justice between the nations. (Art. 6)

The theme of sovereignty gives its title to the first Section of the French text. After definition of the nature of the French Republic, with its flag, national anthem (the *Marseillaise*), motto ('Liberty, Equality, Fraternity') and basic principle of 'Government of the people, for the people, by the people' in Arts. 1 and 2,¹ Art. 3 declares, with obvious reminiscence of 1789:²

National sovereignty belongs to the French people. No section of the people, or any individual, can attribute to himself its exercise.

¹ Art. 2 of the Italian Constitution merely deals with the flag. The new national anthem, Mameli's stirring Hymn of 1848, was accepted by a decision of the Constituent Assembly, but is not mentioned in the Constitution.

² 'The principle of all sovereignty resides essentially in the nation. No community, no individual can exercise an authority that does not emanate expressly from the nation' (*Declaration of the Rights of Man*, 3).

The people exercises it, in constitutional matters, through the vote of its representatives and by the Referendum.

In all other matters, it exercises it through its deputies in the National Assembly, elected by universal, equal, direct and secret suffrage.

The Italian text leaves the manner of exercise of popular sovereignty (more varied and elaborate than in the case of France) to a later section, giving as initial definition the statement:

Sovereignty emanates from the people and shall be exercised within the forms and limits of the Constitution and the laws. (Art. 1)

It is, however, in the presentation of the two Republics that a significant distinction appears. France is defined as '*an indivisible laic, democratic and social Republic*'. Italy simply as '*a Republic founded on Labour*'. Contrasting with the French profession of laicism, a tradition too strongly rooted to be broken, Italy, where laicism seemed to have a similar hold after 1870, has introduced the celebrated Art. 7, accepted, so amazingly, thanks to support from the Communist Party:

The State and the Catholic Church are, each in its own sphere, independent and sovereign.

Their relations are regulated by the Lateran Pacts. Any modification of the Pacts, bilaterally accepted, shall not require the procedures of constitutional revision.

This incorporation of the Lateran Pacts in the Constitution does not, however, mean an attempted return to the 'confessional State', but, as Signor Ruini explained, 'the victory of the thesis that considers Catholicism, through the historical traditions of our civilization, and the allegiance of the very great majority of the people, the religion of the Italians'.¹

¹ Dr. Gonella, now Minister for Education, stressed this point in his summary of the Christian-Democratic Programme for the new Constitution (*Quaderni della Democrazia Cristiana*, No. 16, S.E.L.I. Rome, 1946), presented to the first National Congress of the Party in April 1946:

'The constitutional liberties must have a Christian inspiration. We do not want a party, or confessional Constitution, but a Constitution for the Italian people...

'But the Italian people is a Christian people and hence in our country the general principles of politics and of public law must conform to Christian ethics...

'How could a democracy that calls itself Christian, in any case, want a laic State? Roosevelt, Truman, Attlee invoke the name of God and appeal to the Gospel....'

IV

The summary of human rights in the Preamble of the French Constitution has not the same juridical force as the elaborated articles in the text of the Italian Constitution. Written Constitutions, indeed, are not in themselves a guarantee that their provisions will become realities. History shows too many examples of the ease with which admirable Constitutions can be suspended or merely ignored. It must be recognized, too, in the case of both France and Italy, but more particularly in the latter, that many provisions (the right to work, to an adequate wage to ensure a decent living, to adequate maintenance in the case of disability, etc.) must remain frustrated through the economic difficulties of the State, while others will encounter egoistic resistances that only an exceptionally strong Government can overcome. Thus, as we have noted, such provisions, at least for the time being, are aspirations only, but, as just and humane aspirations, they have their value. The Constitutional Court (corresponding more or less to the U.S. Supreme Court) which is being set up in Italy as a buttress to the Constitution, may be expected to work fairly effectively, in view of the strength and soundness of juridical tradition (Italy has here the advantage over France) in a judiciary whose independence is given full guarantees.

The new Italian Constitution, in general, is bolder and more dynamic than the French, as appears most strikingly in its radical decentralization, with the granting of considerable autonomy to Italy's twelve historic Regions. Their position becomes something between that of a British County and an American State, while within this framework the German-speaking South Tyrolese receive local autonomy such that the Austrian Foreign Minister declared (on 30 January, 1948) that he wished all international questions could be settled with the same loyalty and understanding.

The richer conception of the Italian Constitution as compared with the French has a paradoxical origin. It was the sense of defeat that made the French jettison their Constitution of 1875, but when defeat gave place to resplendent victory, a need for radical innovations was less strongly felt. It was with a sense of victory, of the triumphant resistance to the German terror, with the ferment of a Second Risorgimento, that the Italians sought to lay constitutional foundations for a new Italy; as it was more and

more borne home to them that they remained the defeated nation of 1943, the initial ardour faded, so that it took a whole year of prolonged, often wearisome, debate to give the new Constitution final form. Matthew Arnold's couplet could well apply :

For tasks in hours of insight willed
Shall be through hours of gloom fulfilled.

Yet enough of the inspiration of the 'hours of insight' remained to produce a Constitution that has behind it something of the *mystique* of both the First and Second Risorgimento, and in which, cumbersome and imperfect though it may be, the rights of the human person, both individual and variously corporate, are carefully defined and defended. It is ironical that the fine jurists who have given so much thought and impassioned conviction to their affirmation should be debarred from any say in the Charter of Human Rights of the United Nations.

THE OTHER GERMANY

A Note on the Christian Resistance to Nazism

By ROBERT D'HARCOURT

THE question which every German, and especially every German Catholic, must ask himself today', writes Walter Dirks, one of the leaders of post-war Christian Youth in Germany, 'is what was his attitude towards the last war. Not towards the war when Germany was suffering defeat, but towards the war when Germany was triumphant.' Not at the time 'when the rain of bombs from the Anglo-American Air Forces, and the military disasters in the East, West and South were opening the eyes of every German,' but at the time when the war was still bright with promise. 'We must not forget. We must not try to deceive ourselves. Some amongst us had the strength to resist the voice of temptation. Others succumbed to it, utterly, completely. The great majority of us showed ourselves undecided in attitude and divided in heart (*zwiespältig*).'

I re-read these stern words after having read the fine posthumous book by Theodor Haecker (*Tag- u. Nachtbücher*. 1947), and I was tempted to consider them unjust. I turned once more to the volume in which pious hands have compiled the daily notes which the great writer (one of the greatest in Catholic Germany) jotted down in a diary which experienced tragic vicissitudes and only escaped the hands of the Gestapo by a kind of miracle. I re-read those notes written in the silence of the night in Munich. (Haecker had to reckon with possible visits by the police, and it was safer to write at night than during the day.) In these pages Haecker delivered himself of everything that oppressed his mind and heart.

It was not the notes written in 1942 or 1943, when the first signs of breakdown were visible in the German war machine and the shadows of doom were already beginning to appear, to which

I instinctively turned. Nor did I look for those of 1941. I turned to those of 1940, of Spring 1940, written when the German military victory was still fresh with promise, when the delirious enthusiasm was at its height, when all the signs of heaven seemed to augur the final victory of Hitler's arms.

Once more I studied those notes of May and June 1940, and I wondered if the reproach addressed by Walter Dirks to his fellow-Catholics could be levelled at the man who wrote those lines. Could one, without injustice, say that Haecker had shown himself 'undecided in attitude and divided in heart', at the time when the scales were swinging so heavily in Hitler's favour? For, in 1940, Haecker was writing as follows:

18th May, 1940. The voice of the national radio is not only inhuman. It is a mockery of the supernatural life and of the Trinity. At the moment I am writing, that is my only reason for believing that God will not grant victory to the Nazi pestilence. The immense cowardice of so many Catholics and Protestants, who think that they can be delivered from the pestilence within our boundaries only by the course of external events, may well be punished by an increase of the pestilence through these very events. The reason for the fearful strength of the German soldier—the soldier unalloyed—is that he feels no concern to understand the cause for which he is fighting, and that, in fact, since the time of the Prussian hegemony, he has never known that cause. He does not enquire about the goal towards which he is being urged. His beloved calling, for which he is so prodigiously endowed, suspends his faculties. The person who knows how to master him may well be the most contemptible of mankind, he may be obviously leading the people to disaster—it does not matter. The German soldier will continue to function even more efficiently than the machines of war, and they work pretty efficiently.

19th May, 1940. Today the hideous robot-like voice of the national radio has informed us of a thought propounded by its Master. It appears that the dash and dynamic energy of the German soldiers in the rape of Holland and Belgium can only be paralleled in history by the dash of the soldiers of the French Revolution in their conquest of Europe and in spreading the ideas of the Revolution. But nowadays, it is carefully added, the revolutionary idea would be a senile conception, whilst the ideology of National-Socialism is young and vigorous.

The things they have the insolence to tell us in these days! Let us examine this statement a little more closely. The programme of the French Revolution was Liberty, Equality, Fraternity. Those ideas, incidentally, were stolen from Christianity, and partly corrupted and misapplied. But they were ideas which contained a principle capable of creating enthusiasm among men. What are the

ideas of Nazism? Exactly the opposite. First of all, inequality instead of equality (all of which originates from Gobineau's essay on the inequality of the races). Next, oppression instead of liberty (it is the Führer who decrees everything, in Science, Art and Religion). Finally, 'hardness' replaces fraternity (one race alone is proclaimed superior to all others. Certain peoples—Jews or Poles for example—being racially constituted of 'sub-men', cannot claim the status of brothers of Aryans). Those are the ideas which we bring to the world and we expect the world to receive them with enthusiasm! Everything is upside-down: and that is why it is harder to endure this victory than a defeat.

Under the Emperor Augustus, Virgil could openly proclaim his horror of war. Today, such frankness would bring him to the concentration camp. This accursed Reich (*dieses fluchbeladene Reich*) has fallen, because of its apostasy, to depths lower than paganism.

22nd May, 1940. France has many Saints because she contains many souls who pray. There are many prayers rising to Heaven from France at this moment. They will not be heard, perhaps—not today.

I cannot imagine a Peace which would resemble a Pax Romana. The whole future seems black to me. I think the probable outcome will be exhaustion. But that would be no Peace. From the point of view of culture there would be a dreadful desert everywhere—but especially in Germany. Southern Germany, Catholic Germany, is Prussianized (*verpreusst*)—that is, destroyed. In Italy the steam-roller of Fascism has smashed down everything. Will England and France go the same way? America, I think, is too young a nation. But perhaps I am mistaken. Fundamentally all that is immaterial, because there will be no decisive result. Perhaps there will never be a decision. Lord, help thou my unbelief!

Men continually begin building the Tower of Babel over again, and, when the Tower falls in ruins, they say (and they will keep on saying till the end of time): 'We were within a hairsbreadth of succeeding. There was some mistake, a tiny flaw in the building, which ruined everything.' Or else they say, 'A handful of saboteurs wrecked our plan.'

26th May, 1940. If I were to die today, I would certainly die overwhelmed and engulfed by sadness (like everything else on earth which comes to maturity). I would die with the vision of the dismal days, the 'dark ages' in store for us. But I would not die despairing. I think that nothing can wrest the Faith from me any more. Grant, O God, that this light may remain with me! Yes, if I died today, radically hostile to the spirit which is reigning among my people, I would still not die despairing—and is not that, too, a witnessing to Truth? As for my sadness; well, is there not cause for sadness today, my friends? I am living in spiritual and material difficulty. I am living under a cloud. But when difficulties pile upon me I have one remedy: I throw myself on the incomprehensible abyss of God (*ich stürze mich in die Unbegreiflichkeit Gottes.*)

31st May, 1940. The ultimate cause of this war is hatred of Christ and His Kingdom: and that is what makes the policy of Mussolini so contemptible and vile. It is said everywhere that he will attack tomorrow. The name he will bear in Europe will be: treason. . . . If it be true, as they tell us, that this is the war between the plutocrats and the have-nots, between the Capitalists and the Socialists, and that the stake is the fruits of the earth—then it is the most criminal of follies, because the decision is bought by piles, by mountains of dead. But I don't believe it. The real meaning and the real stake in such wars are much higher things.

1st and 2nd June, 1940 [when the British Army was evacuating Dunkirk]. Reading the communiqué 'weather overcast', I thought again of Newman's theory about the coincidence of natural events at certain times as being the sign of Divine Providence. If Newman were alive he would say in a sermon: 'An angel caused a calm on the waters of the Channel which usually run high with storms at this time of the year, and at the same time he spread over the sea a veil of impenetrable mist.' And thus tens of thousands of men have been saved. . . .

Hegel was originally a great speculative mind but, like many South Germans, he underwent the Prussian infection. Prussian idealism took from the Germans their heart of flesh and blood, and in return it gave them a heart of paper and iron. Thenceforward the heart of the Germans was to be made of paper and iron, of acts and phrases. And therein lies the inhumanity of the Germans as they are made in Prussia. Duty bound up in a sentence—that is the essential definition of the brutalizing (*Entmenschung*) of the individual. And it is a Prussian invention.

It is a double process. A man accomplishes his duty in a phrase or, conversely, duty itself becomes a phrase. Today we see both phenomena. Fortunately, in all parts of the world, men have still sufficient healthy instinct to defend themselves with all their strength against this inhumanity. Frederick II's proclaiming himself 'the servant of the State' was even then a mere phrase. Frederick was much more sincere and truthful when he admitted that it was ambition which had led him to attack Silesia. . . .

Dictatorships are always feverish impulses. Medicine teaches us how long a fever can last in a human being. It is not otherwise with nations on the moral plane. . . . The hour of Evil is when Satan works more miracles than God. . . . It cannot be denied that, at the present time, a great effort is being made to govern the life of Man with the sole help of a religion of this world. In the last analysis we are witnessing an attack against God. God might permit that attack to end in triumph. It would be the end of Europe.

14th June, 1940. Our troops have entered Paris in triumph. If the Germans were real Pagans even, they would feel within themselves something of the fear which the Ancients knew, of the Nemesis of the Gods. . . . Success is the child of technocracy. Any people which has consecrated itself body and soul to technocracy must achieve

success. But it purchases that success by the loss of its soul. The 'robot-man' was originally a French conception, but only the Prussians made it a reality, after their triumph over the Germans. . . . Success (*Erfolg*) is a natural product of technocracy. But the blessing (*der Segen*) of the efforts of Man belongs to God. The blessing of God may rest upon the most unsuccessful individual or nation, and His curse on the most glittering success. The confusion between these two concepts of success and blessing is at the root of the most prodigious disorder in men's minds today.

The 'prophetic' voice of the Church is silent as though her function of prophecy were in abeyance. Is this, too, a part of the general picture of the conquering hour of Evil? We walk stumbling in the night. . . . Yet, in many simple hearts today, there is being born a confused foreboding that our successes cannot be blessed.

23rd June, 1940. Yet again a little time, and how shallow will appear those souls who have been uncritically carried away by the tumult of the days through which we are living.

'Germany will cure the world' (*am deutschen Wesen soll die Welt genesen*). The Nazis do not say that simply because of its rhyme: they really think so. One could keep the rhyme and say exactly the opposite, with much greater truth: 'Germany will putrefy the world' (*am deutschen Wesen soll die Welt verwesen*). What is being proclaimed is *Salus ex Germanis*. There is to be no more talk of *Salus ex Judaeis*. They are overturning the history of the world, or rather that of the salvation of mankind. . . . Their attitude to the Christian religion is not the purely political attitude of a Machiavelli or a Napoleon. They are not content with wishing to make religion subserve their plans for domination. They wish to destroy it and take its place. *Salus ex Germanis*: the German, bearer of Light and Salvation (*der germanische Heil- u. Lichtbringer*), is to take the place of Christ. . . . The moral, religious and material misery which they will bring down upon the world exceeds everything that we can guess. It is only comparable to the visions of Patmos. How black is the prospect before us!

I have purposely limited these quotations to the months of May and June 1940.¹ These pages, written at the zenith of Hitler's victory, were in reality written at the blackest hour for those Germans who saw in the Swastika the sign of their nation's

¹ I would not think it right, however, not to reproduce for the reader the page of Haecker's Diary for the last day of 1940. 'Roosevelt has just spoken. It seems clear that he knows, or at least divines, what is at stake. It is something much more than democracy. The stake is Man. It is to decide whether the triumph of lying will put an end to humanity: whether it is the destiny of the Germans to bring darkness on the earth for a thousand years. I do not believe it. I cannot believe it. The phrase in the Gospel "Fear not" echoes in my heart. We are going through a hideous torment, but we shall be delivered from the most evil criminals Germany has ever known. I pledge myself in advance to endure any horrors by thinking of the gratitude we owe to God for not having permitted that bondage. But how long will the night last, O God, how long?'

shame. Composed in the hours of silence which were so rare in the Third Reich (the régime made its allies of noise and tumult and everything which prevents Man from being alone with himself), this nocturnal diary was at first a constraint for Haecker, as he has confessed to us. Afterwards he found strange contentment in it. Therein he took revenge on everything which oppressed his soul. These meditations illumined his night.

Such unequivocal professions of faith, even though written by night, were not without danger in the Third Reich. It was not a prudent idea to keep them for too long a period in one's own home, especially when one had come under the notice of the Gestapo, as was the case of Haecker, who had early been forbidden to write by the authorities, and whose house had often been honoured by police searches. The manuscript of the Diary moved from one house to another. There was always someone brave enough to harbour it.

One day the lackeys of the Gestapo called again at Haecker's home. By a fatal coincidence the manuscript, which normally was locked away, was lying that day on a table in the main room of the house, visible to anyone. It was this very obviousness which diverted the police from examining it at once. They proceeded to their routine investigations, opening cupboards and conscientiously rifling drawers.

Meanwhile a strange presentiment prompted Haecker's daughter, who did not live with her father, to call at that very time. (The whole sequence of the events of that day has the stamp of Providential intervention.) At the first glance she grasped the danger of the situation and, obeying a sudden inspiration, she exclaimed that she was late for a music lesson (invented for the occasion), openly took the fatal manuscript and left the house. The Gestapo guards at the door allowed her to pass. Haecker was saved.

She returned an hour later. The Gestapo was still in the house. This time they decided to search her brief-case. But their curiosity was belated. The contents had been changed. The case really did, by this time, contain sheets of music; the compromising diary was in the safe keeping of a priest in the neighbourhood—and he had duly supplied the girl with the innocuous sheets of music which supported her story.

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As may be imagined, a writer with such an ardent faith as Theodor Haecker did not content himself with writing in silence. Every man convinced of the rightness of his cause becomes an apostle of that cause. Haecker soon gathered round himself an audience, mainly young men, to whom he communicated his ardour. The meeting-place was an artist's studio in Munich, in the Schwabing district, the haunt of the intellectuals and artists. At these meetings the above-quoted passages of the Diary were read.

But the same meeting-place was to shelter something more in the nature of direct action. The painter's studio was transformed into a printing-shop. From there was circulated a whole underground literature, aimed against Hitler, and composed during the night with any material which came to hand, in exactly the same style as the underground literature in France.

These propaganda sheets were called 'Leaves of the White Rose' (*Blätter der Weissen Rose*). The authors were students, Hans Scholl, aged twenty-four, a medical student, and his sister Sophie, aged twenty-one, a student in Philosophy, both born at Ulm. Associated with them was a group composed of their friend, Christopher Probst, also a student, and a professor of Philosophy, Kurt Huber, whose class on Leibnitz was eagerly followed by his students, who knew the ideas of the professor and revered his courage.

Hans Scholl, the leader of the group, was a handsome, energetic and intelligent youth. He had a fine career before him. Full of the love of life, his tastes were for music and French literature. In short, his youth was full of promise of a life of ease and distinction. He dedicated that life to the struggle for liberty, well knowing the dangers of the fight he waged. He knew what he was risking when he wrote sentences like these, which are quoted from 'The Leaves of the White Rose'.

Every word which proceeds from the mouth of Hitler is a lie. When he says 'peace' he is thinking 'war'. When he invokes the name of the Almighty, it is Satan whom he adores. His mouth is the stinking maw of Hell (*der stinkende Rachen der Hölle*). . . . How can we find the weak spot in this hateful régime? Our watchword will be simple: sabotage in the war-factories, sabotage of their propaganda (meetings, demonstrations, etc.), sabotage of all technical establishments which permit the prosecution of this war (research laboratories), sabotage of newspapers which spread the Brown Lie, sabotage of the Party street-collections.

These challenges to brute force sped from the studio in Schwabing into houses where they aroused responses, sometimes eager, sometimes fearful. Some recipients were chilled with terror when the morning mail brought these messages of the White Rose inside an innocent typewritten envelope, and hastened to destroy the inflammatory news-sheets. Timid opponents of the régime kept them—but well concealed. The braver spirits passed them on to other readers.

As often happens in that kind of enterprise, the bold plotters were encouraged by their impunity. Day by day, Scholl became more daring. He no longer called his news-sheets 'The White Rose', but, undisguisedly, 'News-sheets of the German Resistance' (*Flugblätter der Widerstandsbewegung in Deutschland*). His activity had long since brought him within the shadow of the Gestapo and he worked more and more openly. Months passed. Came the beginning of 1943. The disaster of Stalingrad made the first deep crack in the Nazi propaganda. From end to end of the Ludwigstrasse, one of the main traffic arteries of Munich, there appeared, chalked on the walls and pavements, the words: 'Liberty! Down with Hitler!' Hans Scholl decided to strike boldly.

On 18 February, 1943, he left his home with two heavy cases in his hand. Those who saw him go testify that his youthful face never looked more cheerful. He set out for the University, where he deposited copies of his propaganda tracts in many of the lecture-rooms, and then hurled the remainder of his explosive burden down the main staircase of the University. The heavy bundles of paper, thrown noisily, went smashing down on the flagstones of the ground floor.

The University porter came running at the noise, and set off the alarm system, which in turn brought the Gestapo into action. All the exits were guarded and Hans Scholl and his sister apprehended. They allowed themselves to be arrested without losing their look of radiant faith. In life and in death they were to be the apostles of an idea. The contents of the tracts seized by the police permitted no illusions about their fate. Here is the text of that leaflet:

Men and women fellow-students! Our people is stricken with horror at the disaster of Stalingrad. 330,000 German soldiers have been hurled stupidly, criminally, to death and ruin. That is the balance-sheet of the inspired strategy of 'the Corporal of World

War' (*Weltkriegsgefreiter*—the title which Hitler had assumed). We thank thee, Führer!

The minds of our German people are in ferment. How long are we going to confide the fate of our armies to this blood-stained mountebank? Are we going to sacrifice the remainder of our Youth to the base lust for power of a Party clique any longer? Never! The time has come to settle accounts—that settlement which German Youth demands—with the most atrocious tyranny which our people has ever endured. We have come to manhood in the midst of a State which is determined to gag all free expression of opinion. The finest years of our lives have been sacrificed to the H.J. (*Hitler Jugend*—Hitler Youth), to the S.A. and the S.S., whose task was to mass-produce and dope our minds. 'Doctrinal formation'—that is the name which was given to a scheme for smothering all freedom of thought under the mask of the most hollow phrase-mongering. In these fortresses of Order (*Ordensburgen*) they set about selecting the Führers of the future, the future bonzes of the Party. The aim was to train generations of murderers (*Mordbuden*) and rogues broken in to a blind and stupid obedience (*blinde, stupide Führergefollgschaft*).

For us there must be only one watchword—War on the Party! Let us quit *en masse* these Associations in which the aim is to gag us politically! Let us quit the lecture-rooms which are under the surveillance of the S.S. and are spied upon by their lackeys. We want knowledge—true knowledge. We want freedom of thought. No threat, even that of closing the University, must frighten us.

For ten long years Hitler and his followers have vilely exploited the two greatest words in the German language: Freedom and Honour. They have deformed these words, dragged them in the mire like the mummers they are, not hesitating to make husks for swine of the highest ideals of the nation. What they mean by Liberty and Honour is shown clearly enough in their ten years of systematic destruction of the moral fibre of our people. Today there is no German so stupid as not to have his eyes opened by the blood-bath into which these creatures have plunged Europe in the name of the Liberty and Honour of the German nation. The name of 'German' is forever sullied if German youth does not rise to shatter its torturers (*Peiniger*) into fragments, and to build a new spiritual Europe. Men and women fellow-students! The people of Germany looks towards us! In 1813 we destroyed the yoke of Napoleon. In 1943, sustained by the strength of the Spirit, we shall destroy the Nazi terror. In the East the flames of the Beresina and of Stalingrad rise in the sky. The dead of Stalingrad call to us. In its faith in Liberty and Honour, our people is rising against the slavery which Nazism is trying to impose on Europe.

In the Third Reich such a pamphlet could entail only one verdict on the writers—the death sentence. Nazi 'justice' was not slow to act. Arrested on 18 February, condemned on the 22nd,

Hans and Sophie Scholl were beheaded by the axe in the prison at Stadelheim three hours after the sentence had been pronounced. Hans Scholl's only defence, shouted in the face of his judges, was 'Long live Freedom!' And here are the findings of the Court:

The People's Tribunal, at its session of 22 February, 1943, at the Assizes in the High Court, sentenced to death Hans Scholl, Sophie Scholl and Christopher Probst, convicted of plotting high treason and assisting the enemy (*Feindbegünstigung*). The guilty persons endeavoured, by the diffusion of highly treasonable tracts, shamelessly (*in schamloser Weise*) to impair the will to resistance of the German people. In view of the heroic fight which is being carried on by our people, these degenerate individuals (*verworfenen Subjekte*) deserve only a rapid and ignominious death.

The cases of the other accused were more long-drawn-out. Those concerned were two other students implicated in the same demonstration, Alexander Schmorell and Willi Graf, who were executed respectively on 13 July and 22 October, and Professor Kurt Huber. During the hearing of Professor Huber's case there were some dramatic exchanges. The Nazi prosecutor, Freisler, hideous in his red robes, gesturing in the course of one of the oratorical effects to which he was given, shouted at the accused, 'You have made common cause with the murderers of Katyn!' But the Professor, a man of retiring nature in ordinary life, was fearless in the greatness of his cause. 'How can you have the effrontery to say that?', he riposted. 'You, who have on your conscience many more victims than the murderers of Katyn!'

Before his death, Professor Huber had written his testament—that of a teacher, a lover of ideas—couched in accents of the noblest candour:

My object was to arouse the conscience of our students. My action is not one of illegality, but entirely the opposite—it is the re-establishment of legality. I have had constantly before my mind the 'categorical imperative' of Kant. I have constantly asked myself what would be the result if my own rule of conduct became a universal maxim. And, viewed in that light, I had to answer that my activity was good. . . . In the remotest corners of Europe the right of peoples to dispose of themselves is violated today. Among ourselves the real community of the people is systematically poisoned by the distrust sown between man and man. There has never been a more appalling verdict recorded on a community of people than the admission which every one of us is forced to make: that is, that no

German can have trust in his neighbour, nor any father in his sons. . . . I have achieved my goal, which was to utter a supreme warning, not before some little private club, but before the highest Court of Justice in my country. For this purpose the forfeit of my life is all too small. I demand that freedom should be restored to our German people. We do not want to spend our short human lives in the chains of slaves, even though the chains were those of a life filled with every material satisfaction. I leave behind me in mourning and poverty my unhappy wife and two poor children. I ask you to grant to this poor family the support befitting my status as a University Professor. You have stripped me of my dignity as a Professor—a title which I gained *summa cum laude*. But that interior dignity, that moral dignity which pertains to a University Professor proclaiming his ideas bravely, no trial for high treason can wrest from me. I have firm confidence that History will justify my acts. I wish with all my heart that the moral forces which have guided me may free themselves in my people. I have acted as an inner voice commanded me.

He, too, fell under the axe on 13 July, 1943. Do not let us think that such seeds are sown in vain. In an admirable speech at Munich in November 1945, to the memory of Hans Scholl and his sister, Romano Guardini dwelt eloquently on the rich fecundity of their sacrifice. On the very evening of the execution of the two unsullied heroes, unknown hands chalked everywhere on the walls of Munich three words: *Der Geist lebt* (The Spirit lives on).

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Such magnificent examples of the Resistance in Germany (in the intellectual sector which is being specially studied in this essay) should not cause us to lose sight of the larger proportions of the subject. At all times it is the duty of a historian to record truly the distribution of light and shadow, and this becomes a question of moral scruple when we attempt to weigh responsibilities in that dim land which was Germany during the years of tyranny. If it is true to say that many students remained staunch in face of the multiple temptations of Nazism, one cannot say as much for their teachers. If we place side by side the names of those University Professors who remained true to Liberty under the tyranny, and those who, rather than lose their Chairs and salaries, arrayed themselves without a qualm on the side of brute force, the comparison provides a sad spectacle. (Those who yielded always alleged to themselves and others the specious reasons which cowardice always discovers: 'By keeping my

position I am defending one Chair: I am barring the path against worse things', and so on.) For one Alfred Weber, one Walter Eucken, one Schnabel, one Beutler, one Edward Spranger, one Karl Jaspers, how many were the deserters from the cause of the Spirit! Their number is so great that it discourages enumeration. As one Professor told the writer recently, 'There is nothing in the recital to make one feel proud of our Corporation.'

The treason of the teachers renders still more praiseworthy the fidelity of the alumni. Thirty per cent of students, scorning all the chances of careers, and despite the cynical pressure of the *Reichsstudentenföhrer*, refused to join the Nazi student organization (*nationalsozialistischer Studentenbund*). And they could not look to their Professors for example and encouragement. The youthful heroism of such a one as Hans Scholl places in its true light the attitude of a Catholic poet like Max Mell, who sang Hitler's praise in 1938, in his poem *Du, gewaltiger Mann* (Thou, mighty man), or of a noted professor like Joseph Nadler, who tamely consented to revise the fourth edition of his *History of Literature* in accordance with Nazi teachings. The 'sacrifice of morning' renders more evident the calculating temporizings of the old men.

It is not without sadness that one thinks of Gerhard Hauptmann being brought in pomp to Vienna in the personal railway coach of the Führer of Nazi Youth, Baldur von Schirach. One remembers how methodically and skilfully the stages in this 'annexation' of the patriarch of German literature were conducted by the Nazis. In April 1933 Hauptmann was at his estate at Kiddensee. There he received an invitation from the National-Socialist Party to make a speech at the German Labour Day Rally. On that same day Hauptmann was entertaining some author-friends who keenly observed his reaction. Hauptmann despised Hitler, but he feared him also. He hesitated, but he had to make a decision. He turned to his guests, and affecting an attitude of ironical detachment, said (how the memory of such remarks lingers!): 'Oh, well! I have spoken so often, on so many occasions and on behalf of so many political movements! One speech more or less . . .'

Perhaps Hauptmann thought that day that it was not he who was making the approach to Hitler, but Hitler who was making advances to him; and that, fundamentally, it was the political machine which was bowing to the criteria of Art, implicitly recognizing the primacy of the latter. Perhaps such men as

Richard Strauss and Furtwangler quieted their consciences in similar fashion. But the facts remain to distress us. . . .

This lack of perception of the dignity of the Spirit among so many German intellectuals seems to me to be most ingenuously avowed in the reply by Richard Kassner to a Swiss journalist, who expressed astonishment that there should have been no clandestine literature in Germany comparable to that in Occupied France. 'What could one do? The slightest sign of opposition meant being hanged. It was not really cowardice on our part. One cannot combat criminals without losing one's own standards. (*sic*).'

A strange conception of the honour of the Spirit! But those are simply the poor excuses of cowardice. There come to mind the words of judgement about his fellow-writers by another German intellectual who, for one, lived heroically through the shameful era—Reinhold Schneider:

At the top the leaders orated, but the lower ranks remained obstinately silent (*es wurde beharrlich geschwiegen*). . . . Our ear was doubly betrayed: from one side by an untruthful, exaggerated propaganda, from the other by the half-truths, the semi-compromises, the contradictions and the mendacious excuses which we made to ourselves so as to be able to continue our lives as lecturers and writers.

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These pages have surveyed very rapidly some aspects of the resistance to Nazism among the German intellectuals. Before leaving the theme, something should be said of the resistance in other sectors. It would require volumes to give a reasonably complete account of the subject.¹

One point is worthy of emphasis before any other. The German Resistance was not confined to any one sector of life or opinion. It permeated the whole nation, from Communism to the extreme Right of Conservatism, from the passionately anti-militarist Socialists to the old caste of Generals, from practising Catholics to convinced atheists, from the bourgeoisie to the aristocracy. In its ranks are to be found workers and ambassadors (von der Schulenberg, von Bernstoff, von Hassel): dancers (Oda Schottmüller) and Protestant ministers (Dietrich, Bonhoeffer, Asmussen, Niemöller); Jesuits (Frs. Delp, Koenig, Roesch) and

¹Two such have now been written. The reader is referred to Rudolf Pechel's excellent book, *Deutscher Widerstand* (German Resistance), Zurich, 1947, and to Ulrich von Hassel's *Das Andere Deutschland* (The Other Germany). There exists also *Underground Germany*, by Allen Dulles.

opera singers; Jews and Cardinals (Faulhaber, Galen, Preysing); generals (Beck, Stülpnagel, Witzleben) and society ladies (Hanna Solf, Lagi Ballestrem, Elizabeth von Thadden). There were conspiracies against Hitler in suburban cellars and around fashionable tea-tables. The shame of seeing Germany dishonoured by the man who spoke in her name, the consciousness of the duty of taking an active part in the struggle against him, with all its risks—these things were the exclusive privilege of no one class in Germany. The disciples of Lenin made common cause with the General Staff. In June 1944 a Communist leader (who was arrested five days later and hanged himself in his cell lest he might betray his fellows) said to the wife of Rudolf Pechel, the resistance writer: 'At the present juncture of affairs we can now strike a pact with the Devil—I mean the Generals—and combine to carry out a *coup d'état*.'

It is difficult to arrive at a comprehensive estimate of the German Resistance. First of all, it is indispensable to make distinctions between the different sectors. Taking the Universities alone, one finds that the Medical Faculties, for example, were much more staunch than those of Law. In contrast to the numerous intellectuals who were found lacking in courage there must be honoured such writers as Ernst Wiechert, Haecker, Ricarda Ruch, Guardini, Werner Bergengrün, Reinhold Schneider and Jaspers, to quote only a few names. There must also be cited the names of the Reviews which maintained worthy traditions (*Hochland*, *Deutsche Rundschau*, *Stimmen der Zeit*).

The fact remains that the Resistance did not play in Germany the rôle which it fulfilled in other countries occupied by Hitler, that it was carried on by isolated individuals, and that, as a whole, it remained outside the nation. There were several reasons for this. First, and probably fundamental, was the endemic weakness of Germans in the presence of the regular machinery of Government, their innate respect for established authority. Again, after 1939, there was the fact that, to many Germans, any secret blow aimed at the leaders of their country appeared like treason and something in the nature of the 'stab in the back' of much-advertised memory.¹

¹ 'The psychological conditions in which the fighters for freedom worked,' writes Rudolf Pechel very justly in his book on *The German Resistance*, 'were quite different from those in the occupied countries. The nations violated by the invasion of the Nazi armies were confronted by a clear situation and a struggle which left no possibility of misunderstanding: they were fighting against the enemy of their country. All the noblest sentiments of the heart—love of one's people, of Liberty, Justice and Humanity—united to sustain the sentiment of duty—the duty of fighting for one's despoiled fatherland.'

Those are the general reasons. To them must be added some particular causes which an Opposition writer, Günther Weiserborn, seems to me to have outlined very clearly in his 'Speech on the German Resistance', delivered at the Hebbel Theatre in Berlin, on 11 May, 1946.

First of all, the conditions of the terrain: the much greater difficulty of the underground fight in the home territory of the Gestapo than in the occupied countries. In Germany the Gestapo was operating on familiar and well-reconnoitred ground. It knew the anti-Fascists—the individuals, their meeting-places, their methods. It had had twelve years and more to lay its network, to organize detailed supervision of the postal, telephone and other services. It was at home. In Norway, Yugoslavia, France, Holland and Belgium it was working against 'the unknown'. And it had only four years to study the terrain.

Next—and of supreme importance—the Resistance in the occupied territories had this great strength at its disposal—liaison with the Allies still at war. We cannot but admit the truth of Weiserborn's argument about the immense *outside* help which came to the French Resistance. The Resistance in Germany had to depend on unaided internal support.¹

It must be added that, on the rare occasions when it sought contacts with the outside world, under conditions of extreme difficulty, the results were discouraging. The Anglican Bishop of Chichester, Dr. Bell, has written in the pages of the *Contemporary Review* an article of historic interest.² He has told us of conversations which he carried on in Stockholm in Spring 1942, with two Germans of the Resistance, Dr. Schoenfeld and Rev. Mr. Bonhoeffer (the second of whom was afterwards implicated in the plot of 20 July, 1944, and hanged).

The two Germans acquainted Dr. Bell with the internal situation in their country. They informed him of the strength of the anti-Hitler movement, which had accredited them to make contact with the Allied Powers. They showed that the network covered the whole country, even at that time, having reliable contacts in the General Staff, the clergy, the underground Trade Unions, and that its key positions were in the great cities like

¹ 'The French, Norwegians and Yugoslavs could always have in mind the help which was coming to them through the Allied landings. That possibility greatly sustained their will to resistance. A German who entered the struggle against Hitler could not count on outside help.'—Weiserborn.

² 'The Background to the Hitler Plot'—*The Contemporary Review*, October, 1945.

Berlin and Cologne. They gave the names of their trusted supporters in places of authority (names which later figured in the list of victims after the 1944 plot)—Goerdeler, Beck, Hammerstein, Jakob Kaiser. They outlined their programme for a new Germany purged of despotism, renouncing autarchy for ever, taking its place within a confederation of free European States opposed to all forms of militarism. The strength of this federation for Peace was to be assured by an international Army. They were prepared to break off diplomatic relations with Japan, to help re-establish Poland and Czecho-Slovakia as free sovereign States taking their places in the Council of Nations, and to abolish the racial laws against the Jews.

After thus setting out their programme they put some questions. Would the Allies consent to treat with an honest Germany which had been purged of Nazi tyranny? Would the Allies be prepared, as from that time, to make a clear pronouncement on this programme which would be binding for the future?

On his return to England, the Bishop made a report to the Foreign Office on his conversations at Stockholm. Mr. Eden examined it, and informed the Bishop that the names of several of the conspirators were known to the Foreign Office, but expressed doubts about the possibilities of acting upon these conversations, as the latter might cause the United States and Russia to imagine that Britain was seeking to establish separate negotiations with Germany. The idea was dropped and the report was relegated to the Limbo of diplomatic files, the cemetery of so many similar reports.

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I have tried in these few pages to give some scattered ideas of the nature and extent of the opposition to Nazism in the country of its origin. The German Resistance did exist. The victors have spot-lighted the rottennesses of the Third Reich, the vileness of Buchenwald and Auschwitz. We have a duty in justice not to leave in the shadows the heroism which was shown in Germany. Germany as a whole must not be judged on the record of her concentration camps. This study has dealt, though only in a fugitive manner, with a few episodes. The subject still remains to be fully studied in France. It will be facilitated by the works which we may certainly expect from beyond the Rhine. Germany has an obvious interest in throwing light on this chapter of her history. Her honour is involved.

THE PRESUPPOSITIONS OF PHYSICAL SCIENCE

By E. F. CALDIN

THE last decade has seen a considerable growth of interest in the history and method of science. This has been partly due to a more or less continuous debate about the place of science in society, which has coloured some current accounts of the history of science in no small degree. The view of the 'social function' of science that has been popularized by such writers as Hogben, Bernal, and Crowther¹ is that science exists to provide techniques for promoting material welfare. The corresponding popular view of the development of science is that it has been, and ought to be, controlled by the material wants of man. This view appears to rest on a confusion between science and technology, two branches of study which differ radically as regards their ends; for the end of science is knowledge about the behaviour of material nature, and the goods that knowledge brings, while the end of technology is the control and use of material nature, and the goods that control makes accessible.

The truth which is exaggerated in this popular view is that science has been helped, especially in its earlier developments, by the empirical knowledge accumulated by craftsmen of all kinds, and by the prospect of rapid applications of scientific knowledge. It is true, and important, that scientists are part of the social organism, and are not insulated from the movements of their times; and historians of science ought, while respecting the inner logic of science itself, to remember that science is made by scientists, whose outlook and interests will be at least coloured by those of their fellow-men. But the correct conclusion from this is that we need an account of the development of science in the wider setting of its relation to thought, literature, art and religion, as well as to technical arts and crafts. It is an over-simplification of

¹ Cf. Hogben, *Science for the Citizen*; Bernal, *The Social Function of Science*; J. G. Crowther, *The Social Relations of Science*.

this truth to say that it is the material needs of society (or of its rulers) that are the predominant influence on scientists. It might be more accurate to say that the most important element in the influence of society on scientists at a given time and place is the intellectual climate, and in particular the current beliefs about nature. Science develops because men are inquisitive and wish to understand natural phenomena; the growth of science, therefore, depends on a mental climate in which it is assumed that phenomena are intelligible, and, as we shall see, it is a presupposition of scientific method that there is order in material nature. In this article we shall examine the inductive method as used by physical science, in order to indicate its presuppositions, and hence the intellectual pre-conditions for its use. It will then be possible to assess some of the historical factors that favoured the rapid rise of physical science in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries.

We shall take the work of Galileo as representing the beginning of physical science in the modern sense. Its development at this period is very rapid; the acceleration begins with Stevinus of Bruges, only a few years before Galileo's physical work; and a few years later, the work of the Accademia del Cimento shows that Galileo's methods are established as the normal way of practising physics. From Galileo's accounts of his own work it appears that the modern physical method, consisting of controlled experiment, measurement, inductive generalization leading to quantitative laws, and mathematical interpretations of these laws, had already reached its full development, as far as basic principles are concerned. It is a pardonable exaggeration to call Galileo the father of modern physics. Our procedure is, then, first to consider the actual method of physics in order to discover its presuppositions; then to consider the factors that made possible Galileo's unquestioning assumption of the truth of those presuppositions and of the validity and usefulness of the inductive method; in the hope of indicating a way to approach the history of science that may correct the one-sided and indeed misleading approach of too many contemporary writers.

II

Physical scientists obtain their information by measurements on inanimate matter. They are not concerned with living beings

as such, nor with man-made objects, but with non-living beings or inanimate matter as such. And their examination of it is not philosophical, theological or aesthetic, but is concerned with empirical regularities in phenomena. It consists first in measuring; only what is measurable is of interest, and so every non-measurable characteristic of the object is neglected from the start. It is worth noting at the outset that this self-restriction of physics to measurable phenomena, to one single aspect of the material world, implies that physics cannot contribute the knowledge essential to the solution of fundamental philosophical problems. The difference between philosophy and physics is not between the appeal to *a priori* knowledge and the appeal to experience; both must rely upon experience and on its interpretation. Nor is it the difference between emotion and reason; both rely on rational interpretation of experience. Nor is it the difference between subjective and objective; philosophy and physics alike rely both on attention to objective fact and on personal reflection. The difference is that physics is restricted to the measurable aspect of inanimate matter, whereas philosophy should aim at being a commentary on experience as a whole. For instance, physics excludes from consideration, from the start, everything characteristic of a human act; that men have intellects and wills is taken for granted and not further examined, for measurement sheds no light upon it. Consequently, physics cannot possibly have any bearing upon rational action or the freedom of the human will, and the general philosophical problem of causality is likewise beyond its reach. The belief entertained by some scientists that physical indeterminacy guarantees human free will, which would otherwise be incompatible with physics, is a bogus solution of a non-existent problem.

In its simplest form, a physical experiment consists in observing the concomitant values of two measurable quantities, one of which can be caused to vary by the experimenter. Everyone knows the generalization called Boyle's law, that if the pressure on a gas is increased the volume is proportionately decreased, other things being equal. In an experiment to determine the relation between the pressure and volume of a gas, one investigates the way in which the volume of a specimen of the gas varies when the pressure is altered, every other variable (such as temperature) being kept as constant as possible. The fact that the experimenter is a part cause of the changes which occur, and that he must have some

motive for doing as he does, is ignored; *quâ* physicists, we consider only the measured quantities. We first observe a series of pairs of values for the pressure and volume; this is the raw material of physics. We then try to find a simple quantitative relation which is approximately fitted by all of them; a good solution turns out to be 'volume varies inversely as pressure', or 'pressure multiplied by volume equals constant', and this is said to be an empirical law derived from the observations. But this is, on the face of it, a curious procedure: we have written an exact mathematical equation in place of some observations which were few in number (compared to the total number of possible states of the system), and of which none may fit the equation exactly. We have assumed that the deviations from an exact law are due to 'experimental error', and that the law holds for all values of the variable although only a few have been investigated. We have in fact already gone beyond the immediate evidence. We do so again in the next step. So far all our statements have been about one specimen of the gas, and one kind of experiment on it. Suppose now we carry out other experiments on this same specimen of gas, and observe its density, heat conductivity, and arc spectrum. After a large number of such experiments we say 'This specimen of gas appears to have a number of nearly constant properties; under the same conditions, it always has the same arc spectrum, within experimental error, and so on.' We then come across another specimen of gas which gives the same spectrum; on examination it proves to have all the same properties as the first specimen, within experimental error. This happens several times with other specimens. We then make the generalization 'Every specimen of gas which gives such and such a spectrum also has such and such other properties'. We have found a *kind* of gas, which has constant properties whatever specimen we examine. This is a second kind of empirical law. In formulating it, we have not only gone beyond the evidence in the way previously mentioned; we have gone beyond it much more radically. We have enunciated a law which we do not intend to verify—we do not carry out measurements on every specimen of hydrogen in the universe to see whether they are identical in all respects. But neither do we doubt that they would prove to be identical, within experimental error, if the trial were carried out. We have extrapolated, in a sense, in generalizing a law to cover quantities which we shall never measure; but we do not doubt the legitimacy of this high-handed procedure. It is

recognized as a rational procedure in physical science. This curious situation demands a reason.

It may be said that the generalizations are always liable to revision, and must be regarded as provisional. But this is not a complete answer, for we should still have to account for the newer generalizations which replace them. Again, it may be said that the validity of such generalizations is a common-sense presupposition; nevertheless, it is a presupposition, and should be justified. Again it may be said that the generalizations are merely aids to the acquisition of more empirical data, whose sole importance is the control they give us over material phenomena. But this is quite inadequate, for it is impossible to deny that the generalizations of science (and still more their theoretical interpretation) do give us some insight into the characteristics of matter; and it is beyond doubt that curiosity is one of the main motives of scientific research. The root problem of scientific method remains: how are such generalizations justified, seeing that they go beyond the experimental evidence? The justification cannot come from science itself, which is under examination; nor from formal logic, which can only tell us about the valid modes of deduction; it must be metaphysical.

The reason why we make these generalizations is, I think, that we have an antecedent rational conviction that there is order in the material world, and that we can come to apprehend it, in some degree and if given long enough, through regularities in experience; we are convinced, on grounds that are ultimately metaphysical, that causality operates in the material world, and that its operation is manifested to us in observable regularities. Causality is also manifest in human acts, when we recognize that man is master of his own actions, that he can plan ahead and choose his objectives; and in animal behaviour, when, for example, we observe adaptation to environment. Inanimate matter cannot exhibit any such spontaneity or self-movement, and the operation of causes in it is manifested not through rational action nor through adaptation, but through regularities in measurable phenomena. These regularities do not of themselves prove that there is order in the material world;¹ they merely manifest an order in which it is rational to believe on metaphysical grounds.

¹ Hume, in his examination of causality, does succeed in showing that empirical data do not carry their own interpretation, and of themselves give no grounds for belief in causality.

From metaphysics alone, however, we could not say that the order would be simple enough for us to find by means of experiment, nor that quantitative measurement would be the way to find it. It is the actual existence of a coherent and agreed body of natural science which gives us our strong grounds for believing that well-established quantitative laws are manifestations of the order in inanimate matter.

So far we have spoken only of the formulation of empirical laws on the basis of experiment. But this is not the whole of science as we know it. In the pursuit of science there are always two converse processes at work: one is the formulation of empirical laws on the basis of experiment, the other is the construction of a theoretical interpretation of those laws. Here is a step which takes us still farther from the empirical data. The theory is not strictly implied by the observations; it is an interpretation of them. We do not deduce the theory; we construct it. The theoretical scheme is designed (in the old phrase) to 'save the phenomena'; by deduction from the theory we obtain rules which agree with empirical laws as closely as possible. Thus the theory, once constructed, implies the laws, though the laws do not imply the theory. The theoretical scheme consists of various types of entity, such as atoms, electrons, and so on; and of principles, such as Maxwell's equations or the conservation of energy. These are all mathematically defined. Corresponding to the metrical type of experiment and quantitative laws, we invent mathematical interpretations. In place of characterizing (say) hydrogen merely by a constant conjunction of properties, we unify our data on hydrogen by interpreting these properties theoretically. We invent a simple model, consisting of one negatively charged particle with a certain mass, moving about one positively charged particle with another mass; quantitative deductions of the behaviour of this model in various situations agree with the experimental data. Or using the wave mechanics, we can find one single equation from which the properties of hydrogen can be deduced in very good agreement with experiment.

Such theoretical interpretation does not, of course, make our experimental data any more accurate or our empirical laws more certain; but it means that our diverse experimental data can all be expressed as applications of relatively few principles and entities. The theories depend for their validity on their agreement with empirical data, and are more or less likely according as they agree more or less

well with the latter. In believing that they contain truth, although doubtless subject to much revision, we go still another step beyond the empirical evidence. If we are philosophically convinced of the existence of order in inanimate matter, it is rational for us to do so, and the theoretical models manifest that order to us in a new way. Theoretical interpretation, then, offers us a new window on the order in nature; we penetrate beyond the relatively superficial manifestations of it provided by uninterpreted empirical laws, to a more fundamental manifestation.

Now surely this is a key to the intellectual excitement of the physicists of the seventeenth century. Philosophers of the tradition exemplified by St. Thomas Aquinas had already realized that the order in the material world is in principle capable of being apprehended in some degree. In the age of Galileo this order is being for the first time systematically investigated by experiment; and by the use of measurement scientists have hit on a way of getting data which can be interpreted. Through mathematical interpretation a rational connexion between experiments is discovered, theory begins to penetrate experiment, and it is shown that a closer approach is possible to the order in nature.

One can now state some of the presuppositions of modern physical science which are relevant to the situation in Galileo's time. I give them in two groups, the first of which seem to me to be philosophically certain, while the second consists of generalizations based on the success up to date of physical science.

1. (a) There is a material world; it is extended, and consequently measurable.
- (b) There is order in material nature, including inanimate matter.
- (c) Men through their intellects can in principle apprehend this order, however imperfectly. They can pursue ordered thought, with the help of formal logic. Quantities can be rationally related by the use of mathematics.
- (d) A detailed account of the order by which inanimate matter is ruled can be reached only through detailed study of facts, and cannot be obtained *a priori*, either from logic or from 'innate ideas'; nor can it be obtained from metaphysics. The experience of the senses provides the data needed for knowledge in the first place. Reason, working on experience of this kind, gives us ordered knowledge. Science therefore (like metaphysics) is a joint product of reason and experience.

2. (a) In dealing with inanimate matter, measurement is the most fruitful method. Quantitative empirical laws can be derived for many phenomena.
- (b) Observation (as in astronomical measurements) is not the only kind of quantitative study. Experiment, in which an experimenter arranges conditions so that he can cause one measurable quantity to vary and observe the variations in another, is very fruitful and extends enormously our empirical data.
- (c) It is possible to construct a theoretical scheme which agrees with the empirical laws, that is, from which they may be deduced within experimental error. Since the laws of physics are quantitative, this interpretatory scheme is mathematical.
- (d) In the construction of this scheme, reason working on the empirical data is the guide; in science there is no other competent authority, any more than there is in logic.

These presuppositions of modern physics seem to have been Galileo's also. This is one reason for his greatness, and it gives him his position as the father of modern physics. A new outlook on natural science, a whole new method, a new technique for understanding the workings of inanimate nature, are implicit in the simultaneous use of all these presuppositions. And Galileo uses the combination naturally, accurately and fruitfully. On the other hand, not one of these notions was original. It was the free use of the combination which was his achievement.¹ On examination, we find that every one of these elements of the scientific method had been used before, but not all together. We must give some account of this: and first, of the philosophical presuppositions.

III

To a surprising extent these presuppositions seem to derive from the philosophical developments of the thirteenth century, culminating in the philosophy of St. Thomas. Holding a realist view of knowledge, St. Thomas stressed the great potentialities of even finite intellects like ours. He taught that the material world, being created by God, is good, and is a reflection of God, and worthy of study—so far is he from restricting Christians to

¹ For a short account of Galileo's work in physics and astronomy, see F. Sherwood Taylor, *Galileo and the Freedom of Thought*. On his method and presuppositions, see Burt, *The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Science*, Chapter III.

the study of theology and the Scriptures. He taught that changes in inanimate matter, like all changes, are due to causes—that is, that there is order in inanimate matter. He even taught that there are sciences whose method was the mathematical interpretation of the data of the senses (sciences ‘materially physical and formally mathematical’)¹, which is precisely the method of the modern physical sciences; presumably he was thinking of astronomy. He taught that quantity is the first among the accidents of a substance, the ground of all others such as colour or hardness. As a pupil of St. Albert, and as the man who did most to ‘baptize’ Aristotle, he was well aware that scientific knowledge is won by painstaking observation and by recognition of the extreme complexity of nature. He firmly rejected the tradition which tried to extract results from theorizing without observation. In his philosophy and theology he keeps a clear grasp of what may change with changing scientific views, and what is philosophically and theologically certain.² To St. Albert and St. Thomas, again, belong the credit of vindicating in Christian thought the full claims of reason, and of establishing in Christian tradition that there is a large body of knowledge which a man can gain by the light of reason alone, independent (at least formally) of revelation—for example, the existence of a First Cause, the relation of the world to It, the essential nature of man and hence some of his rights and duties. Before St. Thomas’ view prevailed, the common view among Christians would seem to have been that the sources of fundamental knowledge are the Scriptures, and the Fathers who interpreted them. The breakaway from this, the attitude characteristic of the commentator rather than of the developed thinker, is already manifest in Abelard’s insistence on the application of logic to theology; its completion is the work of St. Albert and St. Thomas, in showing the true relations of nature and grace, and in bringing the doctrines (corrected and much extended) of Aristotle and Plato into a synthesis, and integrating the whole into a complete and balanced Christian world-outlook, a framework for life. It was St. Albert and St. Thomas who, by introducing Aristotle at the cost of making themselves temporarily disreputable, established in the West this confidence in human reason. We shall find

¹ Cf. Maritain, *The Degrees of Knowledge*, p. 52 seq. For a different view, however, see P. Rousselot, *The Intellectualism of St. Thomas*, Chap IV.

² ‘*In astrologia ponitur ratio excentricorum et epicyclorum, ex hoc quod hac positiona facta, possunt salvare apparentia sensibilia circa motus coelestes; non tamen ratio haec est sufficienter probans; quia etiam forte alia positione facta salvari possent.*’—*Sum. Theol. I, q. 32, a.1., ad 2.*

that their act of intellectual courage lies at the basis of modern science.

For, in particular, they established the independence of reason in natural science, and showed the coherence of this position with their Christian synthesis.¹ When mediaeval Christianity encountered science—the science of Aristotle, enlarged by the work of the Arabs—many did not know what to make of it. To most educated men of the eleventh and early twelfth centuries, it would appear (speaking in very general terms) that nature in itself was not an object of interest; rather it provided a series of pegs on which to hang a complicated symbolism. Moreover, the ‘Platonizing’ tradition tended to regard the sensible world as a hindrance imprisoning the soul rather than elevated by it, hiding God rather than reflecting Him, to be transcended rather than studied. Many, therefore, confronted with the question whether the new natural science should be received, answered No. But St. Albert understood natural science too well to do this. Every known science interested him: mineralogy, anatomy, botany, medicine, meteorology, optics—and this not as a mere collector, but as an observer who knew how to generalize, how to extract a law, and to construct an hypothesis. For him, as for the modern scientist, the material world has a nature and laws of its own, and it is intelligible (in some degree), and so it is a reflection of God’s creative power, and men through their understanding can offer it back to God. Creation in itself proclaims the glory of God, not as formerly only through the shadows of symbolism; the intelligible world itself manifests God’s operations. This was a revolution indeed. Natural science could not have begun without this revolutionary change of attitude towards knowledge of the material world. And thus it was St. Albert and St. Thomas and the men of their tradition who formulated and established the philosophical presuppositions mentioned above—the order in the material world, its intelligibility, the need of precise observation, the free and independent use of reason working on experience, even the use of mathematical interpretation.

However, the great advance in science did not begin yet; and physics in particular was weak.² The root causes of this are

¹ P. Chenu, O.P., ‘The Revolutionary Intellectualism of St. Albert’, in *Blackfriars*, (Jan. 1938).

² F. Sherwood Taylor, ‘The Experimental Method in the Middle Ages’, in *Blackfriars* (1945). Cf. also *The Attitude of St. Thomas to Natural Science* (Blackfriars, Oxford: 1944).

obsure, but some of the immediate causes may be suggested. First, the experimental method was not yet developed. Observation was understood, but the technique of controlled experiment, both to find new laws and to test theoretical interpretations, had yet to be developed. Second, measurement was still little used outside astronomy. A third contributing factor may have been, as Whitehead suggests,¹ the predominance of syllogistic reasoning; this is excellent for classifying, but not for handling quantitative laws. The deeper underlying causes are much more difficult to characterize, but a tenable view would seem to be that the reason why science did not engage the attention of more of the best minds was simply that the rich intellectual life of the age provided many sublime things to study, and many pressing problems, to which science was quite secondary in importance; and that the worship of material prosperity was less dominant than it later became.

Let us turn now to the second set of presuppositions, namely those more concerned with the historical fact of the success of science. Measurement in science is not, of course, the invention of Galileo; it had long been used scientifically in astronomy (the most developed of the physical sciences) as well as applied in surveying and weighing. Again, the method of formulating empirical generalizations and then interpreting them theoretically was well known, both in astronomy and in other sciences; we may cite as an instance the Ptolemaic theory of the orbits of the planets. Again, Galileo was not original in his use of practical laboratory work; this had been used and brought to considerable technical perfection by Arab chemists, for example. However, these experiments were not followed by the formulation of laws, let alone by theoretical interpretation; and they were not quantitative. The experiments of Archimedes in the great period of Greek science were quantitative and led to laws and even to interpretations; but Archimedes' chief interest lay in pure geometry, and he seems to have regarded experiment as subsidiary to the use of deduction from 'self-evident' principles. Every element in Galileo's physical method had in fact been practised before, but seldom all of them together. It is the synthetic combination of all these elements, and the masterly use of the resulting method, which constitute Galileo's greatness. Building on the intellectual foundation bequeathed by St. Albert and St. Thomas, Galileo supplies a free use of experiment, formulation of empirical laws, and theoretical interpretation of them; all in the

¹ *Science and the Modern World*, Chapter I.

easy and natural combination which we use today. This is his main contribution to human knowledge. It is no service to him to set him up, in contradiction with the facts, as the man who first upheld reason and experience against 'authority'. He certainly did break away from a decadent tradition, but the principles for which he stood are the principles for which Greek culture groped and which it occasionally glimpsed, and which were won for Europe by Christian civilization.

IV

Can we find any reasons why the full modern method of physics should be developed at just this period, the end of the sixteenth century and the beginning of the seventeenth? Developments of this kind are usually caused partly by some man of special acuteness and partly by circumstances which favour his success. Reared in a certain culture amid certain influences, the man of genius seizes upon the synthesis which is waiting to be grasped. Personal brilliance is not susceptible of historical analysis, but circumstances are. Scientists are not usually independent of the intellectual climate of their times, and I think we can find a number of influences favouring the Galilean synthesis, without diminishing the achievement of the man who perceived the separate threads clearly and saw how they could be woven together.

In the first place, there were still extant in Europe the ideas of the intellectual renaissance of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries about the capabilities of reason and the intelligibility of the world, without which science could not proceed. But these beliefs alone were not enough; measurement and the experimental method still lacked popularity in the middle ages, and lacking them science did not develop very fully. Paradoxically, it would seem that a second contributory cause may have been the later decadence of scholastic philosophy, its decline from the synthesis of St. Thomas, a decline which by Galileo's time had brought it to a low ebb. There grew up a nominalist tradition which held (speaking very roughly) that we have no means of reaching real understanding of anything; that we have no concepts, but only names, for convenience of classification. The upshot is that one can never have any sort of knowledge of the nature of things, can never understand the world—in complete contrast to the view of St. Thomas. It would not be surprising if men brought up to believe this view

were to turn to empirical observation; in despair of interpreting experience, they would observe and classify. The nominalist influence is explicit and important in Hobbes,¹ and may well have made itself felt earlier. It would seem, then, that both the Thomist tradition and the nominalist decadence from it favoured the rise of science; the former was necessary before interpretation of empirical data on the material world could begin, the latter before an interest in gaining those empirical data could claim enough attention.

A third intellectual influence was the current of ideas which may be loosely called neo-Platonic— notions about numbers and their properties and their symbolic significance, with a strong Pythagorean flavour.² The interest in mathematics and its applicability to the world of such men as Leonardo da Vinci and Nicholas of Cusa reflects this Pythagorean stream, which was prominent also in the Medici academy at Florence in the fifteenth century, and certainly influenced Copernicus during his stay in Italy. Nicholas of Cusa is credited with the statements that 'number is the first model of things in the mind of the Creator' and that 'knowledge is always measurement'. Clearly this line of thought was of importance in turning men's attention towards quantity and measurement as the key to the understanding of nature; this comes out strongly in Kepler's work and still more in that of Galileo.

Besides these influences which helped to form the intellectual climate in which natural science developed, one must take account of the fact that the pursuit of science requires certain material conditions, such as reasonable security, ample leisure, and accurate craftsmanship. These conditions were provided in Italy at the time, partly by the universities and partly by wealthy patrons, and there were educated laymen as well as clerics who took advantage of them. The development of science owed much to the advent of an educated laity in Europe, though it was also advanced considerably by priests, like Nicholas of Cusa and Copernicus.

Finally we should mention the influence of practical needs and economic considerations on the growth of science. Current popular views of the history of science have stressed these factors to the exclusion of all others—maintaining, for example, that Galileo's

¹ Cf. Burt, *Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Science*, Chapter V.

² *Ibid.*, Chapter II.

advances in mechanics were made because cannon were coming into use and information was wanted about the flight of projectiles.¹ But this is quite clearly not the whole truth, even apart from its defiance of the historical evidence. For these scientific discoveries demand special methods of investigation, special ways of thought, and a special intellectual background; they presuppose, in fact, the belief in the intelligibility of the material world, the interest in empirical data, the ready use of mathematics, and the other elements in the intellectual climate of the time which we have mentioned above. The fact that the new scientific knowledge was soon found to be applicable to some contemporary problems of technological control is not enough to account for its origin. Science is one thing, the pursuit of truths of a certain order; and technology is another, the application of scientific knowledge to the control of matter for extra-scientific purposes. Technology is content with control; science insists on understanding. Empirical data are often sufficient for control, but they are only the raw material of science; for example, astronomical tables are sufficient for the navigator, but the most accurate astronomical tables are only the preliminary data for a science of astronomy.

However, extrinsic social factors, such as those mentioned by Professor G. N. Clark in his *Science and Social Welfare in the age of Newton*, no doubt favoured the rise of science and of technology. Expanding mercantilism and developments in warfare favoured technological advance, and vice versa. Pure science was indirectly favoured by this technological advance, partly because it contributed some raw material for science; partly because a more intelligent audience for scientists came into being, and patrons became more science-conscious and provided salaries, however small, for scientists; partly because craftsmanship was developed and hence more reliable apparatus became available. Science was also directly promoted (according to Professor Clark) by other extrinsic conditions such as developments in medicine and in various peaceful arts; but such factors, dependent on the state of society in general, could exercise little influence on the internal development of science, except indirectly by leading to the rapid exploitation of certain discoveries and thereby to a general increase of interest in science. They could not have done much to aid the development of science if the intellectual climate had been unfavourable. We must conclude that, although it is both true and

¹ E.g., M. Cornforth, *Science versus Idealism*, p. 231.

important that scientists are part of the social organism and not insulated from it, it is an over-simplification to say that the material needs of society are the sole important social influence on the growth of science. Such a view would only be accepted by those who hold *a priori* that all fundamental causes are economic; it misconceives the nature of science and it is not supported by historical examination.¹

So brief a survey of some of the factors which seem to have favoured the rise of physics in Galileo's time cannot do more than indicate certain main lines of the problem. The question is not to be divorced from the general problem of the causes of the fifteenth-century renaissance and the rapid changes that it initiated—the new translations of classical texts, the influence of geographical discovery and the wider view of the world, the desire voiced by Bacon for control of material things, the new interest in the self and the profound inward-turning of thought exemplified by Descartes. Much remains to be said, and the problem presents an opportunity for a new kind of essay in the social history of science, in which the social setting is conceived not only in economic terms, but as concerned with thought, literature and religion as well as practical needs.

¹ F. Sherwood Taylor, *Is the Progress of Science Controlled by the Material Wants of Man?* (Society for Freedom in Science, Occasional Pamphlet, No. 1).

'THE WASTE LAND' REVISITED

A Critical Analysis of Mr. Eliot's Work

By DEREK TRAVERSI

IN few poets is a continuous line of development as clearly traceable as in T. S. Eliot. Indeed, it might be said of him—as he himself once said of Shakespeare—that the full meaning of each of his poems can only be defined by seeing them less as separate works than as distinct parts, each with its own function corresponding to its place in time, of a single and continuous creative effort. One effect of this continuity is that our understanding of each of Eliot's more important poems is liable to alter, or at least to become more complete, as we look back upon it in the light of all that he has since written. As the series of related poems lengthens with the passage of time, the perspective with which we view each of them shifts and our vision is altered to a degree which is conditioned directly by the remoteness or otherwise in time of each element in the series; our knowledge of the later stages in this creative process brings out intentions, shades of emphasis and meaning, that were at first obscured by coincidences of a more superficial kind between the poet's vision and the prevailing spirit of the age.

Of all Eliot's poems *The Waste Land* has probably the most need of this process of critical revision. When it was published, in 1922, the prevailing judgement ascribed to it an intention of almost exclusive pessimism and despair. The passage of time, bringing with it a body of later work that clearly cannot be thus described, has made it easier for this judgement to be subjected to the necessary modification; but there are still critics, generally inspired by preconceptions of an ideological¹ kind contrary to Eliot's own, who have preferred to cling to the original reading of *The Waste Land* and to see the whole of the poet's later work, in the light of it, as no more than the grafting of a spurious spiritual

content on to a vision of life that is still, at bottom, negative and despairing. The fact is, that if there exists a very real continuity between *The Waste Land* and Eliot's later, ostensibly 'religious' poetry, the significance of that continuity is, at least in part, the opposite of that postulated by those who find more or less unacceptable all that Eliot has written since the publication of *Ash Wednesday*. The later work is potentially present in *The Waste Land* at least as much as *The Waste Land* manifestly persists in all that Eliot has since written; for *The Waste Land* itself is less an expression of despair, or the picture of a disintegrating civilization, than it is an attempt to build up, through acceptance of the fact of death, a vision of the world which shall be at once contemporary and, in the fullest sense of the word, religious.

To define the method adopted by the author of *The Waste Land* is already to approach the true significance of the poem. The basis of it is a perfectly deliberate acceptance of fragmentariness. The poet, in his own words, has chosen to work through 'a heap of broken images'. He has chosen to do so because it is his intention to be faithful to experience as his own times have offered it to him, but his aim is *not* in any sense the creation of a mere picture of chaos. The end of the poem in his intention is to be, like that of all genuine artistic creation, a harmony, a unification of the elements which experience has provided; but precisely because this harmony must, if it is to be genuine, be more than a mere artificial imposition, because it must come, if at all, at the *conclusion* of the creative process as its crown and justification, it must first be faithful to the broken, discontinuous nature of the impressions of reality which are offered to modern man as a condition of his moral and intellectual vision. To accept this fragmentariness is admittedly to recognize that the creation of artistic harmony is, in our times, a supremely difficult task; but to deny that it exists, or to refuse to work out its remotest and most disquieting consequences is to compromise the integrity of vision without which poetry of true value cannot be written.

When we have given its true importance, however, to the fragmentariness of *The Waste Land*, we need equally to stress another aspect of the poem. Side by side with 'the heap of broken images', deliberately accepted as the material of the poem, there exists, less evident but not less clearly present, another element—the awareness of the continuity and significance implied in a tradition which, though now belonging to the past and apparently

shattered beyond repair, has still sufficient vitality to exist as a point of reference in the poet's own experience. The numerous quotations from European and other authors of all periods, which so disturbed early readers of the poem, are in fact of fundamental importance in its structure. Seen through the eyes of a modern intellectual they inevitably reflect the fragmentary nature of his vision; but, fragmentary though they are, they still proceed from a literary order which is the projection of a spiritual unity that formerly existed and may still, when related to the scraps of contemporary experience, eventually produce a living and coherent scheme of values. The poem, in short, is built up on the interweaving of two main themes: the fragmentariness of the present and the significant continuity of past tradition. The two themes, like two subjects in a musical composition, are at first completely separate and apart, but the aim of the poet is to discover whether, in the creative process, some kind of unified vision will emerge to give meaning and coherence to the poem.

In order to achieve this aim Eliot has imparted to his poem a definite logic and structure of its own. This structure is not merely, as his opening note on the 'plan' of the poem might seem to indicate, a matter of 'suggestions' incorporated from Miss Jessie L. Weston's book, *From Ritual to Romance*. These 'suggestions', in fact, belong rather to the poetic material of *The Waste Land* than to its essential structure; for that structure we need to look less to any element in the poet's reading than to an organization of the elements of experience which, no doubt, reflects a profound immersion in literary tradition but which is inevitably, in the last analysis, personal. The various sections of the poem show, in fact, a perfectly clear and definable progression. The first section, *The Burial of the Dead*, introduces us to the theme of death which is the starting-point of the whole poetic process; opening with an evocation of April, in which the month of rebirth becomes 'the cruellest month', awakening the human faculties to an activity which, in the absence of spiritual sustenance, turns out to be a baseless illusion, it concludes with a vision of the 'unreal City' which is both London and, in a symbolic sense, the ultimate symbol of our sterile civilization. In *A Game of Chess* and *The Fire Sermon* the poet's vision deliberately narrows from the general to the particular, turns from the evocation of universal death to its reflection in particular experience, and more especially in the relationship of the sexes. *A Game of Chess* is mainly concerned to

show, by concrete and dramatic reference to two very different social states, the futility which shadows the relationship between man and woman in a world in which love, with its spiritual assumptions, is without meaning, and only lust and its immediate satisfaction are conceivable. *The Fire Sermon*, continuing this analysis of the place of passion in the Waste Land, carries the development a stage further. Through the eyes of the timeless and sexless spectator Tiresias—whose vision, Eliot tells us in a note, 'is the substance of the poem'—the loveless seduction of a bored typist by a small house-agent's clerk is seen to be of permanent tragic significance, an incident in whose confessed futility is reflected the inevitable nullity of all temporal experience accepted as a sufficient end in itself. The essential tragedy of the situation, foreseen by Tiresias, can only become fruitful, spiritually speaking, by relation to a purgatorial conception of desire, and upon the first broken hints of that conception the third section ends. From the idea of purgation it is natural to pass to the idea of death, acceptance of which may be the beginning of salvation from triviality; and so the last sections of the poem are concerned once more with the evocation of our mortality, no longer mainly associated with sterility, but seen as the foundation of a possible spiritual vision. In the short interlude *Death by Water* we return once more to a consideration of death as the inescapable framework of life, and in the last section, *What the Thunder Said*, the fact of death is considered in relation to symbols that have become for the first time explicitly religious. The ruins of our civilization are set against a vision of death at once tragic and possibly redeeming, and the poet, gathering up the 'broken images' which he has 'shored against his ruin', looks forward to a vision which may be either reality or illusion, but outside which he now knows there is no salvation.

Having grasped that beneath the fragmentary surface of *The Waste Land* there exists, indeed, a 'method' and a coherent plan it is now time to see how that unity emerges in the elaboration of the poem. The opening section, *The Burial of the Dead*, brings into play the various themes of the whole conception, themes on their first appearance apparently separate and incoherent, but destined through significant repetition and development to assume meaning as parts of a unified creation. The first lines, elaborating the significant association of apparently contradictory impressions, at once state the peculiar nature of the creative impulse which

produced *The Waste Land* and point forward to the main pre-occupation of the whole poem. April, normally the month of rebirth, is here 'the cruellest month', the month which produces in the sensibility of the poet momentary flowerings of intuition in a soil which has no nourishing qualities. Some of these intuitions are recalled, without any attempt at uniting them, in the lines that immediately follow. A certain hour of conversation in Central Europe, remembered against an alternating background of sun and rain; a persistent impression of childhood; scraps and fragments of the old, established order of civilized life: all these are reflections of an ambiguous state in which the 'memory' of past moments of integrity and confidence is 'mixed' cruelly, because inconclusively, with the 'desire' that the state in which they were conceived may once more gain reality, be again as formerly elements of a happy and integrated life.

Once the prevailing sense of uneasiness has been thus defined and illustrated, the poet returns once more to reflect on and extend the image of the 'dead land' with which he began. The passage which follows is notably more extended, more continuous in its intention, than all that has preceded it; it is, in fact, a first general statement of the 'waste land' theme and will be taken up again later, more particularly in the concluding section of the poem. Remembering the 'dull roots' that were so disquietingly stirred by the spring rain in the opening lines, Eliot recalls again 'the roots that clutch' and adds a significant reference to the 'branches', whose persistent tendency to grow illustrates the strength of the vital impulse even in the 'stony rubbish', the adverse spiritual conditions with which *The Waste Land* is so concerned. The fact is that, even at this early stage, the mood of the poem is undergoing an important development. The poet, still afflicted by a tragic sense of being limited to the 'heap of broken images' whose true meaning we have already discussed, indicates for the first time a sense of possible relief when he refers to 'the shadow under the red rock' in the desert. This relief we are not yet in a position to understand other than vaguely (a glance forward to the desert vision, in the first part of the last section, will help), but it is clearly associated even at this stage with a possible breaking of the grip of monotony through the acceptance of the idea of death:

I will show you something different from either
Your shadow at morning striding behind you

'THE WASTE LAND' REVISITED

III

Or your shadow at evening rising to meet you;
I will show you fear in a handful of dust.

It is not too much to describe this as the first emergence of what is to be the dominating spiritual idea of the poem: the idea that the acceptance of death in its tragic reality implies an understanding that not everything in life is empty repetition and vanity. In the fear of death, which is the most powerful emotion still open to those who dwell in the Waste Land, there may lie the beginning of a more positive sort of wisdom. It is worth noting that when the poet, after this passage, returns to the evocation of fragments of intense experience, his intuition—this time of beauty perceived through a moment of love—is of a profounder kind than anything evoked in the opening passage. In the vision of 'the hyacinth girl' returning from the garden 'with her arms full and her hair wet' we are aware that we, like the speaker (be he the poet himself or a dramatic projection of personal feeling), are looking into 'the heart of light, the silence' of an emotion that is felt to have a scarcely glimpsed but permanent meaning. Only, since we are after all in the Waste Land, the moment of intuition is significantly framed between two fragments of quotation from Wagner's great romantic opera *Tristan and Isolde*, the first (*Frisch weht der Wind. . .*) hopeful and spontaneous in tone, the second (*Oed' und leer das Meer*) expressive of a sense of desolation and emptiness which love itself cannot, in the prevailing circumstances, escape.

After this interlude the religious theme—its entry prepared for by the suggestion of the possible spiritual significance of death—enters the poem explicitly for the first time. It enters in a form debased in accordance with the spirit prevailing in the contemporary Waste Land, which leads those who have no faith but still feel, in the light of their own impermanence, the need for it to approach the clairvoyante Madame Sosostris. To the Tarot cards—associated as they are in the fertility rites of the East with the rebirth of life which follows the seasonal rising of the waters—are attached many of the most significant episodes of the poem. The card of the 'drowned Phoenician sailor' introduces the theme of death by drowning, which recurs in the later sections and finds its most explicit development in the short elegy on Phlebas the Phoenician. 'Belladonna, the lady of the rocks'—'the lady of situations', as she is also called—is clearly related to the women whose 'situations' in a world where lust has come to be divorced

from the spiritual implications of love are the main theme of the second and third sections of *The Waste Land*. The Hanged Man, as Eliot has told us himself, is to be associated with the Hanged God of Frazer, and therefore at last with the Christ. This is probably the most significant of all the symbols, but we shall not be in a position to grasp its full meaning until the last section of the poem; all that we know at present is that Madame Sosostris, the purveyor of false certainties, is unable to find him. The prevailing vision is still one of 'crowds of people walking round in a ring', and the symbols evoked by the shuffling of the Tarot pack are so far no more than dim indications whose relationship will only emerge gradually in the unfolding of the poem.

The last lines of *The Burial of the Dead* bring us back once more, in fact, to the spiritual desolation of the Waste Land, seen now as the 'unreal City', which is at once London and a symbol of the state of modern society. The preoccupation with spiritual significance is kept alive by the references to Dante's *Inferno* ('I had not thought death had undone so many') and to Baudelaire: to Dante who saw human life in terms of judgement in accordance with a clearly established scheme of values, and to Baudelaire for whom the possibility of moral choice was the only thing that could save human life from unutterable tedium. With this concluding vision of the condition of man and with the reference to the possible sprouting of the buried corpse as a symbol of resurrection, all the main threads of the poem have been introduced and the way is clear for their development towards a possible harmony. That development is the work of the sections which follow.

A Game of Chess, which—like *The Fire Sermon*—is mainly concerned with the possibilities of sexual passion in the Waste Land, opens with a long passage referring back to Shakespeare's account of Cleopatra on her barge in *Antony and Cleopatra*. The reference serves at once to support the prevailing impression of decadence and to establish a contrast. On the one hand the magnificence of Enobarbus' description suggests a civilization which, for all its opulence and splendour, has lost its moral fibre; on the other, *Antony and Cleopatra* contains Shakespeare's supreme expression of triumphant passion, and the superb sensual vitality of its poetry contrasts forcibly with the appalling sterility of the Waste Land. As Eliot develops his description of the modern lady, heiress to all the material advantages of a luxurious civilization, he contrives to convey beneath the surface of rich sensual variety an impression of

artificiality and pointlessness. The 'burnished throne' of the modern heroine glows not, like Cleopatra's barge, on the water, but by reflection on a polished surface of marble; the 'glitter of her jewels' is somehow harsh, artificial, and the perfumes in the unstoppered 'vials of ivory and coloured glass' are explicitly described as 'synthetic'. In the later part of the description, however, the impression of luxury divorced from life shades off into a suggestion of sinister reality; for among the elements of the sumptuous decoration is a carving representing the legend of the rape of Philomel. The legend, though from the long-distant past, still has its meaning for contemporary behaviour in a world for which love and lust have become indistinguishable; for the tragedy is in its essence an eternal one. This the poet indicates by a significant change of tense—'And still she *cried*, and still the world *pursues*'; the only change is that the poignant tragedy of the 'inviolable voice' has lost its meaning for modern ears, has come to be no more than a mere "'Jug, jug" to dirty ears'. After this evocation of tragedy the rich decorations become more explicitly 'withered stumps of time', the representation of fragments surviving from past civilizations but now divorced of meaning, mere inanimate background for a reality in which a sinister element increasingly prevails in the deep hush of 'the room enclosed', in the 'staring forms' leaning out in the fire-reflected shadows, in the 'foot-steps shuffled on the stair', in the fiery points of the combed hair which 'glowed into words'—words expressive of an anxiety barely definable—to be, at the last, 'savagely', discontentedly still.

These 'words', indeed—which form, together with the second episode in this section, one of the most dramatic passages in Eliot—take the form of an extremely subtle interweaving of the woman's spoken anxieties with the main underlying threads of the poem. 'My nerves are bad tonight. Yes, bad. Stay with me.' Four lines of staccato rhythm, expressing persistent preoccupation and a sense of impenetrable isolation in human thought are followed by the significant reference to 'rat's alley', to the vision of sordid and hopeless death which is one of the obsessing features of the Waste Land. It is worth noting that this passage is not, properly speaking, a dialogue between the protagonist of this section and her companion. The replies, unlike the utterances which give rise to them, are not marked as quotations, and belong rather to the main development of the poem than to any of its characters. In the light of this first evocation of unredeemed death

the speaker's fear returns intensified, and the dialogue between her and the commentator (so to call him) gathers new force in the shorter, more direct questions: 'What is that noise? . . . What is the wind doing?' and in the answer 'Nothing again nothing'. With the word 'nothing' the true sense of fear, which is the sense of spiritual vacancy, comes to the surface in a repetition of the keyword of the whole passage:

Do

You know nothing? Do you see nothing? Do you remember
Nothing?

At this point, with the obsession of emptiness and unreality at the height of its tension, the reference to death returns, but in a form transformed and reminiscent of one of the fundamental themes stated in *The Burial of the Dead*: the theme of death by water, associated this time with a phrase from *The Tempest* that has for Eliot a profound significance:

I remember

Those are pearls that were his eyes.

The two possible attitudes to death thus brought together within a few lines and balanced one against another in the sordidness of the persistent rat-image and the tenuous beauty of Shakespeare's marine symbolism are fundamental to the structure of the whole poem. They occur repeatedly from this moment, and their relation to one another will not be definable, even in part, until the end of the poem; indeed, its definition—if we can use so didactic a term to convey what is essentially a process of poetic resolution—is the end to which the whole work moves. For the moment, the fresh tone in the second reference to death is still only a suggestion, overwhelmed almost at once in the following question 'Are you alive or not? Is there nothing in your head?' In the light of this persistent sense of emptiness the echo from *The Tempest* dissolves ironically into the jazzed notes of 'that Shakespeherian rag', and the answer to the insistent question 'What shall we ever do?' remains the mere continuation of an existence so sheltered from reality as to be without meaning. 'Hot water at ten', 'a closed car at four' if it rains, all the paraphernalia of an existence abstracted from reality and devoted entirely to the elaboration of meaningless 'situations' in the abstract 'game of chess' to which Eliot—giving a personal echo to the dispassionate unfolding of intrigue in

Middleton's play—reduces the relationship of the sexes in the society with which he is here concerned. The 'knock upon the door' with which the episode ends at once represents the culminating moment in the sexual pattern—the moment which, bringing the second lover, will provide an illusion that the terror of vacancy and isolation has been overcome—and suggests, in the remote background, the disturbing shadow of death which will sooner or later bring the whole intrigue to an end.

The second part of *A Game of Chess* offers a parallel case of the tragedy hid in less sophisticated circles by the sexual passion in the absence of a redeeming spiritual vision. The main intentions are sufficiently clear. Through the narrow, embittered comments of a companion we are shown a working-class woman in the process of losing her hold at once on her husband and on life. He, we are told, has just been demobilized, and has returned home with the intention of seeking in the sexual act no more than the 'good time' which has been denied him during the years of war service; his desire is in the process of being translated into reality in terms of unwanted children who bring with them, in the circumstances, no more than the shadow of a life of sordid drudgery always liable to terminate in a painful and meaningless death: 'She's had five already, and nearly died of young George.' The question of spiritual sanctions is raised again, this time with a brutal directness fitting the popular setting: 'What you get married for if you don't want children?' Life in the Waste Land, on all levels of society, is above all an attempt to evade responsibility, to undertake actions without a consideration of their consequences; and it is only death that, by persistently throwing its shadow across the human scene, affirms that ultimately this responsibility cannot be avoided without depriving existence of all meaning. This marriage, like so many in the Waste Land, was born in accident and triviality—'Well, that Sunday Albert was home, they had a hot gammon'—but its end, as in the companion episode, is the menace of death, echoed in the barman's insistently repeated call which runs like a significant and *crescendo* theme through the whole monologue, and in the final reference to the last words of the betrayed Ophelia—'Good night, ladies, good night, sweet ladies, good night, good night.' At the end of this section it is clear that the various themes, episodes, and quotations first announced in *The Burial of the Dead* are in the process of being gathered together into a coherent and developing vision.

In this process of integration the third section, *The Fire Sermon*, has a central part to play. Carrying a step further the analysis of passion, it at once deepens the tragic note by a more specific emphasizing of the sense of mortality and prepares the way for a first tentative statement of the spiritual values of the poem; the timeless vision of Tiresias, linking the various isolated episodes into a tragic unity, is, in Eliot's own words, 'the substance of the poem'. The section opens with a passage of meditation in which two visions of the Thames—the modern river, bearing its empty bottles, sandwich papers, and cigarette ends, spectator of the amours of the modern 'nymphs' and their friends, 'the loitering heirs of city directors', and the river of Spenser's *Prothalamion* which serves as a background and contrast—are subtly woven together in a passage in which the note of desolation prevails. Once more, as the meditation proceeds, the thought of death imposes itself and the vision of 'rat's alley', echoing the preceding section, is more explicitly developed. As in *The Game of Chess*, however, it brings with it a contrasted reference to the poetic symbolism of *The Tempest*; the vision of the rat 'dragging its slimy belly on the bank' behind the gas-house near the modern canal is broken significantly by a repetition of Ferdinand's evocation of death by drowning, with its hint of a richer, finer conception of death :

Musing upon the king my brother's wreck
And on the king my father's death before him.

No doubt the fact that the poet shades at this point, through the line 'while I was fishing in the dull canal', into the Fisher King, whose restoration by Parsifal at the end of the quest for the Grail was accompanied by the lifting of the curse from the Waste Land, was of deep personal significance for Eliot at the time of writing; but, though the theme is repeated at the end of this introductory passage in the quotation from Verlaine's poem, evoking the voices of the choir at the Holy Thursday ceremony which preceded the healing of the wounded Amfortas, it remains inevitably tenuous and indefinite. More important at this stage for the general effect is the renewed evocation, after the reference to *The Tempest*, of death and desolation, the background to the amours of Sweeney and Mrs. Porter set here by ironic contrast against the romantic associations of the quotation from Day's *Parliament of Bees*.

At this point the course of the poem is interrupted by another echo from the preceding section, which reminds us once more of the growth in complexity and coherence which accompanies the unfolding of its pattern. The song of the nightingale after the rape of Philomel is evoked once more in its double manifestation of 'Twit twit twit . . . Tereu'—the 'inviolable' eternal voice of tragic sorrow—and the 'jug jug' which it evokes in the sordid indifference of the Waste Land. This broken but significant interlude is used by the poet as an introduction to the central part of *The Fire Sermon* which is concerned with two episodes of life in the 'unreal City', both of them examples of the emptiness of passion when divorced from any spiritual attitude to life. The first episode, that of Mr. Eugenides the seller of currants, is barely touched on, but serves to remind us once more of the theme of 'the one-eyed merchant' announced by Madame Sosostris and to prepare the way for the drowned and transformed Phoenician of *Death by Water*. The second and longer episode, showing us the London typist whose consent to seduction reflects rather boredom than pleasure (her first half-formed reaction to the departure of her lover is, 'Well now that's done; and I'm glad it's over'), is given a universal significance by being seen through the eyes of Tiresias, and so becomes the turning-point of the whole poem. 'The old man with wrinkled female breasts' (developed by Eliot in accordance with a hint taken from Ovid) shares the detachment of the poet and is like him divided 'between two lives', between the futility of a temporal order conceived as an end in itself and an intuition of spiritual value. In the figure of this spectator, whom nothing however sordid can surprise and nothing however complex deceive, the eternal and the accidental aspects of love—already suggested in the references to Philomel and implicitly present, though unrealized, in the scene just evoked—are openly brought together for the first time:

And I Tiresias have foresuffered all
 Enacted on this same divan or bed;
 I who have sat by Thebes below the wall
 And walked among the lowest of the dead.

It is hardly an exaggeration to see in this explicit relation of present futility to the past manifestations of tragic significance the beginnings of a transformation which affects the whole poem. Its episodes, hitherto separate and devoid of meaning, now begin to

assume a suggestion of universal significance; if, thus far, the fragmentary and meaningless has predominated, from now on we shall be increasingly concerned with the difficult and gradual exploration of the elements of permanent spiritual value in human experience.

The first effect of this change of emphasis is an indirect one. A further echo of the water-music of *The Tempest* which the poem invariably associates with the mystery of death brings us to a new vision of London, the city by the river already evoked both in its sordid commercial modernity and in the romantic vision of Spenser's *Prothalamion*. The new vision, however, is strikingly different from that of the 'unreal City' in *The Burial of the Dead*. The riverside London that emerges from it is at once human in its associations and beautiful in its buildings; it is not an accident that, instead of the crowd of dead souls crossing the bridge in 'the brown fog of a winter dawn', we hear now of the 'pleasant whining of a mandolin' in a riverside bar, and that the sinister reference to the dead sound of the clock striking at St. Mary Woolnoth is now replaced by a glimpse of 'inexplicable splendour' on the walls of another of the City churches. The following passage, introducing the song of the Thames daughters, is surely rhythmically one of the most satisfying things in all Eliot's poetry. After the contrast, here repeated in lyric form, between the modern and the Elizabethan river—a contrast in which the commerce-stained Thames of today is given, by the sheer power with which its oily surface and drifting barges are evoked, a peculiar beauty—the Thames-maidens (speaking in turn) repeat once more in their fragmentary utterances the theme of meaningless seduction:

On Margate sands
I can connect
Nothing with nothing.

In the absence of a coherent spiritual attitude to give it meaning, experience reduces itself to a series of isolated impressions, in which sordid glimpses of 'the broken finger-nails of dirty hands' replace what should have been the moment of ecstasy, and disillusionment achieves a certain pathos in the anonymous resignation of the poor:

My people humble people who expect
Nothing.

It is in the light of this repeated insistence on nullity that the poet, at the end of *The Fire Sermon*, appeals for the first time to representatives of the ascetic tradition both in East and West, and introduces the fire-symbol which gives its name to the section. St. Augustine and the Buddha both saw in fire not only a symbol of lust, but also of purification; for that reason here, at the turning-point of the whole poem, we are offered the vision of a fire which at once consumes and, projected into prayer, purifies. 'O Lord Thou pluckest me out': the idea of prayer has made its first explicit appearance, admittedly in a broken fashion, but indicating the entry of the tragic and religious vision with its suggestion of redemption. In this manner, the way is prepared for the concluding section, in which the themes so far developed will be taken up again and integrated, as far as may be, into the foundation of a positive spiritual vision.

What the Thunder Said is, however, preceded by the short interlude *Death by Water*, which has a place of its own in the architecture of the poem. Explicitly connected with the use of the title-phrase in Madame Sosostri's manipulations of the cards, it has also an evident link with the repeated use as a key-theme of the death, also by water, of Ferdinand's father in *The Tempest*. The idea of death is now associated with glimpses, sensed rather than clearly defined, of a more spiritual vision of reality. Among the things forgotten by Phlebas, 'a fortnight dead', is 'the profit and the loss', the commercial preoccupation so sordidly symbolized a little earlier by Mr. Eugenides. In the moment of death the details of past life somehow acquire significance ('He passed the stages of his age and youth') in a way which has a lesson of universal importance to convey; Gentile and Jew alike are exhorted to consider seriously the spectacle of the drowned Phoenician sailor and the subjection to mortality which it implies and which may, it is suggested, contain the seeds of a redeeming vision. The contemplation of death by water points, in its own way, to the same possible liberation from triviality as was previously implied in the transformation of the fire of lust into the purgatorial flame of Christian and Buddhistic tradition.

In the last section (*What the Thunder Said*) the time has come for a recapitulation of the various threads of the poem and for their gathering up, in so far as the conditions dictated by personal experience will allow, into a coherent vision. The opening, significantly enough, is a passage in which impressions of the Waste Land are subtly interwoven with evocations of the incidents surround-

ing the Passion: such are the references to 'the torchlight red on sweaty faces', to the 'silence in the gardens', and to the 'agony'—felt, be it noted, in the 'stony places'—which we may connect at once with Gethsemane and the Waste Land previously described. Once more, as in the opening lines of *The Burial of the Dead*, there is a reference to 'spring', but this time associated not only with the Easter drama, but with a suggestion of impending relief in the mention of thunder, still for the moment distant, but due to break before the poem has come to a close. Meanwhile, however, the death which concluded the Passion, at least in the eyes of the disciples ('He who was living is now dead'), is associated with our own death as individuals and with that of our whole collective civilization:

We who were living are now dying
With a little patience.

And, in this moment of desolation, it is significant that we return once more to the opening vision of the desert; to the passage in the first section beginning 'What are the roots that clutch . . .?' corresponds the evocation here of the rocky, waterless road among the mountains, where once more the hint of thunder occurs, but still conceived as 'dry', 'sterile', and with no promise of relief.

Mere repetition of the theme of the Waste Land is not, however, the true purpose of a passage which aims finally at the integration of that theme into the developing spiritual vision of the complete poem. By an extremely subtle development of the prevailing imagery of drouth, we are led to a sense of delirium which is the basis of the next stage in the unfolding of the poetic conception. Water, absent in reality from the desert evoked by the poet, becomes so intensely present in the imagination that the longing for it merges with the 'drip drop' of the hermit-thrush's note to produce an impression in which reality and the overwrought imagination are inextricably fused together. It is in this state that there appears the vision of 'the third who walks always beside you': the vision, in other words, of the risen Christ at Emmaus, but also—by an association explicitly referred to in Eliot's own notes—the delusion of the extra person felt by the Antarctic explorers to be present at the extremity of their strength. The peculiar quality of this vision, poised between reality and delusion, reflects perfectly the spiritual state in which the poem is conceived. The Christian affirmation, set in explicit contrast to the barrenness of the Waste Land, serves as a focal point for the constructive

forces present in the poem; but the time to affirm its reality, to state that its evocation is a reflection of its truth and not of the plight of a civilization in despair, has not yet come. Indeed, in *The Waste Land*, it never comes. After this brief moment of vision, the poem returns once more to the impression, also conceived through delirium, of universal ruin in the desert of our civilization. The barbarian hordes swarm over 'endless plains', and the impression is one of 'falling towers' in which the urban centres of European civilization are, like the city of *The Burial of the Dead*, fundamentally 'unreal'. Such voices as remain in this world of ruin sing 'out of empty cisterns and exhausted wells'.

There follows, by way of transition, a brief reference to the Chapel Perilous of Miss Weston's book, deserted and found after the long journey through the desert in a 'decayed hole among the mountains'. The chapel is empty, like the shrines of our once-living traditions; even the idea of death has been emptied of terror ('Dry bones can harm no one'), though whether this represents the indifference of futility or an advance in spiritual confidence is by no means clear. What is certain, however, is that at this moment a change is introduced by the voice of the cock—'Co co rico co co rico'—a voice regarded by many primitive peoples as having the power to drive away the forces of evil. The crow is a signal for a break in the weather, for the flash of lightning and the sense of the first 'damp gust' bringing rain to the parched desert soil. The voice of the thunder, heard alike in the Perilous Chapel of Western tradition and in the jungle of the East, concludes the whole poem and brings us as much spiritual vision as can be obtained in the Waste Land.

'Then spoke the thunder.' Its message is summed up in the three traditional Sanskrit words—*Datta*, *Dayadhvam*, *Damyata*. 'Give, sympathize, control.' Each of these three words needs a moment's consideration because, by relating them to the fragments of experience which emerge from our exploration of the Waste Land, some suggestion of positive content will appear. *Give*. What we have given—and the poet here answers his own question—is, in spite of our timidity and lack of faith, the 'moment's surrender' to instinct which is the necessary prelude to all valuable experience, the surrender which Mr. Prufrock in Eliot's earlier poem had never dared to make, but by virtue of which alone our lives are not completely summed up in memories and obituaries:

By this, and this only, we have existed.

Sympathize. The second command follows naturally from the first, for the instinctive acceptance of our own fundamental impulses brings with it logically a desire to surpass our isolation, and to relate our own situation to that of humanity as a whole. Sympathy is required, therefore, with the chief elements in that situation as the poet sees them; in the first place with the tragic sense of isolation that characterizes the modern intellectual, enclosed in the private world of his own experience and unable to extend it to cover external reality (like Dante's Ugolino in the solitude of his tower, hearing the key turn inexorably in the lock of his prison door), and, in the second, with the dim intuitions of a state of heroic integrity, the 'aetherial rumours' that 'revive for a moment' the 'broken Coriolanus', whom reason has exposed in his egoistic weakness without, however, wholly destroying his nobility. By the acceptance of tragedy, we may come to something like a spiritual view of reality. *Control.* To sympathy, the acceptance which must precede creation in the artistic, as in the moral, order (and Eliot has always held that the two orders are related), corresponds control, by which existence is given meaning. To describe the possibility of control the poet returns once more to one of his images from *The Burial of the Dead*. The boat from *Tristan* which bore the lovers happily forward under the impulse of a favourable wind returns once more; 'gaily' it responds to the 'hand expert with sail and oar', and 'gaily' the heart of the loved one 'would have responded' in identification with a control based on the principle of sympathy. The passage ends on a note which is purposely vague—the moment for more precise definition has yet to come—but which suggests acceptance and a possible development.

The final lines may be taken as a summary of the position reached by the poet as the result of this particular creative effort. Like the Fisher King of Miss Weston's legends, he sits upon the shore, still in sight of 'the arid plain'—the Waste Land through which we have just passed—but with it *behind* him, in a certain sense surpassed. His vision of the state of civilization is still what it was at the beginning, a picture of collapse and disintegration summed up in the reference to London Bridge. But we now know that the individual at least has some control over his own existence, that the purpose of life, even in an age of desolation, is to achieve at least such degree of personal order as lies within our reach:

'Shall I at least set my lands in order?' To this end the poet has 'shored' some 'fragments', scraps of the once integrated traditions of humanity, against the threat of ruin. Such scraps are Arnaut's vision of the purifying fire from Dante (which takes up again the theme of *The Fire Sermon*), and the quotation from the *Pervigilium Veneris* with its renewed suggestion of happy love and the return of spring; but, since the serenity so gained is still precarious, still liable to be interrupted as no more than a moment of delirium, the last lines of the poem alternate these positive references with others, to the madness of Hieronimo in Kyd's *Spanish Tragedy*, and to the hero of Gerard de Nerval's *Desdichado*, the hero who—like educated Western man—has lost his traditional inheritance. With this assertion of contrasts, set in the framework of an acceptance recognized, though not understood—Eliot himself in his note refers to 'the peace that passeth understanding'—the poem is brought to an end.

If the foregoing analysis is sound it would appear that *The Waste Land*, far from being the poem of despair and disillusionment that it was commonly assumed to be when it first appeared, is in fact essentially spiritual in conception and religious in content. It is, in fact, Eliot's first attempt to achieve the aim of all his more ambitious verse, which is the creation of poetry at once fully contemporary and genuinely religious. The gap between modern secular experience and traditional religious forms is not of the kind that a true artist can bridge by mere assertion; the attempt to do so can only lead to a rhetoric and abstraction that has always been contrary to everything that Eliot has admired in the literature of the past and sought to express in his own poems. The true importance of *The Waste Land* lies precisely in the refusal to simplify, to produce a final statement of beliefs which was not adequately based on experience as given in the course of the poem. In so far as the inspiration of the poem is Christian—and this is clearly not so in the same sense as in *Ash Wednesday* or the *Four Quartets*—its Christianity emerges from the development of elements of experience which are thoroughly and without prejudice contemporary; there is no question of calling in past tradition as a *deus ex machina* to resolve all difficulties and to lead the reader to a foreseen conclusion. It is the sense of this scrupulous integrity in the conception of *The Waste Land* that makes it, at a distance of twenty-five years from its first publication, appear even more clearly than ever before a creation of the first order.

'THE WRECK OF THE DEUTSCHLAND'

An Introduction and a Paraphrase

By FRANCIS RYAN

THE Wreck of the Deutschland', as Robert Bridges says,¹ is 'logically as well as chronologically' the first of Gerard Manley Hopkins's poems. It was the first poem of his maturity, and the labour spent on it served to fix his style. When he wrote it, in 1876, he was thirty-two years of age. For nearly ten years he had not practised writing verse—at first for lack of time, because he was preoccupied with other things, and later for the additional reason that as a Jesuit he put other interests first. Those ten years were the most eventful and the most formative of his life. In October 1866 he was received into the Catholic Church. The following summer he took his 'double first' in Greats at Oxford, and in September went as teacher to Newman's Oratory School. The following September he joined the Jesuit novitiate at Manresa. After two years as novice, three years' study of philosophy at Stonyhurst, a year of teaching Rhetoric at Manresa, he came, in 1874, to St. Beuno's in North Wales for his four years' course of theology. There, at the end of 1875, the occasion arose for the writing of 'The Wreck of the Deutschland'.

The experiences of those ten years had had their effect. His character had been deepened and strengthened, and had set in a mould which did not change greatly during the thirteen years of life remaining to him. His analytical habit of mind had become keener. He had become well aware of the distinctiveness of his mind and character, but he had gained confidence enough in his powers to take a line of his own.

There were in him two opposing strains which conditioned all his life and work. He was interested, with all his faculties, in strangeness ('all things counter, original, spare, strange'), and had

¹ In his notes to the *Poems* of G. M. H. (p. 104 of the second edition, to which I refer throughout).

a passionate love and sensibility for out-of-the-way beauty, especially for beauty hidden in familiar things; but he had also a love and reverence for authority and exact discipline which increased with the years—since his interests and training as a classical scholar and as a Jesuit, as well as the natural bias of maturity and experience, all tended that way. This mixture of opposite strains is not unique, I suppose, even at the pitch of fervour reached in him, but in him it was tempered uniquely in a white heat of sincerity and integrity. Hence comes his strength, and hence also his weakness. Men of simple sincerity are prone to blindness—stubborn and wilful blindness, it sometimes seems to us, when the bad mood is on us. In Hopkins sincerity was absolutely simple, therefore we must not be surprised to find in him lapses of judgement. We find them plentifully, not only in his verse but in all his conduct of life. They are most frequently, and of course most noticeably, in the direction of the bizarre—partly because in that direction there is more room for error, and partly because the impulse towards originality was the stronger force in him. But in the other direction also he could and did err. He was, for instance, often over-careful about details, and clogged his verse and his drawings with too-exact delineation. His reverence for rule often, and in many ways, led him too far. Of course, in the larger issues of life, in manifest questions of right and wrong, or where as a priest and a Jesuit he was subject to a clear command—there his integrity of soul allowed one course only: absolute and uncompromising obedience. His lapses of judgement were in small things, but they made life difficult for him.

When he set his hand again to writing verse it was no easy task that faced him. The thoughts, images, and feelings of this complex and unusual mind of his had to be communicated to his hearers or readers, and the communication must be honest, exact, and complete. Nothing less than this would satisfy him—at least he would attempt nothing less. As far as possible his hearers and readers must be made to think and feel as he did; his mind must be transferred into theirs. Of course he did not see the difficulty as we can, viewing it after the event and with other minds. (He never, indeed, then or to the end, fully appreciated how very distinctive he was in mind and character—nor how strange and contorted his resulting style.) All he could see was that, in honesty, he had simply to be himself, give his impulses freedom of play, and try to the best of his ability to express himself.

From his well-known letter to Dixon which is quoted by Bridges in his notes,¹ and from some lecture-notes on 'rhythm and other structural parts of Rhetoric' which he made while teaching at Manresa,² we know that during his years of silence he had given much thought to prosody and kindred matters, and had evolved theories, especially about rhythm, which he was eager to put to the test. 'I had long had haunting my ear', his letter says, 'the echo of a new rhythm which now I realized on paper. To speak shortly, it consists in scanning by accents or stresses alone, without any account of the number of syllables, so that a foot may be one strong syllable or it may be many light and one strong.' We do not know how long he laboured at the writing of 'The Wreck of the Deutschland'. He must have laboured greatly, testing his theories, striving to express himself. By the time it was completed he had formed for himself a style, all of a piece with his new rhythm. (But 'The Wreck of the Deutschland' is more than an experiment: it remains his greatest poem, taking its length into account. Composition for him entailed painful effort, and he never afterwards succeeded in sustaining effort at this length.)

From his letter to Dixon we might judge that the rhythm was the only new thing in his new style, for he passes very lightly over the 'great many more oddnesses' in the poem. Actually he had given his impulse towards originality free play, and everything—rhythm, syntax, diction, imagery—was new and strange. Yet never quite new, never arbitrarily so, for the mere whim's sake. The other impulse in him would not allow that. Everything must be justified. He nearly always had dictionary authority for his strange words and usages, and if at the last resort he coined new words or gave an unwarranted twist to old ones, he justified it by the necessity of poets in every age: he must say his say exactly and completely, and no other words or arrangement of words would do. His imagery is especially characteristic. It is the direct product of keen and careful observation, but from an unusual angle. His similes and metaphors, because of this, or because they are too far-fetched or too homely, may seem odd, but they are always exactly illustrative. The same mixture of exactness and extravagance is evident in the metres and forms he chose. The stanza of 'The Wreck of the Deutschland' is an elaborate one, and

¹ *Poems of G. M. H.*, p. 102. The letter in full will be found in *Correspondence of Gerard Manley Hopkins and Richard Watson Dixon* (O.U.P., 1935), p. 14.

² Published in *The Note-Books and Papers of Gerard Manley Hopkins* (O.U.P., 1937).

for his later poems he preferred the rigid discipline of the sonnet to all other forms. But of course his are sonnets with a difference. They are curtal sonnets, in sprung and outriding rhythms, with codas and what-not. Yet even the variations from the normal must be according to rule (though of his own devising), and they add to, rather than take from, the burden of discipline.

Originality is the most striking quality of his verse, but it is in restraint, not in originality, that his strength lies. There is first of all the restraint of discipline, which curbs and mingles with his extravagance so strangely, and which safeguards him from carelessness. But above and beyond this there is the restraint of perfect sincerity. Nothing showy, no mere bravery or finery, nothing that is not stark truth, could pass this bar. Without this his verse would be no more than piquant at best. With it comes that power which is his chief merit, and which gives him a real claim to greatness—the power, namely, of communicating intense and urgent feeling, barely yet securely controlled.

II

'When in the winter of '75 the *Deutschland* was wrecked . . . I was affected by the account,' he says, in his letter to Dixon. The account he speaks of here is almost certainly the newspaper account (whether at first or second hand), for he was at the time a student at St. Beuno's, far away from the scene of the disaster. When he set to work on the poem, at any rate, he followed very closely, for the narrative part, the report of *The Times*. The similarity of phrase and of selection and order of events is very striking. (Indeed it looks, from a reading of the newspapers of the day and a comparison of them with his poem, that *The Times* report was the only one he read.) This report is therefore an excellent introduction to the poem. Besides, it is of abiding interest as the material on which Hopkins worked: we can watch him at work, transmuting the journalist's narrative into his rich and strange poem.

The Times had a special correspondent at Harwich to report the proceedings at the inquest on the victims of the wreck. The following is his story, omitting what is irrelevant to the poem:

From the narratives of the survivors and the evidence given by the captain and others today, it seems that the *Deutschland*, a fine

Clyde-built screw steamer, left Bremen on Saturday, and Bremerhaven early on Sunday morning, with a stiff north-east wind and snow falling at intervals. During the day the wind increased to more than half a gale, and the snow fell more heavily, obscuring the air so that a look-out became difficult. The captain, to whose coolness and bravery after the ship struck all the passengers bear witness, was on the bridge after dark and remained there all night. At 4 a.m. he ordered the engines to be kept at half-speed, but even then the steamer was being propelled at the rate of $9\frac{1}{2}$ knots an hour. Between 4 and 5 a.m. three soundings were taken, and on each occasion the ship was found to be in deep water. A look-out was also kept by four men on the bridge, two at the bows. Still the *Deutschland* got out of her course, and at about a quarter past 5 a.m. on Monday morning the captain was the first to see breakers ahead. He at once telegraphed into the engine-room 'Hard astern', and there might have even then been time to save the ship if the screw propeller had not at this moment broken off, leaving her helpless in the trough of the sea. . . . and in a very few moments the steamer was fixed upon the sands, between two and three miles to the north-west of the eastern end of the sandbank known as the Kentish Knock.

Most of the passengers were awoke by the breaking of the screw when the ship struck. They hurriedly dressed and came on deck. The danger, however, did not then seem imminent, and the assurances of the captain and his officers, added to the intense cold and wet, soon sent them shivering, alarmed, below. At first some sail was set. The cargo in the forehold was thrown overboard. The male passengers were summoned at daylight on Monday to man the pumps, and worked at them cheerily. After some hours' work, however, the vessel made so much water that Captain Brickenstein feared if she slipped off the bank into deep water she would go down like a stone. He therefore anchored. . . . And now comes the most remarkable and pitiable chapter in a sad story. Rockets were thrown up directly the ship struck; in the blinding snowstorm, however, they no doubt were invisible to the lightships. But Monday was a tolerably clear day; passing vessels were distinctly seen from the *Deutschland's* deck, and every effort was made to attract their attention. The passengers and crew watched those vessels, two of them steamers, hoping that each one of them had seen, or must soon see, the signal of distress. But one after another passed by and night came on.

All this time the passengers had not suffered materially. It is possible that a few may have been washed overboard as they first hurried on deck after the vessel struck. But after the first shock they kept up their spirits well. Plenty to eat and drink was served out to them, and the work to which the male passengers were put was useful in diverting their thoughts, but it became known that at night the rising tide and rough sea would imperil all on board. At night, therefore, rockets were thrown up once more, and this time they were answered from the Sunk Light, a lightship to the south-

east of the wreck. The signals at the Sunk Light were repeated by the men at the Cork Lightship, which is situated still nearer to Harwich, and after some time they were answered by the Coast-guard at Harwich. But there is no lifeboat at Harwich, and whether from this cause or not, although on Monday night it was known at Harwich that a vessel was in distress, no help was tendered till daylight on Tuesday morning. . . . I said that their situation first became perilous on Monday night, or rather Tuesday morning. At 2 a.m., Captain Brickenstein, knowing that with the rising tide the ship would be waterlogged, ordered all the passengers to come on deck. Danger levels class distinctions, and steerage and first-class passengers were by this time together in the after saloon and cabins. Most of them obeyed the summons at once; some of them lingered below till it was too late; some of them, ill, weak, despairing of life even on deck, resolved to stay in their cabins and meet death without any further struggle to evade it. After 3 a.m. on Tuesday morning a scene of horror was witnessed. Some passengers clustered for safety within or upon the wheelhouse, and on the top of other slight structures on deck. Most of the crew and many of the emigrants went into the rigging, where they were safe enough as long as they could maintain their hold. But the intense cold and long exposure told a tale. The purser of the ship, though a strong man, relaxed his grasp, and fell into the sea. Women and children and men were one by one swept away from their shelters on the deck. Five German nuns, whose bodies are now in the dead-house here, clasped hands and were drowned together, the chief sister, a gaunt woman six feet high, calling out loudly and often, 'O Christ, come quickly,' till the end came. The shrieks and sobbing of women and children are described as agonizing. One brave sailor, who was safe in the rigging, went down to try and save a child or woman who was drowning on deck. He was secured by a rope to the rigging, but a wave dashed him against the bulwarks, and when daylight dawned his headless body, detained by the rope, was seen swaying to and fro with the waves. It was nearly eight o'clock before the tide and sea abated, and the survivors could venture to go on deck. At half-past ten o'clock the tugboat from Harwich came alongside and brought all away without further accident.

Four of the five nuns who perished by the wreck are to be buried at Leytonstone today. [Only four of their bodies were found.] After being made ready the bodies lay in state in the spacious school-room below the Franciscan church at Stratford throughout Saturday and yesterday. . . . The deceased appeared to be between the ages of 30 and 40, and their faces wore an expression of calmness and resignation. . . . One, noted for her extreme tallness, is the lady who, at midnight on Monday, by standing on a table in the saloon, was able to thrust her body through the skylight, and kept exclaiming, in a voice heard by those in the rigging above the roar of the storm, 'My God, my God, make haste, make haste.'

¹ *The Times*, December 10, 11 and 13, 1875.

III

When Bridges received the poem from Hopkins in August 1878 his judgement was even more unfavourable than that of the editor of *The Month* (who at first accepted it, but afterwards, following a very natural editorial course of action, decided that he 'dare not print it'). It may be of interest to assemble here some extracts from Hopkins's letters to Bridges at the time:

The Bremen stanza . . . was, I think, the first written after 10 years' interval of silence. . . . You say you would not for any money read my poem again. Nevertheless, I beg you will. Besides money, you know, there is love. If it is obscure do not bother yourself with the meaning but pay attention to the best and most intelligible stanzas, as the two last of each part and the narrative of the wreck. . . . I may add for your greatest interest and edification that what refers to myself in the poem is all strictly and literally true and did all occur; nothing is added for poetical padding. . . . The *Deutschland* would be more generally interesting if there were more wreck and less discourse, I know, but still it is an ode and not primarily a narrative. There is some narrative in Pindar but the main business is lyrical.¹

Bridges, to the end, found the emotion of 'The Wreck of the *Deutschland*' distasteful and felt that its sincerity was suspect. Many after him have expressed the same feeling. Since the publication of Hopkins's letters and papers his sincerity has been less and less called into question, but non-Catholics must always find it difficult to respond to the emotion of the poem or to accept it as genuine. It is too specifically Catholic; and when communication fails the reader naturally attributes the failure to the poet's insincerity or lack of balance rather than to his own inexperience of Catholic thought and feeling.

There is another reason for lack of response, affecting Catholics and non-Catholics alike: the obscurity of the poem, especially the obscurity of its central theme. A reader who cannot perceive the thought is bound to feel that the emotion is overpitched and feverish. There is, as I find it, a line of thought capable of bearing any weight of emotion, but it is obscured by the poet's treatment, and to find it and keep it in mind is the most enduring difficulty of the poem. Probably most readers of Hopkins have done as Bridges advised—by-passed the dragon 'Wreck of the *Deutschland*', after

¹ *Letters of Gerard Manley Hopkins to Robert Bridges* (O.U.P., 1935), pp. 44, 46, 47, 49.

some small attempt, to essay less dizzy reading in some of the poems that follow. Yet on returning to it, acclimatized to diction, syntax, and the rest, they find that this difficulty remains.

I believe it is best to look upon the poem as a *meditation*—not in the sense of a slow musing over a subject, but in the Ignatian sense of a religious exercise in which, by reflection on a subject, the mind is raised to God and is kindled to acts of worship. (It is not, of course, an exercise of the emotions; the whole mind is raised to God—that is, chiefly and necessarily the intellect and will; there may or may not be an accompaniment of emotion; if there is, it is not the less sincere or balanced because the exercise is deliberate.) In such an exercise the mind is not held rigidly to a line of thought, but may range back and forth, now dwelling on a scene, now on a memory of past graces or transgressions, swiftly passing to acts of praise, contrition, and so on. Meditation in this sense, after years of practising the Spiritual Exercises of St. Ignatius, had become second nature to Hopkins (I do not say that he set out *ex professo* to make a meditation); so, when he set himself to write the poem, he produced something like a meditation, his text being the newspaper account that had touched him.

It is the free ranging of the poet's mind that is the chief cause of difficulty in grasping the central theme. But there are other causes. One lies in the nature of the theme itself. It is at the core of Christianity, a universal and inexhaustible theme, of which new aspects strike us at each reading. Then there is the breathlessness of the poet's new-found style: we are hurried without pause from line to line and from stanza to stanza, though he packed into his poem (since it was his bent to pack) as much of Christianity as he could.

The central theme which I find is: *the mastery of God over mankind: His action to assert that mastery and bring all men to an acknowledgement of it—all through the grace of Jesus Christ*. In other words, the poem is a meditation on the grace of God.

Amongst some notes which Hopkins drafted for a Commentary on the Spiritual Exercises of St. Ignatius there is a discussion of the problem of the relation between grace and free will. Some sentences from this, which come near the poem in subject and diction, may be of help.

God exercises His mastery and dominion over his creatures' wills in two ways—over the affective will by simply determining it so or so (as it is said the heart of the king is in the Lord's hand to turn it

which way he will); over the *arbitrium* [elective will] or power of pitch by shifting the creature from one pitch contrary to God's will to another which is according to it or from the less to the more so. . . . This shift is grace. For grace is any action, activity, on God's part by which, in creating or after creating, he carries the creature on or towards the end of its being, which is its self-sacrifice to God and its salvation. It is, I say, any such activity on God's part; so that so far as this action or activity is God's it is divine stress, holy spirit, and as all is done through Christ, Christ's spirit; so far as it is action, correspondence, on the creature's it is *actio salutaris*. . . . The *arbitrium* is indeed free towards all alternatives, even though one of them should be absolute evil, evil in itself; but not so the affective will: this must always be affected towards the stem of good and *malum quidem appetit sed sub specie boni* [though it desires evil it desires it under the appearance of good]. . . . [The access of grace] takes the form of instressing the affective will, of affecting the will towards the good which he [God] proposes. . . . There must be something which shall be truly the creature's in the work of corresponding with grace: this is the *arbitrium*, the verdict on God's side, the saying Yes, . . . and looked at in itself, such a nothing is the creature before its creator, it is found to be no more than the mere wish, discernible by God's eyes, that it might do as he wishes, might correspond, might say Yes to him. . . .¹

Hopkins takes the storm and wreck to be God's action on the souls on board the *Deutschland*; the nun's prayer ('O Christ, come quickly') is her acknowledgement of His mastery, and serves as a grace to the others on board to bring them also to His feet. These thoughts are developed in Part II of the poem. Part I is a meditation deriving from them, complete in itself, which could as well come after the other part, as conclusion to the poem rather than as introduction. In stanzas 1-5 the poet thinks of God's action, past and present, on himself. He is touched afresh with terror of His action in the past, and cries out to remind Him that he has already made submission (stanzas 1-2). He recalls his way of escape from that terror (stanza 3). He compares God's grace to a well-spring which feeds the supernatural life in him, apart from which his being is as fleeting and unstable as the sands in an hour-glass (stanza 4). In stanza 5 he speaks of God's action on him through such external things as stars, thunder, sunsets. Stanzas 6-8 are a statement of the origin of grace: it comes from the Redemption, from Jesus Christ. To Him, then, we must submit, for this is the work of grace—through stress on the heart of man to bring him to the feet of Christ. The last two stanzas of the first part (9-

¹ *Note-Books and Papers*, pp. 329, 332, 326, 325, 333.

10) are a prayer to God to master all men, whether by the stress of storm or by that of kindness.

The second part takes up the story of the nuns. It is to some extent narrative and descriptive, but never purely so—the scenes of the wreck are looked at in the light of God's mastery (note, for instance, 'God's cold' in stanza 17). The first stanza (11) is prefatory: it tells with new and strange imagery the old truths of the certainty of death and our unmindfulness of it. Stanzas 12-17 are almost pure narrative. The story of the wreck is told in detail (for his crammed style can fit much detail in a small space), and he brings the story to a climax at the end of stanza 17 with his picture of a prophetess arising with a message for terror-stricken souls. Then (stanza 18) he halts and turns aside for a moment to analyse his own overpowering emotion—incidentally delaying the revelation of the identity of the prophetess. In stanza 19 he reveals her to be a nun, and describes her call, in the midst of the storm, to her Master. In stanzas 20-21 he explains that she is the leader of a group of five nuns, exiles from their native land and now in desperate plight—but watched over always by their Master, ultimate author of both exile and storm. Then follows a strange and very difficult passage (stanzas 22-23), in which he relates the number of the nuns to the number of Our Lord's wounds and of the Stigmata of St. Francis of Assisi. In stanza 24 he again turns to himself to contrast his own comfort with the plight of the nuns, and he gives the words of the nun's call. Stanzas 25-28 are a discussion of the meaning of the call. He states and rejects two explanations: that she longed for suffering in order to be like her Lover, and that she longed for her reward in Heaven. Then in a climactic stanza—the central point of the poem—he gives the true meaning: the storm is Christ (since He wills it), the call is a recognition of Him and a submission to His will. Stanzas 29-30 are praise of the nun's clear-sighted heart, that saw and uttered truly, that like Mary Immaculate conceived and gave birth to the Word.

In stanzas 31-33 he considers the Master's way with the others on board. The bay of His blessing vaults them in too, for the nun is the instrument of His Providence, a bell to ring them back to the fold. The poet cries out in admiration of God's ever-watchful though hidden mercy, which reaches down even to the uttermost, so that the most abject soul is brought to His feet. Stanza 34 is addressed to Christ, new-born to the world through the nun's utterance, praying Him to shine forth over the world. The final

stanza is addressed to the nun in Heaven, praying her to remember England, that Christ's light may shine upon it again, that He may reign over it again as Lord.

IV

The rhythm of the poem is 'sprung rhythm, without counterpoint'. The brief explanation of it which is quoted above from Hopkins's letter to Dixon is sufficient to go on with, and I shall not attempt to add to it except to give the scansion (as I read it) of the first stanza:

Thou mástering mé
 Gód! gíver of breáth and breád;
 Wórld's stránd, swáy of the seá;
 Lórd of líving and deád;
 Thou hast bouúnd bónes and veíns in me, fástened me flésh,
 And áfter it álmóست ún máde, whát with dreád,
 Thy dóing: and dóst thou touéh me afrésh?
 Óver agáin I feél thy fínger and fínd theé.

This pattern is preserved throughout: 2 3 4 3 5 5 4 6 (that is, two stresses in the first line, three in the second, and so on, taking no account of the number or order of unstressed syllables), except that in the second part of the poem the first line in each stanza has three stresses instead of two—though, in the second edition, the indentation of the lines is the same in both parts.

In the remaining difficulties, of imagery, syntax, and diction, the busy reader will best be helped, I believe, by a complete paraphrase of the poem. Accordingly, I offer an attempt at one, with apologies for the impropriety. There is precedent for such a proceeding in the paraphrases and explanations which Hopkins himself was occasionally forced to give his friends, and his comment ('It is dreadful to explain these things in cold blood') is rather heartening than otherwise. I offer it very tentatively, first because I am uncertain of the meaning in many places and have merely set down what seems best to me, and secondly because I realize that any interpretation must as yet be doubtful, no matter how certain and satisfied the interpreter may feel. I beg the reader's indulgence for the baldness and uncouthness of my attempt, and for the loss of meaning suffered in the substitution of other words

for the poet's. These are, in some degree at least, unavoidable—especially the latter, above all with this poet, who links so closely the meaning and the sound of his words.

PARAPHRASE: PART I

Stanza 1. O God, who dost exert mastery over me, creator and sustainer; world's strand,¹ sway of the sea; Lord of living and dead; Thou hast made me, binding bones and veins and flesh together, and afterwards almost unmade me with terror: and now dost Thou touch me once more? Over again I feel Thy finger² and realize³ Thee.

Stanza 2. But surely I made my submission then, O Christ, O God, when Thy lightning flashed and Thy rod lashed me; surely Thou didst hear my heart confess, truer than tongue, Thy terror; Thou knowest the place, the altar before which I knelt, the night and hour of my submission: and how my heart swooned under Thy storm-tread, in horror of Thy height: and how my breast strained under the weight of Thy stress, bound in by its fiery bands. *Stanza 3.* His frowning face before me and raging Hell behind, where was a place of escape for me? Wings I found to fly with, that time, and fled with an impulse of the heart to the Heart of the Eucharistic Host. O my heart, your wings, I know, were the wings of a dove, your mind, I dare to boast, that of the homing pigeon, when you fled from the fire of stress to the fire of love, when you towered in flight from the grace of stress to the grace of comfort.⁴

Stanza 4. I am sand in an hourglass: the glass is fixed at the wall, but the sands move always, crowding at the narrows and toppling down. I am water in a well: at a steady height, balanced there, with glass-like surface, yet ceaselessly coiled by the spring underneath, which

¹ 'Strand': the sea-margin (cf. stanza 32, line 4), or, better, the bond running through and holding together the solid earth.

² 'Finger': cf. stanza 31, line 6. Hopkins liked this image, in this precise sense—probably derives from the hymn *Veni Creator Spiritus*, where the Holy Spirit is called the finger of the Father's right hand. Cf. *Note-Books and Papers*, p. 342.

³ 'Find': suddenly and keenly realize. Cf. 'It is the forged feature finds me', of No. 21 where, however, the usage is in reverse. There is dictionary authority for this latter.

⁴ These are the stanzas to which Hopkins chiefly referred when he told Bridges that what refers to himself 'is all strictly and literally true'. We need not, however, take literally the lightning and other symbols of storm: he is relating his own trial and submission to the trial, and the submission of the nun. The account of the wreck touches him with terror of God's 'frightfulness' to men. It recalls to him a storm of terror that he has suffered in the past—terror of obedience, perhaps, or of the suffering that God has sent, or will send, to him. Under the buffeting of that storm he was tempted to despair, seeing at first no choice only between the frown of a terrible God (who seemed infinitely far away above him) and the horrors of Hell. But he found another way: the way of submission. He confessed to God his terror, threw himself on His mercy, suddenly found the smile of a loving God (very near him in the Eucharist), and realized that the storm of terror was God's action on him, asserting His mastery. Hence when he feels a fresh access of that terror he reminds God of his submission and reminds himself of the way of escape. No. 40 deals with a similar, or perhaps the same, trial.

brings down from the mountainside the living water offered in the Gospel, which keeps me to my height, which is my source, the gift of Christ.¹

Stanza 5. I kiss my hand in salute to the stars, the lovely multiple starlight, inviting Him to come to me; I glow and glory in thunder; kiss my hand to the sunset west, damson-dappled; (since, though He sustains the world's splendour and wonder, this mystery must, through His grace, be brought home); for thus I greet Him whenever I recognize Him, and bless Him for the grace of recognition.²

Stanza 6. Not from God's eternal bliss in Heaven—nor first from there (and few know this)—comes the stress felt from the stars, the stroke dealt by storms—stroke and stress that hushes guilt, flushes and melts hearts—but it floats on time like a riding river (and here even the faithful waver, while the faithless fable and miss the truth).³

Stanzas 7-8. It had its beginning on the day of His Incarnation in Galilee; it springs from His grey life in the womb (grave-like but warm); from the manger and His maiden-mother's knee; from the thronging, harrying Passion and the frightful sweat of blood; thence it comes, there it swelled into flood (though felt before the Incarnation, though in high flood yet)—A truth no one would know if the heart, under pressure of stress, did not blurt it out! Oh, at the last that Word, be it best or worst to us, rushes to our lips! How a lush, plush-skinned sloe will gush through a man when its flesh bursts in his mouth, flushing him brimful in a flash with its sourness or sweetness!⁴ Hither, then, to the feet of Christ, hero of Calvary, in submission to Him, men go, first or last—whether or not they mean it, or want it, or are warned of it.

Stanza 9. Be adored among men, O God, One in Three; wring with wrecking and storm the rebellious malice of man, dogged in his den. Sweet beyond saying, beyond the power of tongue to tell, Thou art at once lightning and love, as I myself have found, at once winter and warm; Thou art father and fondler of the heart which Thou hast wrung: when Thy descent is dark, then Thy mercy is greatest. *Stanza 10.* Forge Thy will in him with fire and anvil-ding—or rather, stealing

¹ The image of the well derives from St. John's Gospel, Chapter 4: Jesus tells the Samaritan woman at Jacob's Well: '... the water that I will give shall become in him a fountain of water, springing up into life everlasting.' A passage in his Journal, dated October 1875, describes a visit to St. Winifred's Well (at Holywell) and it is interesting to compare it with this stanza—*Note-Books and Papers*, p. 214. 'Roped': coiled by, as in a coil of rope.

² 'Stress' is God's action on man; 'instress' I take here to be the consequent illumination, through man's co-operation with stress or grace.

³ There are several puzzles in this stanza. I have taken 'riding a river' to be 'a riding river' (cf. stanza 15, line 5; No. 16, line 14). But the straightforward meaning is probably better. The image is either of a river of grace flowing over time, or of a river of time on the surface of which the stream of grace flows. Line 3 is, I believe, a statement of the Scotist opinion that the Incarnation would have taken place even had man not fallen from grace, and that all grace, including that of the angels and of our First Parents before their fall, is grace of Christ. Hopkins adhered to this opinion—v. *Note-Books and Papers*, pp. 343 seqq. 'The faithful waver' in the last line may then refer to the different opinions held by Catholic theologians.

⁴ The form of the simile—beginning with 'how'—is noteworthy. The same form occurs in stanza 26.

like Spring through him, melt him; but always master him: whether at once, as once with a crash Thou didst master Paul, or as Augustine, with a lingering-out sweet skill, let Thy mercy show forth in us all, and Thy mastery, but only that we may adore Thee, may adore Thee as King.

PART II

Stanza 11. Death on his drum proclaims: 'To some I come in the form of a sword; some I crush between the wheel-flange and the rail; to some I am flame, or fang, or flood', and as on a bugle, his fame is blown by storms. Yet we, dreaming, think our roots are firm in earth—Dust! Men die before our eyes while we, of the same flesh, continue like flowers in a meadow to wave our blooms in air with the rest, and forget that the meadow must bow to the sour scythe and that the ploughshare will make all bleat.¹

Stanza 12. There sailed on Saturday from Bremen, bound for America, two hundred souls, in round numbers, counting men and women, emigrants and sailors—O Father, not sheltering under Thy wings, nor guessing that their voyage was to end on a shoal of sand, that drowning was to be the fate of a fourth of them; yet did not the bay of Thy blessing,² though with its dark side, overshadow them? were they not wound round and round with Thy mercy?³ *Stanza 13.* Into the snows the *Deutschland* sweeps on Sunday, hurling Bremerhaven behind; the bitter weather continues, the sea, black-waved, like flakes of flint under the steady gale from—cursed quarter—east-north-east;⁴ snow-flakes, white as fire, make wire-lines⁵ in the air as they spin whirlwind-twisted to the deeps that drown husband and child and father. *Stanza 14.* She drove in the dark to leeward and struck, not a reef or a rock, but where the waves broke on a sandbank: night had drawn her right to the Kentish Knock; and there she beat upon the bank with her bows and her riding keel while the breakers rolled on her beam with ruinous shock: and these she must endure, for canvas and compass, screw and wheel are useless forever to move or guide her. *Stanza 15.* Hope had grown grey, had mourned, with features trenched and carved with tears and cares, had died twelve hours before: a nightfall of terror ended a day of woe, nor was there a sign of rescue, only the flash of rocket and lightship: lives were beginning to be lost in the wash of the waves; they took to the shrouds and there shivered in the hurling and horrible wind. *Stanza 16.* One man came down from the rigging to save the distracted women below, but, handy and brave as he was, and in spite

¹ There is authority in Shakespeare (*Ant. and Cleo.*, III, ii, 100) for the transitive use of 'cringe'. For 'bleat' cf. No. 7, line 6. I take it as 'making bleat' here.

² Hopkins frequently uses the word 'bay' to mean the vault of the sky, or part of it. See, for instance, No. 17, line 22, *Note-Books and Papers*, pp. 125, 144.

³ The sense is the same as in No. 37, lines 34-36.

⁴ 'East-north-east' does not occur in *The Times* report quoted above. It is from an earlier report, v. *The Times*, 9 December.

⁵ Cf. 'hailropes' in No. 17, line 27.

of the rope's end round him, he was pitched to his death at a blow—for all his fearless heart and sturdy sinews: they could see him for hours, swinging to and fro,¹ in the cobbles of foam-fleece—what could he do against the force² of the fountains of air, the leaping and surge of the seas? *Stanza 17.* They fought against God's cold, and failed in the fight and fell—to the deck and were crushed, or to the water and were drowned, or rolled with the waters that romped over the wreck. The roar of the storm was mingled in the darkness with the heart-breaking sound of a heart-broken rabble, the woman's wailing, the child's unchecked crying—till over the babble a lioness reared, a prophetess towered in the tumult, the tongue of a virgin prevailed.

Stanza 18. Ah, heart, mother of my being, you are touched in your bower of bone! you have writhed in exquisite pain! you make words break from me here all alone! O incorrigible heart, always in pursuit of evil, yet always uttering truth, you are weeping! are you? yes, tears; such a melting throb, a madrigal shock! What can it be, this glee, this revel that never grows old, this river of youth? is it, O my heart, your own natural goodness?³

Stanza 19. It is a sister, a sister calling a master, her master and mine!—the waves washing over the wreck run swirling and twisting: the violent, stinging,⁴ heavily beating brine blinds her; but she at this time sees one thing only; reaches out for one thing: she raises her voice to Divine ears, and the call of the tall nun was heard over the brawling of the storm by the men on the masts and in the rigging.

Stanza 20. She was chief of a group of five nuns. (O *Deutschland*, doubly desperate name to them! O nation astray from its good! But St. Gertrude, Christ's lily, and Luther, beast of the waste wood, came from the same town: from life's dawn it has been so, Abel and Cain are brothers and have sucked the same breasts.) *Stanza 21.* Loathed for the love men knew them to have, exiled from the land of their birth, the Rhine refused them. The Thames was to ruin them; surf, snow, river, and earth gnashed teeth at them: but Thou, Orion of light, art above: Thou, O Master of martyrs, wert weighing their worth in the poisoning hands that have taken them from their chancel: in Thy sight snow-flakes were scroll-leaved flowers, lily-showers—sweet heaven was astrew with them.

¹ 'Dangled the': I suggest it is a MS. mistake for 'dangled there'.

² He re-coins an obsolete verb, 'to burl', combining its meaning ('to bubble forth as from a fountain') with the vigour of the current 'burly'. I take it that 'buck' in this same line (dialect: 'to drench') has added to it in the same way the current meaning 'leap upwards'.

³ The final question I take to mean: 'Is it your natural desire for the good?'—natural desire, as distinguished from that which results from the action of supernatural grace. Throughout the poem he seems to use the word 'heart' with the precise meaning 'affective will'. Though 'unteachably after evil' (*malum quidem appetit*), it is the heart which is the first to recognize truth, because it is the heart that is melted or wrung by God's action. Cf. stanzas 2, 3, 6, 7, 29, 30; also No. 14, line 13, No. 27, line 5 *seqq.*

⁴ 'Hawling': I merely guess at a meaning. 'Rash' and 'smart' are used in obsolete meanings.

Stanza 22. Five! brand denoting man's realization in himself of suffering Christ,¹ image of Him,² and symbol. Note that it is man who stamps the brand,³ and that it means 'Sacrificed'. But He Himself brands it in scarlet on those whom He has chosen beforehand⁴ for Himself, those whom He values most highly and for whom He has paid the greatest price—brand, sign, five-leaved symbol that is stamped on the fleece of the Victim-lamb, that reddens the Rose-petal. *Stanza 23.* Joy be to thee, their father, Francis, image of the dead Life; with the gnarls of the nails in thy hands and feet, wound of the lance in thy side, thou that art a picture of His crucified love, sealed by His seraphic visitation to thee!⁵ and these thy daughters, five-lived, thy pride and five-leaved favour, are also sealed, sisterly, by His coming to them in wild waters, to bathe in His harvest-gold mercies, to breathe in His all-fire glances.

Stanza 24. Away in the lovable West, on a pastoral mountain-slope of Wales, I was at rest here under a roof while they were a prey to the gales; she was calling to the black air about her, to the breaker, to the thickly falling flakes, to the throng that hears her and quails: 'O Christ, Christ, come quickly': she gives the name of Christ to what afflicts her, christens her wild worst with the Name that is best.

Stanza 25. The majesty of it! what did she mean? Speak and tell us, O chief and original Breath. Is it that she desired to be as her Lover had been? Speak, body of lovely Death. The men, then, that woke Thee with 'We perish' in the storm of Genesareth were of altogether different mind.⁶ Or did she cry out for her reward in Heaven, desiring it more keenly because of the keenness of the combat for it? *Stanza 26.* For how cheering to the heart it is when the grey, down-dugged, ground-hugged⁷ fog lifts and reveals the jay-blue heavens of May, cloud-dappled or bare! Or higher than blue, grey-glowing; or the night-sky, higher still, with tinkling stars and the moth-soft Milky Way; or whatever is your picture of the Heaven of desire, the treasure eye hath not seen nor

¹ It will be useful to read No. 85 with these two stanzas. It explains 'cinquefoil', 'five-leaved', 'ruddying of the rose-flake', and will help towards an understanding of Hopkins's feeling for the number five. 'Finding' may have reference to the Stigmata.

² 'Sake': see Bridges' note on No. 21 (p. 109).

³ This may mean that it is a man himself who stamps (i.e. that it denotes self-sacrifice) or that it is stamped by others—or both.

⁴ 'Before-time-taken' may mean 'taken before time began'—i.e. predestined from eternity.

⁵ For an account of Our Lord's appearance as a seraph to St. Francis when he received the Stigmata, see *Fioretti*, Reflection 3 on the Most Holy Stigmata.

⁶ The reference to the plight of the Apostles and their cry, 'Lord, save us, we perish', is puzzling. At first sight it appears that the poet attributes the same meaning to both cries—of the nun and of the Apostles—since he rejects a suggested motive for hers by referring to theirs. Later, however, he gives a much larger meaning to the cry of the nun. I take it that here he gives part of the argument (a particular instance of it, sufficient for the moment) against the motive suggested. The argument is that 'love in her of the being as her lover had been' would not be natural in the circumstances—witness the behaviour of the Apostles in the same circumstances.

⁷ Hopkins was interested in the ugliness of nature as well as in its beauty. There are several passages of description not unlike this in his Journal.

ear heard—was it this she cried for?¹ *Stanza 27.* No, these were not the reasons for her call. The asking for ease of the sorrow-drenched heart has its source in weariness of the dreary journey through life, of the endless succession of tasks and troubles, not in the electrical horror of danger; nor could the other be her reason; the appeal of the Passion is more tender in solitary prayer: she had, I gather, a different meaning, in the force of the storm and the beating of the dragon-like seas. *Stanza 28.* But how shall I . . . how write it large enough? Give me a . . . Fancy, come faster—See, do you see it? look where it looms there, the vision she . . . there then! the Master, He Himself, the only one, Christ, King, Head: He was to cure her, Who had brought her to this extremity: let Him, her pride, ride in triumph, let Him hasten and have done with the sentence He has passed.

Stanza 29. Ah! there was a heart uttering truth! There was an eye that was single!² Interpreted the unintelligible violent night and knew from whom it came and why; calling it by the name of the Word that all things present and past, heaven and earth, are word of and worded by—a soul like Simon Peter's! a Rock firm as the Tarpeian against the blast, but fanned into a beacon of light to the world. *Stanza 30.* Jesu, light to the heart, Jesu, son of a virgin, what was the Feast-day that followed the night on which Thou wert glorified by this nun?—the Feast of Mary Immaculate.³ She was conceived immaculate in order that she might be immaculate for Thy conception: but here, O Word, was a heart-throe, a birth of a brain, that heard Thee, and kept Thee, and uttered Thee outright.

Stanza 31. Well, she has Thee to cure her pain, to bring her patience; but how pitiful the lot of the others on board! O heart, go and bleed bitterer tears for them, uncomforted and unconfessed—No, not uncomforted: the breast of the maiden could respond so, could be a bell to the tender light-as-feather finger, God's lovely-felicitous Providence, could ring of it, and startle the poor sheep back to the fold! so the shipwreck then is a harvest for Thee? does the tempest bear the grain to Thy barns? *Stanzas 32–33.* I admire Thee, master of the tides, of the ancient Flood, of the harvest; impulse of the ceaseless motion of recurb and recovery at the ocean's edge; girth, and wharf, and wall of it; Thou that dost stanch and quench that other ocean, the restless mind of man;⁴ foundation and granite core of being; God, past all comprehension, sovereign on Thy throne behind death, watching but unseen, knowing beforehand but waiting; with a mercy that outrides the mighty ocean and is an ark of refuge for those that hear the Word; with a love that glides lower than death and the dark for the lingerer;

¹ This whole stanza is an amplification of the question in the last two lines of the previous stanza. The question-mark at the end refers to the whole stanza, or at least to the last four lines. For the equation of God's Heaven with the visible heaven, cf. No. 8. The last line refers to 1 Cor. ii, 9.

² Matt. vi, 22.

³ The scene he has described took place between midnight and morning of 7 December.

⁴ 'Motionable' for 'mobile' occurs in No. 62, and is there used of a mental quality, as I have taken it here. But the literal meaning, of the ocean, is probably better.

a life-bringing vein of grace for those that are past prayer, pent in prison, those that repent with their last breath—the most abject see Him, new-risen from the Passion, the Anointed of the Father compassionate, brought to them in the winds that are His strides.¹

Stanza 34. Now, new-born to the world, let Him burn, Word that is God and man, that was sent from Heaven to cast fire on the earth, took a human heart and was enfolded—miracle of flame—in Mary's virgin womb, Second Person of the sovereign Trinity! His coming was not in the dazzling light of the Judgement Day, nor yet in darkness; kind He was but kingly, reclaiming His own: like a shower flashing down to the plain, not like lightning hurled from heaven.

Stanza 35. Lady, at our door drowned and among our shoals, remember us in the harbour, the haven of the Heavenly reward: pray for us, that our King may come again to English souls! Let Him rise again amongst us, be a dawn to bring light to our dimness, a beacons eastern sky, brightening our rare-dear Britain more and more as the years of His reign on earth roll by, our pride, rose, prince, hero, high-priest, the hearth's fire of our hearts' charity, Lord of the thronging chivalry of our thoughts.

¹ This stanza is to be understood primarily of those on board the wreck (cf. *The Times* report for the details), but the poet may have had all mankind in mind also.

BOOK REVIEWS

CATHOLIC POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY

The State in Catholic Thought. By Heinrich A. Rommen. (B. Herder, 36s.)

THERE has recently been fresh tentative thinking on the subject of political theology. Indeed, it is as true to say that every political theory has an intrinsic correlation to an idea of God as it is to say that every political theory is correlated to a definite idea of man. The idea of man itself cannot be separated from a corresponding idea of God, though, of course, this 'theological' strain in a social theory may take the form of a dogmatic refusal to accept any such idea. The conception of the rights of man is a very definite one if one recognizes the existence of a personal God as Creator of man, the immortality of the spiritual soul and, in consequence, the nature of man as a person with his ultimate end in God. The conception of the rights of man, however, is another and very different one if the world is ultimately only Spirit or only matter, and man's individual being is only accidental to the development of the Spirit (as in Hegel's philosophy) or of matter (as in Marxist philosophy). In spite of this impact of the idea of God on political theory, Dr. Rommen is right in urging that

from the standpoint of Catholic theology a specific political theology cannot be held. St. Thomas bases political philosophy on natural reason and natural law, not on revelation and supernatural theology. Natural theology in the form of theism is indeed involved, but theism is based on natural reason and not on a traditionalist original revelation nor on a subjective spiritual revelation. (pp. 111 seq.)

Of course, Dr. Rommen is equally definite in insisting that

if the rights of man and the duties of authority, and the duties of man and the rights of authority, do not ultimately originate in a transcendent God who is perfect Intellect, infinite Goodness, omnipotent Will, gracious and just Providence, then there is no escape from anarchy or from tyranny. (pp. 121 seq.)

One of the worst consequences of agnosticism, he contends, is the perversion of democracy itself, since it becomes the expression of a utilitarian relativism and, indeed, as recent experience shows, a slogan for the most contradictory forms of government as in 'liberal' and 'totalitarian' democracies.

Supernatural revelation assures man of what by reason alone he can understand to be his nature. To stress mere reason in the interpretation of the fundamental human ends, values and ideals without raising theological issues tends to broaden the basis for an understanding between those adhering fundamentally to the same sets of values, and for joint action. To emphasize the common ground in the understanding of human nature by reason is especially important in an age such as ours, when it is obvious that only by uniting on a common platform will the forces willing to defend the basic values of Western civilization be able to avert the danger, from without and within, of its utter destruction. This is the more so since these common values still draw their power to influence society from the Christian conception of God, man, society and law, although many of those who stand by these values are no longer conscious of this fact. His scepticism regarding political theology does not mean that Dr. Rommen does less than justice to political thinkers such as De Maistre, Donoso Cortes, De Bonald, A. Müller. But the merit of their 'political theology', he says, lies in certain aspects of their criticisms of modern political thinking and development, not in their positive systems. Dr. Rommen thus makes it clear from the beginning that expressions such as 'the State in Catholic thought' or 'Catholic political philosophy' do not imply that such a theory is based on theology but 'means, so to speak, the place where it grew and found its home.'

The fact, however, that the impact of Christian teaching on political thought has been enormous is, as Dr. Rommen points out, clearly shown by the profound changes in the heritage of political philosophy taken over by Christianity from the Greeks and Stoics.

Yet it does not follow that each concept and every form of thinking must mean something different from what it meant before. . . . The great changes in meaning and import lay far more in the presuppositions, in the theology, and in the moral and legal philosophy of the new spiritual power. (p. 28)

These presuppositions imply above all the Christian interpretation of human nature and the nature of the state. Man's ultimate fulfilment can no longer be sought in the state, and since man's end transcends the state, the state has no absolute power over man and is not the only master of moral life. From this new situation there springs the sequence of themes in political theory which dominate the Christian era.

These themes reappear in every generation, mark the climatic crises in universal history, and lie as the real issue today at the bottom of the struggle against totalitarianism. These themes are: the perpetual struggle of the individual Christian person against the ever-present abuse of power by those that rule, ranging from the trial of Socrates to the trials of Father Meyer or Pastor Niemöller or the martyrdom of so many who suffer and die without due process of law in the concentration camps; the theme of the justification of the state and its sovereign power to rule not beyond the order of law but as a servant of and in the order of law; a theme expressed in many forms, such as might and right, sovereignty and natural law, ethics and politics, political science and moral philosophy, the theme of Church and state, theology and politics, religious freedom and government, or whatever the historical aspects of that theme may be called. (p. 29)

Dr. Rommen divides his treatise into four parts: I. Philosophical foundations. II. The Philosophy of the State. III. Church and State. IV. The Community of Nations. With what high expectations one is entitled to approach such a comprehensive study of Catholic political theory can be judged from the number of Dr. Rommen's earlier studies on various aspects of the subject. Mention may particularly be made of his outstanding study on the political doctrine of Suárez (*Die Staatslehre des Franz Suarez*, 1936), his book on the everlasting recurrence of the Natural Law idea (*Die ewige Wiederkehr des Naturrechts*, 1936) and a smaller study with the same title as the one under review (*Der Staat in der katholischen Gedankenwelt*, 1935).

The main part of the discussion of the 'philosophical foundations' deals with the nature of man and the idea of Natural Law. Throughout its development from St. Augustine up to the great Spaniards in the sixteenth century Catholic thinking in political theory was based on the idea of Natural Law. Dr. Rommen traces the idea in Greek philosophy, describes its growth in the centuries before St. Augustine, points to the idea of order as the philosophical basis of Natural Law and explains its content and its relation to positive Law. Dr. Rommen's intention is apparently to give his discussion of the traditional Natural Law doctrine a form palatable to the modern mind and, at the same time, to show the traditional Natural Law idea in the perspective of the political problems of the modern world. He admirably attains this purpose. Of course, beyond such a purpose there is a wide range of problems for Natural Law theory which have cropped up with the development of modern ethics. These concern first of all the idea of nature itself. Two Natural Law theories diametrically oppose each other; the rationalist Natural Law theory of the Enlightenment sees the whole of man's nature in his reason, the materialist Natural Law theory of Marxian determinism thinks exclusively of his physical

nature. The former theory, upheld by Wolff, Kant, Hegel, Stammler, is far from being dead, as the Neo-Kantian and the Neo-Hegelian theories bear witness. The latter rules the political systems of hundreds of millions. In the view of this materialist theory the nature of man is nothing but matter, though equipped with that small piece of 'organic matter' (Lenin) called brain. The foundation of ethics and practical politics in materialist philosophy is fundamentally 'reflexology', viz. the theory of the reflex behaviour of the brain in reaction to external stimuli.

A second series of problems for the traditional Natural Law doctrine arises with the ramification of modern ethics into the purely deontological and the purely eudaimonological schools. Natural Law doctrine itself deals with both elements in the essence of the moral good on one of which each of these schools exclusively concentrates. The traditional Natural Law doctrine discusses the moral consciousness as knowledge of good and evil including the 'ought', the consciousness of duty. This intuitional *a priori* is by the deontologists (e.g. the Oxford moralists) made the whole subject of ethics. The other element in the nature of the moral good is the eudaimonological one: the moral good is the good for man. This element is made the sole basic for ethics by the utilitarian schools. How important it is, however, to ascertain the amount of truth in their endeavours may be seen from the fact that the traditional Natural Law doctrine itself holds that utility is the function of law and that the moral good is, indeed, the good of man.

A third paramount problem for the traditional Natural Law doctrine is the establishment of a definite, concrete criterion of the good and the right. The more complex the social and political relationships in modern society have grown, the more difficult is the application of the general moral and jural principles of Natural Law to the existing conditions and situations. Dr. Rommen duly emphasizes that Natural Law only provides general principles. On the other hand, he quotes St. Thomas Aquinas' saying that to realize justice in economic life and in the manifold social relations is more difficult and more laborious than to define the correct diagnosis and therapy in medical art. The importance for political theory of a very definite criterion of right may be seen especially from the attempt to base the rights of man on his social functions. This idea is at the bottom not only of the Marxist materialist legal philosophy in present-day Russia but also of many schools of socialist legal thinking and of affiliated political theories such as that of Laski.

The core of Dr. Rommen's study lies in the second part, in which he discusses the philosophy of the state. He deals with the origin of the state, with the state as 'perfect society' and as a moral organism, with the common good as the measure of state activities, with the state's relation to education and religion, with political authority,

its original holder (including a well-balanced discussion of the controversy about this subject amongst the Scholastics), its justification and its tasks, with sovereignty and the forms of government. Dr. Rommen knows how to enliven the traditional pattern of teaching by constantly presenting in wide perspective the history of the various problems, and the implication of this pattern with regard to present-day situations in democratic and totalitarian states. And in cases where Dr. Rommen does not deal specially with problems which crop up in political developments and political theories in these days, the reader can easily draw from the argument conclusions which throw light on the problems in question. Some such problems which suggest themselves are the free society and planned society; the impact of modern economic and technical development on state dynamics; the manifold implications of present-day social security schemes; the establishment of economic order in a free society; the influence of population pressure and declining birth-rates on the domestic and foreign policies of states; the dynamic forces of historical character at work in the origin, the life and decline of states; the political dynamics engendered from pressure groups and international constellations; and, in connection with all this, the true and the pretended imperatives of *raison d'état*.

In his discussion of 'Church and State' Dr. Rommen sets out by emphasizing the sociological aspect of the problem: the Catholic Church as the stronghold of freedom from the state in a definite sphere is

anything else but state [and yet] the most powerful social form of history on earth . . . again and again the states have tried to use for their finite political ideas the uniqueness and superiority of the Church, they have tried to copy the imperial power and the hierarchic majestic order, the absoluteness of its divinely instituted dogmas and morals. There were at all times, and there are still in the world of states, those who aped Rome; they were and are always the mortal enemies of Rome. (pp. 507 seq.)

On the other hand, it is most important to see the historical character of the problem involved:

What matters is not the logical delimitation of a formal abstract sphere of religion from a likewise formal and abstract sphere of the state. The problem is the endlessly new task for new forms of political life, to encounter the concrete fact of the universal, independent Church, older than any of the states, mightier than any coalition of them, in her end and organization transcendent to them: the Roman Catholic Church, from the beginning not directed to the *polis* but to the *cosmopolis*; she is not a community

of worship of a nation or a tribe but of the people of God above nations and tribes though in the midst of them. (p. 510)

With this fact in mind Dr. Rommen discusses the rise of the problem of Church and State, the types of relationship between them in the course of history, the fight against Caesaropapism, the struggle for the liberty of the Church in the era of Gregory VII and Henry IV, the development of the medieval theory of Church and State, the theory of the indirect power of the Church, the development of the relation between Church and State in the period of the Reformation, the origin of national Churches, the rise of secularism and the answer of the Church culminating in the encyclicals of Leo XIII. Dr. Rommen's discussion of these problems combines the historical and theoretical perspective exceedingly well. He throws the essentials into relief without missing the details which give colour to the whole.

After an inquiry into the co-operation of Church and State by means of concordats, and into the separation of Church and State, in its hostile and its acceptable types, Rommen concludes this part of his study with some pertinent observations on 'social and political Catholicism'. The age of the neutral state, he says, the era of progressive secularization, becomes in many countries the age of the great, popular Catholic movements of political and social Catholicism. These movements take advantage of political liberties in order to protect the rights of their members in the sphere of education and association and the rights of the Church, and to promote social reform in accordance with Natural Law principles, Dr. Rommen is, of course, well aware that the existence and activities of these movements depend upon the circumstances in each country, but he is equally definite in rebutting undue criticism.

Some people have spoken disparagingly about these movements, particularly about 'political Catholicism'. These criticisms have been made especially since in Italy, Germany, and Spain these Catholic parties were unable to prevent the rise of dictatorial totalitarian regimes. It has been said that such parties proved a burden for the Church because their existence led to an identification of party politics with the Church. Foes of the Church condemned these parties as a modern secular arm of the Church and ridiculed them as clerical parties. Both views are wrong. These parties were not a secular arm of the Vatican serving its policies nor did they identify themselves with the Church as a hierarchically organized religious institution. They were simply political associations of Catholic citizens, using the democratic political liberties for the good of the whole people, working for the preservation of Christianity, of Christian morals, and of natural law in political and international life as well as in the national and economic life of their own states. (p. 610)

In addition to social and political Catholicism there is today a new form of activity of the Church in society: Catholic Action. Many may hope that Dr. Rommen will deal with this paramount subject in a subsequent edition of his book. He is certainly the man for such a task. It would seem to form an indispensable part of a treatise on 'Church and State' in modern society. One thinks not so much of the more organizational aspects of Catholic Action, which must needs vary from country to country, as of certain problems involved in Catholic Action, such as that of the difference and borderline between political Catholicism and Catholic Action, or its character as one form of the exercise of the indirect power of the Church in neutral society, or the status of the laity in the Church, to whom the call to Catholic Action is addressed.

In the last part, which is devoted to the 'Community of Nations', Dr. Rommen deals chiefly with the Catholic doctrine about war. The problem of war and the preservation of peace has, indeed, so far been the main issue of international law. In an introductory chapter Rommen develops the foundations of International Law: the plurality of states, the brotherhood of all men, Natural Law in the international sphere. Since 'an international order is fundamentally the consequence of the pluralism of states and nations', Dr. Rommen's answer to the question of the possibility or expediency of a World State is in the negative. He attaches particular importance to the argument with which Bellarmine refuted the idea of a World State: that it could not come into existence without grave wars and violence, since the national and geographical differentiation justifies a plurality of individual independent states. The attempt at world domination which resulted in the Second World War is ample proof of this proposition and no one can doubt that a new attempt would meet with the same reactions. Dr. Rommen then discusses the just war and the just conduct of war, the means of avoiding war and abolishing the causes of war, and finally the basis of international peace.

He then considers that he has obtained a basis 'for a reserved judgement about so many proffered proposals to preserve peace by the introduction of a world state or a world government after the abolition of national sovereignty.' But he remains sceptical.

On paper such a world government has a fine appearance. . . . As soon as an issue which some states consider of vital interest for themselves should be decided against them by even a qualified majority, they would secede. And any legislation would be the result of power politics by pressure groups of states highly organized and efficient. (p. 730)

In face of the present state of international life this contention is unanswerable. But there seems to be a radical difference between a World

State in the full sense of one single body politic, and world government by an international authority with definite powers for the prevention of war and for armament control. Dr. Rommen obviously concluded his study before the Hiroshima disaster. In the atomic age it becomes imperative that there should be a minimum of international organization for the establishment of such an authority on the basis of a true democracy of nations. Dr. Rommen himself, since he stresses the view that the application of Natural Law is governed by the actual circumstances, would no doubt draw a similar conclusion from the Natural Law principles in a world faced with atomic weapons. His master, Suárez (*De legibus*, L.III, c. 2.5; c. 4.7), realistic observer that he was, though he refuted the idea of a World State on the ground that it was not necessary, would now certainly agree that an international authority has under present-day circumstances become indispensable. Indeed, Dr. Rommen's book shows all the clarity and firmness in the interpretation of the principles, and all the realism and flexibility in their adaptation to circumstances, which are characteristic of the best tradition of Natural Law theory.

J. MESSNER

THE BEGINNING OF THE END

Decadence : A Philosophical Inquiry. By C. E. M. Joad. (Faber. 12s. 6d.)

DR. JOAD'S latest book raises a great many questions which the author appears unable or unwilling to answer. It points to the existence of a vacuum, but does nothing to fill it. It postulates a problem crying aloud for a solution, but makes no attempt to solve it. It terminates the argument at the point where it begins to become really interesting. It makes the negative side of the case, but ignores the positive side. It indicates that the low moral and aesthetic standards of the present age are caused by the absence of some 'object' which would give a criterion of absolute values, but refrains from inquiring whether such an object is capable of being discovered by rational inquiry.

'Decadence' is identified by Dr. Joad with 'the valuing of experience for its own sake, irrespective of the quality of the experience, the object of the experience, that upon which the experience is, as it were, directed being left out of account.' It is defined as the 'dropping of the object'. Decadence is a condition which ignores the objectivity of moral standards and aesthetic values, which exist as 'part of the moral and aesthetic order of the universe by which our experiences are evoked, to which our judgements refer and about which, if they are correct, they give us information.' All 'objects' are not necessarily true. The fascist,

the nazi and the communist alike possess objective standards of value which inspire their actions with vigour and confidence. Their standards are false and dangerous. Their objects are finite and competitive, and cannot be enjoyed in abundance by everybody. Moreover, they ultimately fail to give lasting satisfaction to those who secure them. One part of the world is pursuing false objects and another part is pursuing no object. The great problem of the day, as Dr. Joad sees it, is to discover a true object to displace the false objects, and to fill the vacuum of the decadent, objectless civilization. This is no doubt true. Indeed it is unquestionable.

Although the quest for a true object is not pursued, there are clues indicating where it could be found. There are many hints throughout the argument that might be profitably developed. If it were found that such developments all led in the same direction, the coincidence should surely provoke the curiosity of an impartial inquirer. If the pursuit of a number of independent paths always appeared to approach the same destination, something more than a coincidence would seem to be present. If every echo in the forest seemed to come from the same point, it would certainly be foolish to fail to examine the source of the sounds. Throughout Dr. Joad's book there are frequent hints of Christian doctrine, frequent footprints leading to Christian teaching, frequent echoes of the Christian voice. But these clues are neglected. They are not followed up. It would be of great interest to know the conclusions that Dr. Joad would reach if he were to attempt to pursue his investigation to its logical conclusion. Such an inquiry would inevitably involve an examination of the Christian claim to possess the true object of human existence.

Dr. Joad admits the need for some religion if men are to be saved from the decadent life of valuing experience for its own sake. It is only a small minority of mankind that is capable of developing philosophical arguments in favour of some extra-sensory object that belongs to the order of being known as reality. The great mass of mankind must be prepared to accept that object on the authority of some teacher. The great majority of men have neither the leisure, the mental equipment nor the inclination to reach a philosophical explanation of life. Men are unequal in endowments and circumstances, and are therefore not equally capable of prolonged philosophical inquiries. But, unless it is argued that they are therefore unequal in spiritual value and moral capacity, they must not be condemned to the bitter alternatives of pursuing false objects or no object. The suggestion that a small *élite* should alone possess the secret of objective standards of value, and that the vast mass of mankind should labour in spiritual darkness, is one that cannot be entertained. It offends against Dr. Joad's own statement that no object can be true that cannot be universalized.

Dr. Joad asks, 'What, in the sphere of social philosophy, fills the

office which I have assigned to the "object"? He suggests that the answer must be found at two levels. At the first level the answer is, 'the goods upon which democracy lays stress'. A list of these goods includes restraints on power imposed by law and custom, representative government, and the rule of law. It is essential to democracy that 'the individual should be treated as an end in himself', and that the natural rights of man should not be interfered with by arbitrary power. At the second level the answer must be found in the recognition by society of an independent moral order in the universe, which would manifest itself in the social and political virtues of self-discipline, respect for minorities, and a number of other commendable practices. But these are the virtues particularly associated with Christianity out of which modern democracy has grown. Indeed, Dr. Joad admits this: 'There never was so much need for the Christian virtues as in a world in which man's power to do harm through the lack of them is so vastly increased. Yet the Christian virtues', he continues, 'cannot be practised with effect unless there is a recognition of an independent non-human order of reality which constitutes the objective ground for the ends which we know to be valuable.' In other words, the object which democracy finds excellent is to be found in the Christian virtues, and the Christian virtues are impossible without a foundation of religious belief. Surely this raises a *prima facie* case for the most impartial and dispassionate examination of the claims of the Christian religion to be regarded as the possessor of the object which can define the ultimate values, not only for the philosopher, but for the common man who cannot be expected to discover them for himself.

The truth of the Christian religion does not rest solely upon the moral perfection of its precepts. Many other approaches have to be made by a sincere seeker after truth besides the mere inspection of the moral excellence of Christian teaching, much of which can be found in other religions. If, however, the philosopher seeking for guidance on the true values of reality discovers an institution which claims to know them, and if the doctrines of that institution regarding them appear to coincide with his own judgement, he is surely bound to pursue his inquiries further. An examination of history might lead to the conclusion that the virtues peculiarly associated with modern freedom and democracy had their origins in the Christian insistence on natural law and the inherent sacredness of the individual person. If this did, in fact, emerge, the claims of Christianity to speak the truth on other subjects should, in all fairness, be examined. Dr. Joad's book is full of hints that such an examination would lead him to the conclusion that the Church is right on many other points. For example, he has independently reached the conclusion that his earlier humanism was over-optimistic, that 'man seems to me to be sinful and, in part, evil. . .', and that he cannot 'advance as a reasonable and spiritual, that is to say, as a dis-

tinctively *human* being except help be given to him from outside. . . . Man's further advance depends, in fact, upon the inpouring of grace.' If, in the course of a life devoted to the pursuit of truth, a philosopher discovers that many of the conclusions which he reaches by independent reasoning have already been reached and proclaimed by an institution that claims to speak infallibly, he is bound further to investigate that claim. Dr. Joad has performed only part of his task. He has demonstrated the consequences which society suffers by 'dropping the object', but he has not helped to discover where the object can be found again. The Christian apologist claims that he holds the key to the discovery. Is he not entitled, at least, to make his case?

GEORGE O'BRIEN

AESTHETICS AND MYSTICISM

Aesthetic Experience in Religion. By Geddes MacGregor. (MacMillan & Co., Ltd. 15s.)

SO FAR Dr. MacGregor's book seems to have attracted only a passing attention among Catholic thinkers. It is not surprising that they should feel dissatisfied with his handling of the relation between religion and art, but it would be unfortunate if the high interest of it were to be overlooked. The potted history of aesthetics in which his first chapter consists reveals immaturity, but one which is full of promise. We may feel that his thought is still groping, but we encounter along with some *naïveté* a rugged quality of intellect and a power of arresting generalization which seems likely to become most serviceable. Dr. MacGregor's aesthetic is the Crocean, and his second chapter is an analysis of Croce's *Estetica*. It is heavy going, some of it is far from clear, and a good deal of it is not directly relevant to the main issue; but it is a not inconsiderable achievement. Dr. MacGregor, while accepting Croce's isolation of the 'aesthetic fact', enters admirable protests against his anti-metaphysical bias and his subjectivism. 'It is thoroughly unsatisfactory to have to suppose that the only delight we can have in aesthetic contemplation is that of Narcissus beholding his own face in a pool.' (p. 94)

Having reached the conclusion that aesthetic experience (in the wide, 'alogical', Crocean sense) is the ground and the *terminus a quo* of all experience, Dr. MacGregor turns to the subject of mystical theology. This is introduced by an account of St. Thomas's general position in epistemology, which will seem obscure even to Thomists. For one thing it is much too short; Dr. MacGregor insists that he is not directly concerned with questions of general epistemology, but in fact the relation between sense and intellect is a subject of

fundamental importance for his thesis, and the unsatisfactory character of his conclusions seems to result very largely from his view of sense-knowledge as something which arises in independence of intellectual knowledge, the latter being conceived of as a merely 'logical' function and not as that 'intuitive' grasp of reality which it is in the authentic Thomist account of it ('intuitive' is here used not in a rigidly technical sense, but to indicate that immediacy which is found in all genuine apprehension of objects). Nevertheless he draws attention in a very useful way to a factor in the Thomist account which does (in the present writer's opinion) militate against realism: the doctrine of the progressive 'dematerialization' of 'material' objects by the knowing faculties. 'The material can never be immaterial enough to stop being material.' (p. 100) This needed saying.

It is not surprising that Dr. MacGregor, after adopting this anti-intellectualist position, should appeal to 'empathetic activity' as an explanation of mystical experience ('beatitude is an activity of the will, however necessarily grounded in knowledge', p. 116). He rejects the suggestion of an 'independent religious mode of experience' (p. 122). It is excusable that he should have failed to find the suggestion in modern Thomism (he considers that he has dismissed it when he dismisses Otto's *Das Heilige*), but we may urge that faith, which is 'the beginning of eternal life' and so also of mysticism, must be interpreted, in spite of modern Thomist disclaimers, as a *noesis* which is not grounded merely upon 'ordinary analogical knowledge'. (p. 139) Two pages earlier, indeed, Dr. MacGregor has reminded us that 'as soon as the traditional analogical arguments (to prove God's existence) become substitutes for the apprehension of God they become sophisms', referring us, as we should expect, to Dr. Farrer's *Finite and Infinite*. It is strange that he should seem not to find in Dr. Farrer's position implications which are irreconcilable with his own thesis.

This thesis is that 'mystical experience, viewed as a whole, and distinguished from the act of mystical union which we interpret as a super-empathetic activity, has within itself an aesthetic "moment" peculiarly significant to the experience.' (p. 191) This 'moment' is found in the rejection of imagery. It is not merely that there must be images to reject; what have to be rejected are 'specially intuited aesthetic symbols of God—symbols intuited from the propositions of theological truth and put back into the crucible [of experience].' Dr. MacGregor does not offer any satisfying explanation of the connection between this '*properly mystical rejection*' of images, as he calls it, and the 'super-empathetic' activity which follows it. He is content, on the whole, to direct us to the statements made by the mystics themselves and to ask whether they do not support his interpretation. The answer, if one maintains against him the existence of a special 'religious' mode of awareness, is that the rejection, not only of

imagery in general but also of theological imagery in particular, is not in dispute, and that his interpretation is a truism on one side of it and a lapse into 'voluntarism' on the other: that is, first, it goes without saying that awareness in general is the pre-condition for any special and supervenient form of awareness and, secondly, it does not make sense (p. 220) to speak of a tendency to love God which is not equivalently a tendency to know Him. In short, if Dr. MacGregor were to discard *Einfühlung* as a factor of explanation, perhaps he would find the statements of the mystics more comprehensible.

To claim that there is a 'religious' mode of awareness is simply to claim that God communicates Himself to the intellective soul without the intermediary of sense-data; not that the consciousness is voided of all sense-data, but that God is known not merely in the 'background' of sense-data but as now presenting Himself in that 'foreground' of knowledge which is normally occupied by sense-data alone. This *increase* in our knowledge of God is non-sensory in that it is not itself mediated by sense-data. Such would seem to be the obvious reading of many of the texts that Dr. MacGregor has put together in his valuable penultimate chapter. It would seem to stand out even from Maritain's hesitant account, on which he largely draws. He would find the doctrine stated with admirable lucidity in Maréchal's *Psychologie des Mystiques*. At this point one might venture to suggest that Dr. MacGregor's position would be greatly improved if he were better acquainted with the Augustinian tradition of Christian philosophy and with the Thomism of the Rousselot school. He might then accept an 'intellectualist' interpretation of the passages which he has quoted from St. Augustine himself and from the Flemish and the Spanish mystics. Suárez's remark *contemplatio . . . consistit in simplici intuitu* (quoted on p. 179) might not then seem to him, as it apparently does now, a patently unacceptable definition.

This review must end with an expression of thanks to Dr. MacGregor for a discussion of aesthetics and of mysticism which should encourage serious thought on these subjects and should recommend itself to Catholic philosophers and theologians as tending to profitable conclusions. The differences which have been here exposed may prove to be due in the main to the use of different philosophical traditions and vocabularies for a common purpose; the underlying spirit of Dr. MacGregor's work strongly suggests this. The theme of a 'putting back into the crucible of experience', although originating in a philosophy which is alien to Christianity, is not only illuminating for aesthetics but capable of interpretation as an approach to a genuine objectivity. And Dr. MacGregor's brief sketch of St. Francis of Sales, to mention only one of many incidental good things, should be enough of itself to justify us in welcoming his *début*.

DOM ILLTYD TRETHOWAN

THE IMPLICATIONS OF EVOLUTION

Human Destiny. By Lecomte du Noüy. (New York. Longmans, Green & Co. 17s. 6d.)

LECOMTE DU NOÜY is a distinguished French biologist who was turned to the subject from an early training in law through contact with Dr. Alexis Carrel. His first work was on the healing of wounds, which, although not, as claimed by the biographical sketch at the end of this volume, 'the first time that mathematics had been successfully applied to a biological problem', led to some very interesting results. His later work on a variety of other physiological problems was carried out both in the United States and at the Pasteur Institute in Paris, in which he was for a time head of the Bio-Physics division. In his purely scientific work, e.g. his book *Biological Time*, he sometimes showed a taste for abstract speculation, and like a number of other distinguished scientists he has extended his discussions to philosophical questions outside the strict limits of natural science, although raised by it. For some of these he was awarded the Arnold Raymond Prize by the University of Lausanne in 1944.

The present work is concerned with the human and cosmological implications of the theory of evolution. The author's thesis seems to be roughly the following. If we take a broad geological view of the evolutionary history of living things, omitting for the moment the details of evolutionary mechanism, we see a progress 'from the most elementary organism to man and the incredible manifestations of his brain'. 'Evolution begins with amorphous living matter or beings such as the Coenocytes, still without cell structure, and ends in thinking Man, endowed with a conscience.' The mechanisms by which biologists have attempted to explain evolution, such as adaptation (Lamarck), natural selection (Darwin), and genetic mutations (Naudin-de Vries), are not themselves always progressive. They produce limited results according to limited laws, and offer no explanation, for instance, of the sudden origination of the major animal groups between which there are few links. The broad sweep of evolutionary progress up to man shows, on the other hand, that we must postulate a progressive impetus guiding evolution towards a goal. There is a hiatus in our knowledge between the evolutionary mechanisms postulated by biologists and this teleological impetus, just as there is between physical theories and the phenomena of life (e.g. the latter seem to contradict the second law of thermodynamics), and between the physiology of the human brain and the phenomena of the human spirit as seen in abstract thinking and conscience. The explanation of evolutionary progress can only be found in the will of God. There is no reason to believe that it will cease with man. With man's free will and conscience a new factor enters, which

transfers evolution from a material and animal to a spiritual level. Man is able to choose between, e.g., a charitable act which is good for his soul and an act which satisfies his animal desires. 'Good is that which contributes to the course of ascending evolution and leads us away from the animal toward freedom. Evil is that which opposes evolution, and escapes it by regressing towards the ancestral bondage, toward the beast.' A process of moral selection thus leads to a continuation of inevitable evolutionary progress.

This thesis is highly speculative, and is not closely articulated with the evidence. First, in spite of his own warnings, the author seems to take a naïvely 'realist' view of scientific hypotheses. A scientific hypothesis, which is the product of the rational analysis and correlation of experience, could, however, be said to represent 'reality' only if it could be proved that it correlated all the relevant experience and was the only hypothesis which did so. It would be difficult to establish such a proof and it has in no case yet been established. Nothing can therefore with certainty be concluded about the world from the hiatuses between physics and biology or between biology and psychology. It may be scientifically useful, in the sense that it may help to correlate more data, to postulate a teleological impetus to account for the geological record. Such a hypothesis must be judged by its fruits, i.e. its predictive success; in Lecomte du Noüy's hands it has none. But unless such a hypothesis fulfilled the conditions mentioned above, it would be going beyond the evidence to give it any status in 'reality'.

Lecomte du Noüy is somewhat vague about the origin of man from his animal ancestors. He says in one place: 'The animal shape capable of sheltering the spirit, capable of allowing it to develop, is found'; and in another he refers to the 'means of knowing . . . given us by our senses and our reasoning faculties—i.e. by our brain cells'. This seems to imply that he considers the human mind a product of the human brain developing in accordance with the teleological principle. But to regard the mind as simply a product of the evolving brain would be to go beyond the evidence, while to introduce an omnipotent God to bridge the gap between animals and men would be to go beyond the scope of a scientific hypothesis. Lecomte du Noüy's transgressions in both directions add nothing to our understanding of human nature, and the utopian ethical suggestions which he deduces from his theories are far too vague to be of practical value to known human beings.

A. C. CROMBIE

A NEW SCIENTIFIC DEBATE

Is Evolution Proved? By D. Dewar and H. S. Shelton. (Hollis and Carter. 18s.)

MANY biologists of diverse training and outlook consider that the facts of biology and of palaeontology point unmistakably to an evolution of species. I wonder why, then, some antagonists of evolution repeatedly assume that biologists are necessarily materialistic in outlook merely because they interpret these facts in a truly scientific way. Undoubtedly many biologists also believe in design and purpose, and in the activities of an Intelligence behind the iron curtain which separates natural happenings from supernatural happenings. As men of science, while they may marvel at it, they can say little about it. I suppose it is a lack of appreciation of this very important and elementary point, namely that science, empirical science if you will, and metaphysics are two completely different ways of approach to knowledge, which renders possible the publication of such a book as *Is Evolution Proved?*

This book, by Douglas Dewar and H. S. Shelton, is, however, important and opportune at the present time, if for no other reason than that Mr. Dewar, who is the most outspoken modern anti-evolutionist, is enabled to emphasize several times in the course of the text that biological textbooks and writings generally teach evolution as though it were an undoubted fact, and not a theory. Throughout the book evolution as a method of origin of organic forms is contrasted with their production by means of special creations, and again, one of the merits of the book is that it shows that special-creationism is a theory also and not a fact, and one which is not subject to any form of experimental verification. Thus the facts of biology can be subject to diverse and opposite interpretations, and it seems to be clear from this book that beyond a certain stage the interpretation of the facts depends, not so much on the facts themselves, as on the metaphysical and philosophical presuppositions of the interpreters. Here Mr. Shelton scores by remaining a scientist. Even when he discusses metaphysical or philosophical subjects he is careful to point out that he has left the realms of science and gone over to the realms of metaphysics or philosophy. Mr. Dewar, on the other hand, becomes a mixture of scientist and metaphysician just when it suits the purposes of his argument. The result is a mass of tangled ideas and strained interpretations which must surely confuse the general reader who tries to approach the book without bias. The imaginary jury who are to give a decision for or against evolution would, I am afraid, be asleep long before the summing-up stage was reached.

There is little that is new in this book. It is written in the form of letters by two able debaters; one, Mr. Shelton, states the evidence for

the occurrence of organic evolution; the other, Mr. Dewar, states the evidence telling against the occurrence of organic evolution. There is also a long introduction by Mr. Arnold Lunn, who acts as the editor (or judge). The introduction, however, is distinctly biased in favour of Mr. Dewar, and it would have been better if Mr. Lunn had left the two antagonists to fight it out for themselves, and contented himself by summing-up.

Mr. Shelton presents the evidence for evolution under the usual headings of evidence from geology, from geographical distribution, from morphology and classification, etc. He is at pains to show that the evidence is cumulative and points only in one direction, namely, that organisms have come into existence only from existing organisms and that throughout the course of time some of them have changed to give rise in a natural way to different organisms. He attempts to show (and in my opinion succeeds) that no other interpretation of the facts is scientific or even warrantable. By implication Mr. Shelton attacks the idea of special creation which has been put forward to account for these same facts of biology. He does indeed condemn special creation as absurd and meaningless, and not to be admitted at all in serious scientific discussion. Scientific methodology demands this attitude from a scientist, for the aim of natural science is to interpret scientific happenings in terms of natural causes. Science can neither affirm nor deny true miracles. Of necessity the scientist takes up the common-sense attitude that if a natural event is explicable in a logical and reasonable way by the operation of natural laws there is no need to invoke the operation of any agency outside the natural process. This is not to deny that natural causes may also be secondary causes, working ultimately through a First Cause. Hence a biologist may believe in Creation but not in special creations.

Mr. Dewar, on the other hand, refuses to accept any of the evidence for evolution as presented by Mr. Shelton. He does indeed allow a certain amount of evolution (or differentiation) of species within the genus or even family. He bases his whole case on the geological evidence which he contends proves beyond dispute that families, classes and phyla of organisms have not evolved one from the other, or all from some imaginary unicellular organism which itself arose from inanimate matter. The abrupt appearance in the geological strata of the majority of these large divisions of the animal world leads, according to Mr. Dewar, to the simple conclusion that they were specially created whole and intact. He also brings forward a large number of difficulties which the evolutionist has so far been unable to explain. As Mr. Dewar grants a certain amount of evolution within the family or genus, and refuses to accept the intermediates which Mr. Shelton puts forward as connecting links between classes, etc., he seems to beg the question, for he is led to refuse to accept as relevant

to the issue the evidence which Mr. Shelton presents from classification, morphology, embryology, etc. In this way Mr. Dewar counteracts the cumulative argument which Mr. Shelton presents. As the latter considers the geological evidence to be the least important line of evidence the result is an impasse, and in this state the book ends.

In parts of the book there is a good deal of acrimony and counter-accusation from each writer. The arguments become confused and irrelevant many times, especially when the writers begin to argue (as they frequently do) about their own arguments. For instance, Dewar wrote to Shelton 'You assert that I assert that you admit . . .' (page 169). In fact it is at times difficult to tell what the writers are arguing about. Sometimes they seem to be discussing mechanistic evolution, at other times purposive activity, at other times minute differences between cats and civets. These arguments and discussions sometimes get so mixed that ruthless editing would prove to be a great help to the reader and would enhance the value of the book. Fortunately there are singularly few misprints; it would be interesting, however, to learn the authors' definition of the species 'ligers' and 'tigons' (page 156).

This book is to be recommended to laymen and biologist alike; to the former it will provide much useful information and a good insight into biological method, while to the latter it will teach humility.

P. G. FOTHERGILL

SEASONS OF CULTURE

Catholic Art and Culture. By E. I. Watkin. Revised edition with 41 illustrations. (Hollis & Carter. 18s.)

THE chief feature of this new edition of Mr. Watkin's prophetic work, first published in 1942, is the illustrations. These form an interesting and well-chosen series covering Christian art from Gallo Placidia to Scott's Liverpool Cathedral. They are certainly a great addition to the book, but, like the title, they mislead as to its real subject. They confirm the assumption that it is a history of the Catholic culture of the past, whereas the focus of Mr. Watkin's story is really his prophecy of the Catholic culture of the future. The point is, I think, important, because the reader may be put off by the first half of the book covering the period up to and including the Renaissance. Mr. Watkin has nothing new to say about the Middle Ages or the Renaissance. One of the lines on which he works in his analysis is that of 'the vertical movement towards God' and 'the horizontal movement of human interests and natural knowledge', which could have made a most illuminating touchstone to separate out the divergent orientation

of Carolingian, Romanesque and Gothic; Anglo-Saxon and Merovingian; or later, of Avignon or Siena or Burgundy; but Mr. Watkin does not really differentiate or discuss the immense complexity and variety of medieval art. Indeed it is often difficult to be sure of what period or country he is writing. He characterizes the Middle Ages as the childhood of the European Catholic; surely it is one of the great achievements of Sir Maurice Powicke's leadership in modern medieval research that we have learnt how to get to know medieval men as particular persons whom we may meet as friends. If we met St. Gregory or Frederick II or Chaucer or John of Salisbury would we feel we were talking to children? Is there any meaning in talking about the 'childlike medieval mind'?

How different it is when Mr. Watkin reaches the Baroque period! 'I love it!', and we are immediately in touch with its reality. For him it is the autumn, the period of fruition of European culture when the classical forms revived by the Renaissance were employed and remoulded by the spirit which had built the Gothic cathedral. He shows the essential unity of Baroque culture; how, while the centre of its life was with the great seventeenth-century mystics, the 'Godward ecstasy of the spirit confronted with human ecstasies released by the humanism of the Renaissance', it is the same life which is manifest not only in painting and architecture but in the planning of formal gardens, in the theatre and that dramatization of life which demanded elaborate palaces and etiquette, and made the actor's wig a part of fashion. But according to Mr. Watkin's analogy this autumn of culture—followed by the winter of the nineteenth century—is also the adolescence of Catholic man. Our period, therefore, which has seen the death of the old Catholic religion-culture, which has passed full cycle, is also that of the maturity of Catholic man. In the Middle Ages he absorbed and incorporated into Christian culture a modicum of classical knowledge, in the Baroque period the increase introduced at the Renaissance; now we are overwhelmed by the new mass of scientific knowledge, but it, too, can be assimilated and a new Catholic culture inaugurated, another spring when the age of the Holy Spirit will open. 'The religion that inspired the Baroque culture and art was a contemplative religion led by mystics. That mystical religion of an élite foreshadowed, I believe, the mystical religion spread through Christ's entire Body for which I look as the future Kingdom of the Spirit. We should expect the autumn of one religion-culture to prophesy and prepare the spring of the next.'

How good it is to meet someone with faith in the temporal future of man in a world in which darkness is so predominant that one feels it almost rude to call someone an optimist! Criticism of a prophecy is clearly irrelevant. Only I wonder whether the culture of the contemplatives which Mr. Watkin envisages will have any room for art

For surely contemplation is the direct way, the way without images, whereas art is the indirect way through the senses. Perhaps I am taking Mr. Watkin's words too literally, but the conclusion is, to my mind, indicative of a tendency in his thought to underestimate the necessity of the 'horizontal' element in human life, just as, in Father D'Arcy's terms, the *animus* is necessary to keep the *anima* on the rails. Mr. Watkin is very well aware that the Baroque culture did not really absorb humanism, that its symbolism was artificial because it did not sufficiently value the identity of the symbol. But he does not, I think, sufficiently emphasize that in this it had definitely lost a vital part of Gothic culture, its capacity for loving and seeing each piece of creation as itself, as well as part of the pattern, in fact a sense of objectiveness, which meant, among other things, that it never closed the door; there was always the possibility of starting again from the particular. The 'ecstatic' culture, in which everything derived its meaning from its interrelation, was closed, and therefore, temporally, a dead end. Perhaps that is why, as Mr. Watkin points out, it is the medieval styles which provide a starting point for the modern revival of Church architecture, a sign of the beginning of the new spring. (It is a pity some of these could not have been reproduced; the illustrations end on a very dismal note of the nineteenth-century winter.) He does not mention a modern church, which, though it is in the 'factory' style, is the most spring-like I know; the little church built by the Dutch Benedictines at Cockfosters.

NICOLETTE GRAY

CHURCH ARCHITECTURE

The Architectural Setting of Anglican Worship. By G. W. O. Addleshaw, M.A., B.D., F.S.A., Canon Residentiary of York, and Frederick Etchells, F.R.I.B.A. (Faber and Faber. 25s.)

Post-War Church Building. Edited by Ernest Short. (Hollis and Carter. 30s.)

Of the Atmosphere of a Church. By J. N. Comper. (Sheldon Press. 1s. 9d.)

THIS 'Inquiry into the arrangements for Public Worship in the Church of England from the Reformation to the present day' should be read by every serious student of Liturgy, for it will help to clear up many points which often puzzle Catholic priests and architects when faced with the problem of planning a new church or refurnishing an old one. As the publishers inform us, it is the joint work of a distinguished Anglican writer on church history and a practising architect with special experience of church buildings. Those who have read Canon Addleshaw's previous book, *The High Church Tradition*, will be prepared for a wealth

of scholarship and erudition, and they will not be disappointed. The very complete bibliography, the list of churches mentioned in the text which still to a large extent retain their pre-Victorian arrangements, the plans, and illustrations, all add to the value of this volume. There is an exhaustive index.

The problem that faced the sixteenth century Anglican authorities was, 'how were the existing churches to be made suitable for that corporate liturgical worship presupposed by the Book of Common Prayer?' The interior of the average English mediaeval parish church was not suitable to following a service, for 'an English mediaeval church is a mysterious succession of self-contained rooms, seemingly stretching away to infinity.' The plan had been gradually evolved from churches intended for monastic communities or canons, who wished to separate themselves from the laity. The final plan was 'an attempt to combine into one whole a series of compartments: the nave, the aisles, the chantry chapels with their parclose screens, the transepts, and the long chancels separated from the nave by a screen, rood-loft and tympanum.' The result was that the clergy and the congregations worshipped more or less apart from each other. It must have worried the sixteenth century Anglicans to decide how such churches could be adapted for a form of worship in which the entire congregation was supposed to take part. If these same churches were to come into our possession we should find that most of them are not suitable for the normal type of Catholic worship as we know it. We might even make a greater mess of them than did the nineteenth century Anglican restorers!

The authors point out that the mediaeval Spanish plan solved the problem of providing for the needs of clergy and laity in a much more practical manner than the typical church in most countries of Northern Europe. In Spain the choir-stalls were usually placed at the back of the nave, with a big space between them and the high altar, in which stood the pulpit.

Again and again in this book one is struck by the intense conservatism of the Church of England in matters of ritual and ceremonial. The stone altars were removed, but it was not long before Communion tables found their way back to the original position of the high altar at the east end of churches. At first the tables were placed in the midst of the chancel or outside the screen. In the former case the communicants sat round the table. The chancel became a sort of 'Sacrament Chapel'. Screens were seldom removed, only the rood and its attendant figures. In the comparatively few new churches built in the seventeenth century the mediaeval plan was retained. The chancel was kept for Communion, marriages and churchings of women after childbirth; the nave for Morning and Evening Prayer; the space by the door for baptisms. Thus the self-contained parts of the typical pre-Reformation

church persisted, but used for different services, and not for different sections of the congregation.

This conservative spirit was also found in the furnishing of altars—as they were called by the Caroline Divines. Archbishop Laud ordered that the Communion tables were to be put back to the east end, and safeguarded by rails. A ‘carpet’, otherwise a full frontal hanging over every side of the altar, was ordered by the Canons of 1604. It had to be of silk ‘or other decent stuff’. As Canon Addleshaw remarks: ‘In the way in which the Church of England treated the altar in the eighteenth century it was following a very old tradition of western Christendom, a tradition of keeping down to a minimum the ornaments on the altar.’ He reminds us that this same tradition was to be found in many French cathedrals, even more so in Spanish churches. The illustration of the High Altar of the Dominican Church, Salamanca, as it existed in 1813, shows that it was furnished in almost exactly the same way as an Anglican altar of the same period. This altar is covered with a frontal, falling in folds at the corners, and with only two candlesticks on it. There is no crucifix, only a picture at the back. Above the altar is a hanging tester; in front, plain iron rails. Compare this illustration with that of the Chapel of Magdalen College, Oxford, in the first half of the eighteenth century, and it will be seen that the two altars are identical in their furnishing.

Two chapters are devoted to the altar and the chancel between 1559 and 1841. One of the most interesting sections of this book deals with various eighteenth century experiments in planning, including attempts to combine altar, pulpit and reading-desk into one unit, as in some Lutheran churches in Germany and in other countries. In more recent times this practice was adopted by the Scottish Presbyterians.

Finally we come to the Victorian Age, summed up by the authors as ‘the Period of Self-consciousness’. Hitherto architects had been content to plan a church for functional purposes; now they were told by the ecclesiologists that not only was there a specific Christian style of architecture in which every church must be built—fourteenth century Gothic—but even a definite plan. There arose a craze for symbolism, and what with this and the rigidity of the ecclesiologists, hundreds of pre-Reformation churches were ‘restored’ out of all recognition. The last chapter, entitled ‘Conclusions’, is brim full of useful ideas which deserve consideration by Catholics as well as Anglicans; above all, practical suggestions as to planning and furnishing.

If only the editor of *Post-War Church Building* had edited the contributions by the twelve distinguished architects, craftsmen, and others which make up this sumptuously produced volume, then it might have deserved to be called ‘a practical handbook’ as the publishers describe it. But it is neither a ‘handbook’ nor is it ‘practical’. It is useless for reference, as there is no index. As the purpose of this interdenomina-

tional production is to help the clergy and laity in the planning and furnishing of churches, the object is partly defeated by the insertion of many whole-page half-tone illustrations which appear to have been supplied as advertisements for certain commercial firms. In more than one instance, but without any indication of the fact, they depict just the sort of thing which the authors insist must be avoided at all costs. There is an unconscious humour in the illustration which faces Mr. Geoffrey Webb's chapter dealing with 'The Building and Furnishing of an Altar according to the Roman Rite'. Nevertheless this book does contain a vast amount of useful information not found in any other similar publication, but it is a pity that those excellent chapters written by Sir Charles Nicholson, Prebendary Stanley Eley, and Mr. N. F. Cachmaille-Day, which deal with the planning of post-war Anglican churches, were not supplemented by at least one contribution devoted to the planning of Catholic places of worship. Although detailed instructions are given regarding the design and construction of Anglican fonts no reference appears to be made to the quite different rubrics affecting Catholic baptisteries. Mr. Llewellyn Williams devotes twelve pages to Church Woodwork, but he omits any suggestions as to Confessional Boxes. For the Catholic reader, the most useful chapters are those which deal with purely utilitarian matters, such as acoustics, bells and bell towers, heating and ventilation. Mr. John Rothenstein contributes a sympathetic Introduction, but one ventures to feel that it would have been more to the point if he had remembered what Eric Gill once wrote, that 'the root idea of building, and therefore of architecture, is the covering of a space, and that the root of this idea is a physical need', instead of concentrating on the 'Problem of Light' and 'The Power of Symbolism'.

Mr. J. N. Comper's pamphlet, entitled *Of the Atmosphere of a Church*, is a masterpiece. Actually it deals with much more than the mental or moral environment of a place of worship. There is sound advice on the planning of churches and on their furnishing. This is what this venerable architect has to say about present-day building: 'Granted the crying need, created by the development of housing estates, for four walls within which to worship, and the lack of self-sacrifice to provide a worthy building, a lesson might be taken from the simplest of our mediaeval churches whose fabrics were little more than a barn—hardly so fine a barn as barns then were—but which became glorious by beautiful workmanship within. To so low and plain a fabric a worthy altar has only to be added, and the white-washed barn will have an atmosphere of prayer and love instead of being reminiscent of the cinema and its impersonal efficiency.' It is interesting to note that Mr. Comper, like the authors of *The Architectural Setting of Anglican Worship*, advocates a return to the primitive position of the altar, more or less in the midst of the worshippers, a principle which was developed

in Spain from the end of the fifteenth century onwards; 'for there, while keeping the mediaeval arrangement of the altar against a great solid screen, they put the choir westwards, leaving space for the body of worshippers between it and the altar.'

PETER F. ANSON

HORACE

A Portrait of Horace. By Alfred Noyes. (Sheed & Ward. 16s.)

To paint a convincing portrait of one of the great figures of antiquity is perhaps one of the hardest tasks of criticism. Sometimes the result stands stiff and lifeless before us, like one of those skeletons of prehistoric monsters, reconstructed from a few fragmentary bones and strung together on steel wires; more often today the unfortunate ancient capers across the screen in all the improbable brilliance of glorious technicolor, but rarely indeed does he achieve real humanity. Mr. Noyes's *Portrait of Horace* seems to be one of the rare successes; it leaves out none of the difficult features and yet presents a living and delightful personality who is wholly worthy of his traditional canonization.

One of the great difficulties of the task lies in the fact that the ancient scene must be reconstructed in some degree out of modern materials; and it is not at all easy to avoid the effect of a neo-gothic railway station. It is by comparisons with modern poetry and life that the Forum and the Sabine Farm can be brought into focus: and it is not easy to use these materials without conjuring up a nightmare of cast-iron crockets, put to purposes for which neither cast-iron nor crockets have any natural vocation. Mr. Noyes discusses the difficulty explicitly, quoting two excellent examples: Horace is sometimes said to have 'become poet laureate' when he wrote the *Carmen Saeculare*; and Warde Fowler says pleasantly that he 'looked in at evening service' when he watched the diviners in the Forum (*Sat.* I, vi). But Mr. Noyes himself avoids this kind of thing almost always, and yet has at his command an immense wealth of quotation, especially from the Victorian novelists and poets, but sometimes from unexpected but very welcome sources (including the apocryphal *Fifth Book* of the Odes), with which he brings many matters into clearer light. Often he gives his own translation, either in prose or in the metre of the original; and he never fails to render pleasantly, even if the English sometimes seems to pant a little as it treads the measure of the nimbler Latin. He understands the Italian irony of the Odes, never missing the twist in the tail of them, and in several instances clears up a difficulty that has worried the commentators. And the whole Italian background is there, the landscape and the people—their dramatic greetings, their endless excitement and waste of time over the collection of fares on a boat or any other practical matter, the bargaining for vegetables at

the market, the fuddled sailor singing of his absent 'amica' half the night, and even something rather like a *scaldino* (*Sat.* I, v, 36), for which no one seems to offer a better explanation.

More important still, this Portrait restores dignity to Horace's relations with Augustus and Maecenas, and worthily records his friendship with Virgil; the underlining of some ironies in his remarks on Augustus is particularly welcome. And all this with a volume of historical learning which we feel incompetent to criticize; such a work must partake of the spirit of history, 'which is contrary to minute exactness'; it restores the main outline, even if it should offend minute learning.

Perhaps it is the main purpose of this Portrait to give back to Horace his piety and high seriousness; as it is written from a Christian point of view it has in this connection a quite special interest, for Christian scruples about the charm of the classics have done perhaps more hurt to Horace than to most. The Middle Ages could use him cheerfully in church and Christian writers from St. Augustine and St. Thomas to Pius XII quote from him often—indeed a learned Jesuit has even maintained that not Horace, but a medieval monk, wrote his works; hence Boileau's pleasant remark: '*quoique je n'aime pas les moines, je n'aurais pas été fâché de vivre avec Frère Horace et Dom Virgile.*'

But St. Jerome's nightmare has always spooked dimly in the background, and in the last century the question took a surprising turn for the worse: the classics began to be presented as a cure for Christianity, as the 'Hellenism' which was to bring sweetness and light into the 'Hebraism' of the Evangelicals, as sugar and milk for the black and bitter brew of the Dissenters. Matthew Arnold makes himself painfully clear: 'To be, like our honoured and justly honoured Faraday, a great natural philosopher with one side of his being and a Sandemanian with the other, would to Archimedes have been impossible.'

And so even Christians have come to think of the classics in general and '*Frère Horace*' in particular as enemies rather than as allies; Fr. Faber (in 1835) has no doubts at all about what the schoolmaster is doing with his charge: 'You tamper with his lusts, his feelings, his eternal welfare, by making him pore over Horace's Odes, where all sorts of enormities are dressed up in all the felicities of melody and diction—in all the charm of levity and jest.' And the late Fr. Leem quotes him (in 1943) with approval.

Perhaps then it is true to say that, even in the face of the Managerial Revolution, the classics are still seen as a force opposed to Christian purposes; a strange view in these days, and one which will hand us over bound hand and foot to the technicians. But such books as this *Portrait of Horace* may do much to recall us to the wisdom and humanity of the ancients.

J. B. SANDEMAN

A FRANCISCAN ANTHOLOGY

St. Francis of Assisi: The Legends and Lauds. Edited, selected and annotated by Otto Karrer. Translated by N. Wydenbruck. (Sheed & Ward. 15s.)

THE idea of bringing together in a single volume the early biographies and legends of St. Francis of Assisi is a good one, but this is not the first time it has been done, as the editor thinks. In 1899 P. Fratini published a similar work in Assisi.¹ P. Karrer, formerly a German Jesuit and now a secular priest with a parish in Switzerland, has used much the same material as P. Fratini. He has added some extracts from the *Legenda Antiqua* and the *Fioretti*, and some of St. Francis' *Cantiche* and prose writings, together with his Testament. Not much more space would have been needed for a good selection from the Letters, and for the two short accounts of St. Francis as seen by his contemporaries in the Holy Land and preaching in Bologna. Of course, as the editor frankly states, 'there could be no question of reproducing the different texts in their entirety not only with regard to the available space, but also because this would lead to many repetitions.' That is true enough, as Fratini found, but it seems a pity that not only is the very first and earliest biographical notice of St. Francis omitted, viz. the circular *Letter to all the Brothers* sent out by Fr. Elias immediately after St. Francis' death (Wadding, II, 149-150), but all but one of St. Francis' own letters are lacking. These, as it happens, throw an unexpected light on the foremost place occupied in the life of St. Francis by the Eucharist, which certainly we are not aware of in the Lives by Thomas of Celano and St. Bonaventure, or indeed in the *Legendae*. It is true that in the *Speculum*² devotion for the Eucharist is enjoined, 'a thing not written in the Rule,' but when we read the Letters we find the central subject of all the general letters of St. Francis is the Sacrament of the Body and Blood of Our Lord. No one would gather that the Blessed Sacrament occupied so pre-eminent a place in the mind and heart of the Saint from any other source, ancient or modern.

Praise must be given to P. Karrer's Commentary in the form of introductions to each section of the book, and the notes are admirably useful and informative.

In regard to the questions which so disastrously divided the Order even in St. Francis' lifetime, P. Karrer quotes Felder: 'the Saint found

¹ *S.P. Francisci Assisiensis Vita et Doctrina ex T. Celanensis, Trium Sociorum et Se Bonaventurae Legendis quas ad litteram excerptis integras et ad unicam ex quatuor lectionem sin. repetitionibus composuit* Fr. Joseph Fratini ex Ministro Prov. Minorum Conventualium. (Assisi, Tip. Metastasio, 1899.)

² *Speculum Perfectionis*, ed. Sabatier, 65.

himself tragically propelled into a dilemma between obedience to God and obedience to the Church which demanded that he should conform — a dilemma from which there was no escape.'

It is, indeed, a tragic spectacle to see St. Francis, the founder, obliged to abdicate the Minister-Generalship of his own Order, and become of no authority in it beyond what his personality commanded. It is indeed tragic to see his despair, and to overhear the sick man's threats which he knew could be of no avail.

It was upon the fundamental ideas, fundamental to him and to the Order he founded upon them, of Poverty and unlettered piety that the trouble arose. St. Francis, as is well known, intended his friars to practise an almost absolute poverty and, in contrast with the Dominicans, to have nothing at all to do with learning. In the event, Gregory IX and Frate Elias, both of whom knew and seem to have loved St. Francis, made those two fundamental principles of the Rule of no effect. The Order came to possess such magnificent buildings as San Francesco and the Sacro Convento at Assisi, and Santa Croce in Florence, and to rival their Dominican brothers in the Schools, notably at Oxford. The solution which the Pope and Elias found for the difference in regard to these matters which had divided the Order, the solution which is mirrored in the *Legenda Major* of St. Bonaventure, is thus commented on by P. Karrer: 'Laudable as the intention may have been, to bring peace in the Order and reconcile the apologists of poverty and learning, or, as the "Spirituals" called it, to conceal the contrast between the Saint's ideals and the actual state of affairs, and splendidly as Bonaventure accomplished the task of assimilating the life of St. Francis to the desired standard, the decision remains infinitely regrettable. It was an attempt against truth, and truth always prevails in the end, however subtle the means by which human prudence strives to conceal it.'

Few today will be found to disagree with the learned editor of this *concordantia*.

There is a number of small mistakes and errors which should be corrected in a second edition. The name of the town in the Marche is Jesi, not Jessi (pp. 1 and 277); the name of the prophet of Flora was Gioachimo, not Iacomo (pp. 172 and 228). John of Ceprano should not appear as 'Sir John' (pp. 2 and 16). The translation from the *Legenda Trium Sociorum* on pp. 14-16 is faulty. 'St. Matthew' should be 'St. Matthias', on page 282. The Church of San Francesco at Assisi is not a cathedral (p. 76). The Cathedral of Assisi is San Rufino. The translation of *Castello* as 'fortress town' is inexact. *Castello* simply means a walled village or small walled township. 'Regular' should be 'secular', on page 151. 'Abbruzzi' should be 'Abruzzi', on page 172; and 'Azanam' should be 'Ozanam', on page 295.

EDWARD HUTTON

SWIFT AS A CHRISTIAN

Swift. A Study. By Bernard Acworth. (Eyre & Spottiswoode. 15s.)

'SWIFT is a great English writer,' said Mr. Leavis in the opening sentence of an admirable essay in *Determinations*. It is a salutary reminder and a necessary one. Swift interests us for a variety of reasons. We are interested in the man, the politician, the Christian and the lover. He is so obviously 'a great English writer' that we are inclined to take his writings for granted, to allow the writer to be obscured by the other parts he played, instead of stressing the close connection between them in the way that we should. We are content with a few well-worn phrases about the influence of his political pamphlets, his 'irony', his 'gravity', his 'clearness and simplicity', and probably wind up with the trite announcement that he is 'a model of English prose style'.

In describing him as a great English writer we mean, or ought to mean, that he owes his peculiar eminence to the particular way in which he arranged his words on the page. We are not concerned primarily with the effect of those words on Swift's contemporaries, or their success in rallying people to his cause and demolishing the causes of his opponents. These things belong to history. We are concerned with something more immediate—with what the words *do to us today*. What they do, I think, is to administer a series of shocks. A famous sentence provides a simple illustration:

Last week I saw a woman flayed, and you will hardly believe how much it altered her person for the worse.

It is one of Swift's greatest virtues that he is continually attacking all sorts of conventional attitudes. His peculiar intensity is disruptive and destructive. We enjoy the attack only to discover suddenly that we ourselves are the victims; and this induces self-questioning and self-examination. His virtue is also a negative virtue. He specializes in the negative emotions of hatred, anger, disgust and contempt. He remarks of Jack in *The Tale of a Tub*: 'Nor could all the world persuade him, as the common phrase is, to eat his victuals like a Christian.' That is Swift's way of saying that Jack refused to kneel when receiving Communion. It reveals him as a clergyman of the age of Tillotson and Locke, as a man for whom expressions like 'spiritual life' or 'religious experience' could have no meaning.

Captain Acworth tells us that his chief concern is to discover whether Swift 'as an ordained clergyman of the Church of England; as the vicar of a parish in Ireland, and a Dean of a Cathedral' was 'a Christian'. He remarks in another place that 'Swift had a wholesome

distrust of metaphysics and "mysticism"', but he does not seem to realize the implications of this admission. He criticizes him because at a crucial moment of his career he 'elected to turn politician rather than clergyman', and concludes that he 'accepted with his head, if not always with his heart, the Christian faith and its implications'. Few people will dispute the truth of this, but it should be realized that Swift's limitations as a Christian were the source of his strength and his weaknesses as a writer. For, like a number of other great writers, he transformed his own moral defects—principally his intolerable pride and his misanthropy—into literary virtues.

The clean skin of the Houyhnhnms . . . (writes Mr. Leavis), is stretched over a void; instincts, emotions and life, which complicate the problem of cleanliness and decency, are left for the Yahoos with the dirt and the indecorum. Reason, Truth and Nature serve instead; the Houyhnhnms (who scorn metaphysics) find them adequate. Swift too scorned metaphysics, and never found anything better to contend for than a skin, a surface, an outward show.

This places Swift and his achievement in their correct perspective. He was a great English writer, but of all the great English writers he was one of the most limited.

It may seem unfair to criticize a book for not offering something which it does not pretend to offer; but it is only right to say that people who are mainly interested in Swift the writer will not find a great deal to help them in Captain Acworth's study. With this reservation, it is a useful short life. He gives a clear account of Swift's career, and relates it to the political background of the time; one wishes that he had treated the theological and philosophical issues in the same way. He writes as a great admirer of Swift, but his presentation of controversial questions is usually fair. He is perhaps inclined to waste too much time in trouncing Swift's priggish nineteenth-century detractors—Jeffrey, Macaulay and Thackeray—and other writers with whom he disagrees, but at least we are shown that other views exist. He emphasizes his intention of allowing Swift to speak for himself, but his method is not always happy. In places the book almost turns into an anthology. The greater part of some of the chapters on his writings consists either of quotations or of close summaries of Swift's works without commentary or criticism, which makes them difficult to read. The Vanessa affair is treated in the same way. The chapter called 'Swift and Vanessa' consists of an introductory account of little over four pages, and the remaining nineteen are devoted to reprinting in full the poem *Cadenus and Vanessa*. In discussing Swift's love affairs, Captain Acworth's feelings sometimes get the better of him, and he appears too anxious to whitewash his hero. He is convinced that the 'secret' mentioned in the poem

was an 'innocent' one, but the reasons which he gives for his conviction are not impressive. He is hard on writers who think that Swift seduced Vanessa or, what seems more probable, was seduced by her, and chides them for being inquisitive; but most of us would like to know! It must of course remain an open question. Personally, I suspect that the 'secret' was a guilty one, though my reasons are not much better than Captain Acworth's. But I was glad to learn from one of our greatest living authorities on Swift that he shared this view—though, as he said, he had never expressed it publicly.

MARTIN TURNELL

A FORGOTTEN DUBLINER

Poor Scholar: A Study of William Carleton. By Benedict Kiely. (Sheed & Ward. 10s. 6d.)

A HUNDRED years ago Charles Lever begged an editor not to expect stories from him like Carleton's. He could not set himself so high a standard. Today most people who are aware of English literature have heard of Lever even though they may not have read him. Can the same be said of Carleton? Those who have not read Lever and wish to do so can buy his better-known books without much trouble. Carleton is unprocurable. A small selection of his stories illustrated by J. B. Yeats was published perhaps a quarter of a century ago. I know of no other modern edition. Persistent neglect of an author is usually easy to explain. The very readable is not left for long unread. Trollope went to ground for a while, he was dug out after a short hibernation, but Carleton has been left in the covert. The truth is that his stories of the Irish peasantry, although nearer to genius than anything that Lever ever wrote, do not fit in with accepted Hibernianism. They are bone of the Irish bone, written by one of the people.

The distance between Anglo-Irish writers, such as Somerville and Ross, and the peasantry, gave their tales a perspective which appeals to the English reader. It must also be admitted that Carleton was not a great humorist and that his stories are to modern taste deficient in entertainment. Having said all this, it remains to be said that William Carleton was the greatest short story writer and the truest delineator of the Irish character of the last century, and his neglect is unjustifiable. Mr. Kiely has done his best to put Carleton where he belongs. In a book which shows a very complete knowledge of the period and an exhaustive study of Carleton's work, he tells the story of the author's life through the medium of his characters and the incidents in his stories.

As an infant of four, William Carleton saw the loyal yeomen, while

searching his father's cottage, stab his sister with their bayonets during the '98 rebellion; in middle age he witnessed the horrors and desolation of the Famine of 1847. He died in 1869. It was a dreary period in Irish history.

Books about writers often suffer from the fact that novelists are not always as interesting as their work. Mr. Kiely's book shows signs of this handicap. Carleton showed bookish ability as a boy which made his family hope that he was destined for the priesthood, but he displayed no evidence of a vocation and in fact deserted the church in which he was born, at the behest of the Rev. Caesar Otway who befriended him and gave the first encouragement to his literary talent. Early in the last century a feverish enthusiasm to rescue the Irish people from Rome manifested itself in evangelical circles. Lord Farnham used to give dinners on Sundays to over four hundred of the local peasantry as an inducement to change their faith. There was an enormous consumption of food in proportion to the paltry number of conversions. Otway edited a paper, the *Christian Examiner*, which was violently sectarian, and Carleton wrote to order. He never seems to have suffered any qualms and for the rest of his life was inclined to sermonize on the dirt and laziness of the Catholic peasantry. His writing was always best when he wrote as an artist and forgot his duties as a propagandist. His fame, which in Ireland was established in the thirties, rose steadily during his lifetime and spread to England, where Dickens and Thackeray were among the admirers of his writing. He became a literary lion in Dublin. The lack of practical sense which drove him in adversity into the arms of the enthusiastic Mr. Otway kept him on short commons even in his years of fame, and he never cut a dash in society like Lever, or spent sufficient time in London to gain a foothold in literary circles there. It is to be hoped that this book will revive his fame. Mr. Kiely is to be congratulated on a scholarly and sincere performance.

TERENCE DE VERE WHITE

A PÉGUY ANTHOLOGY

Meu and Saints: Prose and Poems. By Charles Péguy. French-English Edition. Introduction and English versions by Ann and Julian Green. (Routledge and Son. 10s. 6d.)

CHARLES PÉGUY has now become a power and a presence in the modern world, and this is all the more remarkable for a prophet who was so consistently *anti-moderne*. It is a fair guess that a man who enjoys Péguy and finds a spiritual sustenance in his writings will also enjoy, let us say, Chesterton, Bernanos and Eric Gill. The personalities are very different, but the message is the same. Each man is in his way a considerable

artist; each is more interested in what he has to say than in how he is to say it. Each is concerned, above and beyond everything else, to say where the modern world has gone wrong. Each is agreed in his diagnosis.

Péguy has become the prophet of that Christian humanism which is now the climate of so much Catholic life in France. It is remembered to his honour that he defended Dreyfus when so many Catholics devoted themselves to a demonstration of his guilt; that he preached the virtues of poverty and responsible craftsmanship at a moment when riches were at a moral premium and life had become complicated by capitalism; that he was a patriot when others were pacifists and a believer where others were agnostic; that he believed, among other things, that it was still possible to baptize the French Revolution. In most of these respects he stood opposed to Maurras, and Frenchmen today are extremely sensitive about Maurras, especially those who once supported him. I confess that the sway exercised by Maurras over so many good minds has always been difficult for me to understand. But the fact remains, as Bernanos had admitted, that the *Action Française* really did have a youth and that its adherents, meeting under the sign of Proudhon, were revolutionaries in much the same sense as Péguy.

The fact that Péguy was claimed with equal fervour by Vichy and General de Gaulle suggests either that his attitude was more equivocal than he imagined or that his countrymen have lost the simplicity to apprehend it. There is some truth, I think, in each hypothesis. Gide has rightly insisted that no single party can safely monopolize Péguy, and the reason is not far to seek. He was a man whose sense of the Absolute and devotion to the Ideal made him treat the contingent with contempt. He was far too consistent not to change sides. He had the passion and logic of the controversialist without the pettiness of the partisan. There was, indeed, something disproportionate in his vendettas, against Jaurès, for example, or against the masters of the Sorbonne, but he never made the mistake of believing that truth and justice were only to be found in one faction. Even within the Catholic Church itself he maintained an independence which some thought dishonest and which was perhaps less single-minded than he supposed.

The selections of poetry and prose brought together in the present volume illustrate extremely well the paradox of his thought. The following passage shows at once what an uncomfortable companion he must have been for clerical and socialist alike; yet all he does is to recall each to the first pure impulse of his faith and to suggest, by the way, how the search for sanctity and the quest for justice should in reason go hand in hand. Frenchmen today are very aware of this senseless separation, and they are quick to seize on any text in Péguy which may help them to reconcile what should never have been divided.

We are always being told of the republican degradation. When one sees what clerical policy has made of the Christian mystical doctrine, how can one be surprised by what radical policy has made of republican mystical doctrine? When one sees what the clerics have generally made of saints, how can one be surprised by what our parliamentaries have made of heroes? When one sees what reactionaries have made of holiness, how can one be surprised by what revolutionaries have made of heroism?

'Founders come first. Profiteers come after.' This is a good example of Péguy's prose, and fine as much of his poetry is, his prose is perhaps a more important contribution to French literature. Repetition was, of course, part of his method and it is sometimes wearying to the reader. But while the prose of Péguy is repetitive, it is rarely diffuse. His verse, on the other hand, though it has deeply moving periods, is less exactly constructed. Certainly, in the volume under review, the prose is more successfully translated. Péguy's method is at once so loquitive and so logical that one is hardly aware of the transposition. The style is personal, not classical; it emerges from the refusal consciously to create one. Moreover, the passages have been well chosen. The descriptions, of Jaurés and Bernard-Lazare can never be read too often; they give us the splendour and pathos, as well as the error, the dis-orientation, of modern man. Of Jaurés Péguy writes: 'I have never seen anything or anyone so sad, so distressing, so distressed as this professional optimist'—and we apply the description according to our own experience. We do the same with a passage like the following on Bernard-Lazare:

Of course he was very sincerely an atheist. At that time it was not only the dominant metaphysical system, it was the encompassing metaphysical system, that which one drew in with each breath, a kind of climatic, atmospheric metaphysical system; which was self-understood as good breeding is self-understood. . . . One of his favourite arguments, the one which he always served up to me, was that Israel—since among all the peoples it was the one which believed the least in God—obviously was the people most easy to rid of ancient superstitions. The excellence of the Jews came, according to him, from the fact that they were by anticipation the most free-thinking of peoples.

Others of Péguy's favourite themes are illustrated; his love of Old France, of the Humanities, of Jeanne d'Arc. His very beautiful poem, 'France must go on', is well rendered, and here an analogy with Chesterton and Gill forcibly presents itself. The sense of the eternal inscribed in time, which is at the root of Péguy's thought, is common to all three. Péguy was at once a traditionalist and a revolutionary; he was very little of a conservative. A peasant who hated industrialism, and a

Frenchman who remained profoundly ignorant of foreigners, he would have been surprised that so many beyond the frontiers of France should have been fascinated by the dialogue of his life and moved by the epic of his death. I am only sorry that some of his poems written in a stricter rhythm—'The Presentation of the Beauce to Our Lady of Chartres', or 'For those who die in battle'—were not included in this selection. Lady Pansy Lamb has already shown us that Péguy's rhymed litanies do not defy translation; her own rhymed version of the famous stanzas from *Eve*, published in *The Tablet* six years ago, remains much the best that has yet been offered to the English reader.

ROBERT SPEAIGHT

THE HISTORY OF THE HEART

The Classical Moment (Studies of Corneille, Molière and Racine). By Martin Turnell. (Hamish Hamilton. 12s. 6d.)

WHEN Mr. Wyndham Lewis produced his study of Boswell he contended unanswerably that someone ought to write about Dr. Johnson and his circle every ten years or so. If Mr. Turnell had remembered that the same justification exists for a periodic study of Racine (which constitutes the greater part of his book) he would have been less undecided about his aim and success than he seems to indicate in the Epilogue.

François Mauriac has written of Racine: 'His realm is that borderland between the head and the heart where no one can penetrate who does not belong to the French family. When a foreigner tells us that he is fond of Racine and recites a few lines in a certain tone of voice, we know that he has nothing left to learn about France.' On that criterion, Mr. Turnell's studies of Corneille, Molière and Racine must satisfy anyone who is sensitive to the French manner of feeling, living and writing.

Mr. Turnell has attempted (with considerable success) a great many tasks. He wants to explain to English readers the peculiar nature of the greatness and beauty of the French classical theatre, and the general reader will certainly be the richer for his lucid commentaries on the poetic and dramatic qualities in the abundant quotations. But Mr. Turnell also wishes to place his authors in relation to the forces working within the society which they mirrored; and also to estimate their subconscious reactions to these forces (largely in terms of sexual psychology). His own uncertainty about the result is perhaps the best commentary on the success of these latter aims. But it should be said at once that whatever failure appears in these ventures is mainly due to the limitations of the form chosen by the writer. And, in compensation, he has contrived to be everywhere stimulating.

Mr. Turnell's thesis is that Corneille speaks for a society which was striving to establish authority in every sphere against the anarchy which threatened Europe. Molière represented that society at the height of its stability, confident in its values and critical of departures from the norms of good sense and social urbanity. Racine's preoccupation with the destructive effects of overmastering passion indicates the half-felt consciousness that the forces of dissolution were powerfully at work within that apparently solid structure. The process was not something which readily endures such neat analysis. Mr. Turnell recognizes this fact, and a fair proportion of his essays is devoted to showing the interplay of these forces. It would be easy to pick quarrels with many of Mr. Turnell's statements and deductions; for example, his incautious remark that France was not directly affected by the Counter-Reformation (in which case the huge quarrel round *Les Provinciales* would be meaningless); his view that in France the Reformation was 'signally' defeated; his somewhat contradictory estimates that the new unity of France was narrowly based on the throne and the nobility (Mr. Bernanos would have something to say about the rights of the bourgeoisie and the peasantry in the *Ancien Régime*).

But these points, and likewise reservations as to his estimate of the social overtones of certain passages, would be churlish quibbles in the face of a large and scholarly achievement. Mr. Turnell has, for example, done much to bring to the appreciation of English readers the greatness and attractiveness of Corneille. (For that, I think, he himself owes much to the lamented Robert Brasillach, whose death in that base bigotry of the *épuration* robbed France of her most penetrative younger critic.) Apart from the quality of Corneille's verse at its best ('the thrust and parry of the rapiers—the hiss of steel'), which struck a note unequalled in French till Hugo, there is a hard core of social criticism to be noted in Corneille. His is not a world of noble old men and virtuous youth, but one where scheming ancients seek their aggrandisement at the expense of the happiness of their sons and daughters.

Mr. Turnell's view of Molière does not depart much from that commonly held in England (where he is the most welcome of the French classical writers). However, he does a considerable service in re-emphasizing 'the breadth and variety of Molière's vision of man and society, and his sense of society as a coherent whole . . . his fundamental sanity and . . . that wisdom which belongs to the great European masters.'

It is with the study of Racine that Mr. Turnell gives fullest rein to his enjoyment of the subtleties of French verse and the perennial study of corroding passion which is a constant theme in French literature from Racine to Flaubert and Mauriac. It is difficult not to agree with Mr. Turnell's view that Racine reflected a society which was fundamentally diseased, though not yet completely corrupted. It seems largely true

that the deliberate policy of the Crown in centring all the interest of the nobility on the ceremonies of the Court resulted in a hothouse atmosphere in which intrigue and passion ate away the moral fibre of the aristocracy; and to that extent Racine's haunting verse, with its nightmarish stress on the disruptive effects of passionate love, tells its significant story. But there are other and more simple explanations. Saintsbury, uninhibited by post-Freudian speculation, pointed out that the rigid conventions of the French classic theatre made it inevitable that there should be only one situation in which that conception of the drama could be made tolerable to modern audiences. 'That situation is love-making, which in real life necessitates a great deal of talking and about which, even on the stage, a great deal of talking is admissible.' (It is a pity that more English and French critics do not read their Saintsbury.)

The simplest explanation to Racine's neurotic preoccupation with overmastering passion is that Racine was himself a very neurotic character, and was on that account thoroughly disliked by most of his contemporaries. And, even admitting that Racine was an inadequate mirror of an age which included Bossuet, Pascal, Fénelon, St. Vincent de Paul and St. François de Sales, Mr. Turnell's thesis breaks down when he comes to the episode of Racine's 'conversion'. Admittedly there is no evidence which permits accurate judgement as is possible in the case of Pascal, but Mr. Turnell's treatment of the subject is curiously inadequate. He finds himself with almost nothing to say on the matter, which is surely a commentary on the critical method which enables him to be so fluent on the erotic aspect of Racine's mind.

There are two aspects of Mr. Turnell's theme which seem to me to have been missed. In considering the lack of sympathy of English readers for French poetry (from Corneille to Hugo) he does not, I think, give consideration to the fatal facility of the alexandrine towards rhetoric. In the best of Corneille and Hugo, its greatest exponents, that element seems to inspire the most magnificent effects of the verse. Racine's achievement in making it flexible seduced the subtlest minds ever afterwards: but, if Racine's verse evokes pity and terror, melody and tenderness, more than any other writer achieves, it fails to reach the apocalyptic power of Corneille and Hugo. It is to writers like Villon and Verlaine, *La Pléiade* and Claudel, that the English mind turns with most sympathy. May the explanation not be in their avoidance of the alexandrine?

And there is another element in the French classical theatre which must have an especial attraction in these days. As Mr. Turnell says, it depicts a society in which there is 'something solid and firm on which the mind can rest': . . . a world which speaks with many voices, but on all the major problems of human life each voice proclaims the same message, delivered without the slightest hesitation.' In fact, it is the

world in which art, as we know it, could exist and speak to us across the years of values which are fundamental to European minds.

We are in a situation today where the Cornelian virtues have a desperate urgency, where *devoir* and *volonté* will resume their primacy in the scale of moral and poetic values. For, as Mr. Mauriac pointed out recently:

Le vieux Porto-Riche qui se flattait de 'laisser un nom dans l'histoire du coeur' avait tout prévu, sauf que le coeur n'aurait plus d'histoire... Il eût été stupéfait d'apprendre que les questions que nous poserions si peu d'années après sa mort, et qui concerneraient chacun de nous seraient de l'ordre le plus sanglant: dans telle ou telle conjoncture, notre devoir est-il d'abattre un homme, fût-il notre ami et notre maître, et le crime serait-il de l'épargner? Convient-il de l'aider à fuir, ou de le livrer à la police politique? Est-il louable d'immoler un enfant sous prétexte qu'il ne résistera pas à la torture s'il est interrogé?

A mesure que nous posons ces cas de conscience à la mode du jour, l'admirable lumière chrétienne s'épand tout à coup sous notre regard intérieur. Nous savons bien qu'un chrétien n'aliène pas sa liberté, qu'il est entre les mains du Père et non d'un parti, qu'il se sacrifie lui-même, mais non les autres. Dans chaque cas particulier, la réponse du Christ se formule en lui, à peine la question est-elle posée. En lisant les docteurs de ce temps, n'êtes-vous pas tout à coup saisis à la gorge par l'imbécillité effroyable d'un monde sans Dieu?

FRANK MACMILLAN

'PRINCIPE DELLA MUSICA'

Westminster Retrospect: A Memoir of Sir Richard Terry. By Hilda Andrews. (Oxford University Press. 12s. 6d.)

It was Sir Richard Terry who made Westminster Cathedral famous all over the world, by reason of the grand and forgotten music of which he was the first and the best exponent in modern times. This admirable book is a record of his life and work, first at Downside Abbey and then at Westminster Cathedral. That great man Dom Edmund Ford, O.S.B., first Abbot, was responsible for bringing Terry to Downside, where he first trained his schoolboy and monkish choir (20 trebles, 4 altos, 5 tenors, 9 basses), to sing Polyphonic music, unheard till then, especially the English masters, Tye and Tallis and Whyte and Byrd, as well as music by Italian and other composers. It was at Downside that Tallis's *Lamentations* were sung from manuscript for the first time since the Spoliation. And, indeed, both at Downside and more magnificently at Westminster, where Cardinal Vaughan presently appointed him Master of the Music, Terry was the real exponent of those English masters, of Tye, whose Mass *Euge Bone* is perhaps the loveliest music ever composed by an Englishman, and Byrd, 'that strange Byrd', as the

Downside schoolboy called him, whose *Mass for Five Voices* Terry considered the highest achievement of English Polyphony. These and other masterpieces, with a mass of Italian sixteenth-century music unequalled anywhere else, were sung at Westminster perfectly, up to the First World War; less magnificently owing to the constantly diminishing choir till 1924, when Terry left the Cathedral. Since then one has been able only to regret what we have lost, till today there seems to be a prospect of Terry's wonderful music being in some sort revived. *Esto perpetua!*

Before 1914 the influence of the Westminster choir was quite amazing. It was first recognized at the Eucharistic Congress held at Westminster in 1908. Cardinal Vannutelli, the Papal Legate, took back to Rome, we are told, a report of the care devoted to music at Westminster and, when at Pontifical High Mass on the last day of the Congress Palestrina's *Missa Papae Marcelli* was sung, the Cardinal declared that better singing could be heard nowhere in Europe. He might have gone further. Monsignor Respighi, the Papal Master of Ceremonies, declared that such singing was not surpassed even in Rome. In fact the only rival to the Westminster choir was the Papal Choir itself. Perosi, Director of the Sistine Choir, noted the growing influence, for instance in Paris, of the Westminster music, the fame of which now reached America where Terry's assistant, Sibley, was appointed in 1909 to the Catholic Church in Washington; and the American *Schola Cantorum* was modelled by the Paulist Fathers on the Papal choir and the choir of Westminster Cathedral.

It was not only the perfection of the singing which astonished. It was the immense mass of music the choir sang. One does not find that Terry ever gave an account of the English Polyphonic music he had sung. It amounted certainly to pretty well all there was according to the Latin rite. Of the Italian music he sang at Westminster he gave an account in *The Anglo-Italian Review* for May 1918. It may be summed up as follows:

Palestrina :

Masses, 27; Sequences, 4; Offertoria, 23;
Motets, 56; Hymns, 6; Magnificats, 35 (all);
Antiphons B.V.M., 7; Compline Music, 8;
Holy Week, 9; Total, 178.

Other Italian Masters :

Masses, 36; Other Compositions, 330;
Total, 366.

In all Terry was singing 544 compositions by Italian Polyphonic Masters, of which 63 were Masses. All this beside a mass of English, Spanish and Flemish Polyphonic music. Sometimes he would devote a year to singing Spanish and Flemish or English music, though not exclusively. The bedrock on which he built was Palestrina. The full

record of the Italian music was given by him in *The Anglo-Italian Review* and it is a pity it was not reprinted as an appendix to *Westminster Retrospect*.

One may well ask how this almost incredible total was possible. It is not realized even in Italy, as Terry said, that it is possible to train a choir to read off a new piece of music, and at first sight, as one reads a book. That boys, as well as men, should read a hitherto unseen piece of music correctly at first sight will be considered as beyond belief. Such, however, was the result of Terry's method and the training pursued at Westminster Choir School. The boys were chosen by competition for their voices alone; but if after a year's training a boy, however wonderful his voice, had not become proficient in sight reading he was dismissed. Terry said his experience was that any musical boy of average intelligence could be taught to read music as easily as he reads a book and, what is more, to sing it correctly at first sight. Such was Terry's achievement, and its lovely perfection was alone in the world. It came to an end in 1924 when, after leaving Westminster Cathedral, he wrote for the *Morning Post* an article which was both a confession of faith and his own farewell to the Cathedral, parts of which are reprinted in this volume. It was also a tribute to his old friend and master, Cardinal Vaughan, who had made him his Master of Music, and who died so untimely in 1903.

When an instrument, such as Terry's choir was at its best, is put aside, it cannot be easily rebuilt, nor is it easy to find a builder. In Terry's day at Westminster we lost sight of the man behind the noble music. How well he understood what he was dealing with!

What, then, was the secret of Palestrina's supremacy as a Church composer? It lies much deeper than his supremacy as a musician. The reason that he remains, as truly today as in the sixteenth century, the ideal master for the Roman Rite is that he was steeped in the spirit of the Liturgy. Palestrina was of set purpose expressing in terms of music something he felt to be greater than himself—the mysticism of the faith that was his, as symbolized in the pageantry of rite and ceremonial.

Let him who doubts this listen to a Mass or a Motet of Palestrina's on a concert platform. All this music, English as well as Italian, Spanish or Flemish, only lives as part of the religion it expresses, as part of the rite it illustrates and serves.

For many years in the end of the Golden Age before 1914, the Vesper Psalms at Westminster were sung by Terry in sixteenth century *falsibordoni*. How often was one used to steal into the Cathedral of an afternoon to listen behind one of the great piers to this celestial music floating under the domes of the vast church—Our Lady enthroned, and seraphs on the wing.

GERMAN AND AUSTRIAN PUBLICATIONS 181

The masterpieces of Palestrina, Vittoria, Di Lasso, Anerio and Allegri; of Tye and Tallis and Taverner, of Whyte and Byrd, where are they gone? Shall we ever listen to them as once, again? He made them accessible to us, who, but for him, would never have heard them.

There at Westminster, as the wonderful multi-coloured crown of the Church's year revolved, nothing but this divine music was to be heard save the majestic plainsong of the Proper, like a river

Smooth-sliding *Mincius*, crown'd with vocall reeds,

the plainsong which Terry had also trained his choir to sing or declaim to perfection; in the Graduale, for instance, treble and bass alternately in winding involutions of lovely melody.

We shall not in our day see his like again. Terry's epitaph might well be that of a musical predecessor, who died in 1585, buried in Norwich Cathedral:

Here lies the man whose Name in sight of Death
Renowned lives by Blast of Golden Fame,
Whose Harmony survives his vital Breath,
Whose Skill no Pride did spot, whose Life no Blame.

EDWARD HUTTON

GERMAN AND AUSTRIAN PUBLICATIONS

WHEN future historians come to describe the persecutions of the twentieth century, they will find in the series *Das Christliche Deutschland 1933 bis 1945* (published by Herder, Freiburg im Breisgau, and the Furche-Verlag, Tübingen) much of their documentation, together with a very clear exposition of the peculiar characteristics of martyrdom in our age. The theologians also will find new material on which to base their theories of martyrdom outside the visible unity of the Catholic Church: for the publications are the result of a co-operative effort of Catholics and Protestants to present the testimony of members of both confessions who suffered for their faith under a tyranny worse than Nero's. Among the most touching of the events here described is that of the ordination of Karl Leisner, a deacon of Münster, by his fellow-prisoner, the Bishop of Clermont-Ferrand, in Dachau (in the *Gemeinschaftliche Reihe*, Heft 1: 5.80 RM.). Fr. Max Pribilla's 'The Fate of a Pamphlet' shows how carefully the Catholic resistance movement had to avoid an open conflict which might have brought all its efforts to an abrupt end, and with what skilful use of double meanings its leaders were able to bring home to their followers the true nature of the

situation; it is also an indication of the stupidity of the persecutors that they would have seized at once on a title like 'struggle' and yet—for a time at least—permitted equally provocative expressions under the heading of 'Fear not!' The story of Fr. Johann Maier's death as a saboteur, because he calmed a hysterical mob and then made himself their leader in demanding that Regensburg be declared an open city, has its significance for those responsible for the bombing, as well as for those who neglected opportunities of averting it. (These two articles are in Heft 8 of the *Katholische Reihe*: 4.20 RM.)

A very frank article by Otto B. Roegele in *Wort und Wahrheit* (January) shows what has been achieved and what has been overlooked by Catholic Action in Germany since 1945. The Church after recovering its freedom of action was regarded by the masses as a source of 'enlightenment, comfort, promise, and instruction', and in many places very nobly responded to the needs of the time: in Karlsruhe, Frankfurt, Dortmund, there were courses in theology and philosophy, advice bureaux, soup kitchens—and it was not only at the last of these institutions that the crowds were thick. The greatest weakness is one that is characteristic of the breathing space between persecutions: the unspoken conviction, 'We have conquered.'

In Austria, too, it seems that Catholics have failed to rise to the responsibilities of the post-war period. Dr. R. Svoboda of Innsbruck, writing in *Die Furche* (20 March), attributes their discouragement largely to the prevailing confusion about the Church's claims against a state which is still not at all clear about its own nationalization policy. He insists that they should face boldly the situation created by the condemnation of bishops to imprisonment and death in neighbouring countries, the 'liquidation' of national churches, the breakdown of Christian 'fronts'. He recommends as an aid to clear thinking on these subjects Dr. Karl Rudolf's account of the Austrian Catholic resistance from 1938–1945.

Aufbau im Widerstand (Otto Müller, Salzburg. 37 schillings) is a testimony to the Austrian craft of book production, as well as an absorbing account of the new ways discovered by the Church in Austria of maintaining, intensifying and extending the faith under the pressure of fierce persecution. It was not simply a question of resistance. The political influence of the Habsburgs came to an end in 1918; their ecclesiastical policy had at least a shadowy existence for another twenty years. It was the advent of Hitler which brought to an end the uncertain and often embarrassing association of Church and State; the Church then had to enter on a new and—humanly speaking—lonelier way in her care of souls. Encouraged by the warm approval of Cardinal Innitzer, and prepared by his work at the *Seelsorge-Institut* in the last years of Austrian independence, Dr. Rudolf led wisely but energetically what might be better named a restoration—than a re-

sistance-movement. The resistance, important as it was, was incidental ; the main movement was positive and within the strictly ecclesiastical sphere, but when the Nazis tried to hamper even this they were naturally met with bold opposition. Once again the reality of the persecution is made manifest by the almost exclusively spiritual character of the work in which the Gestapo tried to interfere. Priests themselves were brought back in the first place to a reconsideration of fundamentals : retreats, revision of theology, special instruction in the pastoral needs of the time, were some of the means adopted. Lay-apostles were needed more than ever in the spheres from which the priest—by the new laws—was excluded ; they, too, were given special training : always with equal regard for fundamentals and for the very peculiar conditions under which their apostolate had to be exercised. It is impossible to give in a review any adequate impression of the grandeur and effectiveness of the work of Dr. Rudolf and his colleagues or of the richness of this book. One can only hope that it will stimulate Austrians to a greater effort in what are still—in spite of the darkening eastern horizon—more peaceful times ; perhaps also, enjoying the freedom—however insecure—of the Anglo-Saxon countries, we might learn from it ourselves the way to a more fruitful apostolate.

All the recent reviews are preoccupied with the threat not simply to peace, but to Christianity and perhaps to mankind itself. It is characteristic that the Germans should often speculate so deeply as to seem to lose their grip on the immediate problems, but the crisis is fundamental and those who live among the ruins may be forgiven for taking little account of—say—Britain's balance of payments. Ignaz Zangerle writes in the January and February issues of *Wort und Wahrheit* on 'The Signs of our Times' : all the most characteristic features of our time have been known before, but they have been so worked into our social organization and our very *style* of life as to constitute something which appears very much like an end-stage of humanity, with a scarcely endurable fullness of horror. What should really disturb us, suggests Zangerle, about the concentration-camp is that it is a handy model of the possibilities open to the state of the future ! Does it not seem as if the spirit of man had been subtly changed ? 'The last remnant of chivalry disappeared when the soldier became a technician of destruction.' The revolt of 20 July, 1944, was bound to fail, since it was against a system which had successfully suppressed conscience in its followers and was assured of absolute loyalty even to death : 'The diabolical nature of the situation consists in this, that the defenders of the new religions are much more ready to give their life for a value that is not ultimate, indeed for something utterly unworthy, than the average Christian—enervated by the bourgeois striving after security—is to sacrifice himself for the highest value, the Faith as life in accordance with Truth.' Man has reached a stage at which he is not

simply an atheist, but even 'incapable of God' (the phrase is from Alfred Delp, it expresses the final reversal of the Christian hope that by grace he can become *capax Dei*). Every suffering is possible in the name of the collectivity, but death is concealed from living eyes—in Europe as in Los Angeles: even here we remove our cemeteries to the outer edges of the great cities; moreover, 'we have even dropped the practice of dying and being laid out at home'—we go to hospitals also to die. In this world the Christian is lonely, isolated; and he and his kind do in fact represent a minority. They may make known the social principles of the Church, they may try to reduce the speed of the secularization of politics, but a quick success will not be theirs: only those Christians have any right to enter the political life of our day who are prepared to be martyred. The martyrdoms have begun, and the new age of the world must be dawning; but its true shape and character will not be seen in our lifetime.

There is still much reflection on the past, and the question 'How was it possible?' is frequently repeated. Heinz Holldack, writing in the February *Hochland*, considers it a highly practical question: on the answer depends the training of young Germans in the future. He urges a revision of the German view of history, which was put forward for the glorification of Prussia by Treitschke and Sybel, and reduced to absurdity by Hitler; but even anti-Nazi historians were not above making history serve their purpose, as when Heinrich Berl let it be known that whenever Napoleon III was mentioned in his history of the Second Empire he meant Hitler. The best thing is to take account of the facts before looking for the causes, but the facts must be judged in the light of a Christian philosophy of history.

Lighter, and more concerned with current trends of politics, are the series of 'profiles' in the *Schweizer Rundschau*. One of the sharpest of these is on Karl Renner, who is depicted as a sort of Viennese Vicar of Bray. But the most severe is the criticism of 'Austerity-Cripps': 'the director of Britain's economy who considers himself above economic laws; . . . he holds high the banner of liberty, equality and fraternity; he prefers to demand everything for everybody and to obtain nothing at all for most, instead of observing the permanent laws of economics; . . . he has set out to get the English accustomed to doing without their luxury, as well as without their colonial empire; to drive out of them their damnable individualism, and to lead them into that sublime ideal-state in which there are only officials, plans and rationalization, even though the rations are continually growing smaller in the process.'

Also in the *Schweizer Rundschau* (March) is an interesting article on European unity by Leonhard Haas, recognizing quite candidly the threat of war and the impossibility of a neutral Switzerland in a struggle no longer concerned with the simple balance of power in

Europe: he makes the suggestion that we ought really to be making a serious attempt to maintain the neutrality of Europe itself for any eventual conflict. That was before events in Czechoslovakia had rendered doubtful the very existence of a Europe to be neutralized: in *Die Furche* (6 March), Dr. Albin Bráf asks if these mean a final separation from the West, and recalls the views of outstanding Czechs from Palacký onwards who, however unsettled they might be in the Habsburg empire, still preferred the law and leadership of the West to the Russian tyranny of Czar or Soviet; the same author comments on the death of Jan Masaryk (20 March): 'Masaryk is dead, his son is dead, the illusion of a state of humanity is dead, and its religion of humanity is dead.'

With the end of the old-fashioned secularism, the disillusionment of the more earnest followers of national-socialism, the Christian sense limited to a small and comparatively unimportant minority, it is not surprising to find that there are few signs of a literary revival in Germany: after two years, writes Curt Hohoff in *Hochland* (December 1947), we could scarcely expect the Grimmshausen of our time. One book, hardly in the spirit of Grimmshausen, has caused much discussion—not least because the survivors of Stalingrad have been quick to review it, within their limited space also showing that fine writing can emerge under the stress of great emotion: this is Theodor Plievier's novel, *Stalingrad*. Hohoff praises highly this 'novel without a political tendency', but calls attention to its limitations, due to the fact that Plievier was in the Russian zone when the novel was written; he expresses the hope, now that the author has escaped to the West, that the full truth on the tragedy of Stalingrad will soon be published.

The poets of the past fifteen years are represented in an anthology *De Profundis*, reviewed in *Die Furche* (21 February): the best and most penetrating of the poems quoted is by Reinhold Schneider, known chiefly by his poignant *Motto*, in which the person of the priest is depicted as replacing and symbolizing his ruined church—'Du bist der Tempel, seit der Tempel schwand'; this is on somewhat similar lines, about worship offered from the ruins of German cities as atonement for the sins of the world. It is claimed by P. Sebald Peterhans in the *Schweizer Rundschau* (March) that the greatest of contemporary German Catholic poets is Werner Bergengruen, born in Riga in 1892 and now living in the Tyrol: 'Heavenly Reckoning', quoted in *Die Furche*, is certainly an attractive poem—on the divine reversal of human values—but scarcely a sufficient basis for discussion here.

There is not space to do more than draw attention to the maintenance by other reviews of their established high standards: *Oesterreichische Monatshefte* continue to expound the views of the *Volkspartei* and to uphold the Austrian idea; *Die Wende* spiritedly copes with youth problems in a world which has little to offer to children of any

age; Blackwells' *German Life and Letters* is again informative about intellectual life in Germany and authoritative in its judgements on German writing.

EDWARD QUINN

CORRESPONDENCE

[*The Editor invites correspondence on matters discussed in THE DUBLIN REVIEW.*]

MR. DE LA BEDOYÈRE writes:

IN his review of my life of St. Catherine,¹ Fr. Philip Hughes has been kind enough to praise me as a journalist. He then goes on to criticize in some 5000 words my book on the ground that it is not the work of a professional historian or learned theologian. It would, of course, be nice if I could combine with journalistic competency such further and greater merits. Alas, I cannot! As a journalist, I must be content with the homely, but not unimportant, ambition of trying to convey to the ordinary reader some of the characteristics of a saint. For example, I cannot help thinking that the ordinary reader would be somewhat puzzled by Fr. Hughes' approach—if he understood it at all. A saint, Fr. Hughes tells us in effect, is a person so far removed from ordinary mortals that we cannot hope to approach her life by the ordinary biographical paths. An ordinary reader, hearing this, might ask at what stage exactly in the saint's life does one have to resort to the new approach? At baptism, at confirmation, after the first ecstasy or miracle, or, maybe, at death? Because St. Thomas More was canonized, is the Catholic obliged to correct all his life through Fr. Hughes' supernatural spectacles? And, of course, the poor contemporaries of any saint, who presumably did not know what we know of posthumous veneration, can hardly be trusted, seeing that they used ordinary human minds and senses in their contacts with the saint, and in their reports about him or her.

I do not know whether it is as a theologian or as an historian that Fr. Hughes has his superior laugh at the expense of the journalist who finds a clue to character in the type of physical features. Did not the Saint's contemporaries do so? I can only wonder how Fr. Hughes gets on in *his* normal life if he despises in his dealings with people such clues to character as appearances suggest. I have indeed occasionally wondered whether the great historians and hagiographers ever condescend to this level of commonsense approach. Apparently not—and it is we who suffer through the demands of their scholarship.

¹ THE DUBLIN REVIEW, No. 442, p. 171 *seqq.*

Still, exalted as Fr. Hughes' standard appears to be, he does not seem to be entirely immune from human failings even in a review. Thus, despite the fact that he is in the habit of reading books like the *Dialogue* on his knees—a most unsatisfactory position for taking notes—he appears to be incapable of discerning the fact that the teaching of the *Dialogue* gave me the clue to the interpretation of St. Catherine's teaching (e.g. Part I, Chapter 2). Perhaps more footnotes would have helped him. Again, he most surprisingly states that I hardly ever refer to Fawtier. I can only suppose that Fr. Hughes has momentarily lapsed into a way of arguing most unworthy of a scholar. He makes sweeping statements without ever having read Fawtier, for only so can I explain his failure to recognize Fawtier's guidance (albeit very critically followed) on practically every page, and not least in the dating of the Saint's letters. True, I did not put in footnotes, or again and again quote Fawtier's name, but then I was not writing for a scholar who apparently requires such helps.

Lastly (for I do not wish to burden your valuable pages with the dozen and more retorts that are bubbling in my humdrum journalistic mind) I am grateful for Fr. Hughes' two simple tests of sanctity. The first, 'brotherly love in the highest degree', is reflected throughout the pages of this Life. As for the second, I maintain that Catherine's 'utter dependence on God' has been made out. As for 'its accompanying lack of self-interest and self-will', this seems to me to be to some extent a matter of words. Many of the expressions and phrases used by the Saint, as well as some of her apparently mistaken actions, are hard to reconcile verbally with this lack. But one of my aims has been to show that these phrases and actions are not in fact inconsistent with an 'utter dependence on God', and this I believe to be true (see the Epilogue).

I might add, for Fr. Hughes' comfort, that the book has so far received two separate *imprimaturs*.

FR. PHILIP HUGHES writes:

Mr. de la Bedoyère's book was not, of course, criticized 'on the ground that it is not the work of a professional historian or learned theologian', but because in the reviewer's opinion the methodology of the book is wholly wrong, and because the Saint is presented to the reader through the author's fancies, rather than through the facts of her life objectively stated. The author's letter seems to the reviewer hardly to touch these criticisms, except as a complaint that criticisms have been made: the letter is more taken up with the construction of a picturesque figure to which he attaches the reviewer's name, an attack upon which will serve as an exposure of the review—the references to the 'theologian and historian', to the 'superior laugh' and the 'exalted . . . standard', and the contrast these are so easily made to present to the 'humdrum journalistic mind' of the author, with his 'homely but not unimportant

ambition' and his 'commonsense approach' (to say nothing of the suggestion, latent in his last sentence, that the reviewer questions the author's orthodoxy!); none of this, whatever its tactical importance, in any way touches the point of the criticism, however—namely, that to write the life of a saint and ignore what it is that makes saints saints, is to caricature the saint. This it is which, in his letter, the author does not even notice, except indirectly, by labelling as 'Fr. Hughes' approach', 'Fr. Hughes' supernatural spectacles', 'Fr. Hughes' exalted standard', 'Fr. Hughes' two simple tests of sanctity', what both he and I hold to be theologically true, if not a truth of faith.

The reader who is interested has before him in the review the principle of the criticisms made, and some passages from the book which, it is maintained, warrant the application of the principle. The author, in this letter, does not confute that principle, nor does he justify the book against the application which is made of it in any one of the points selected by the reviewer.

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To the Editor,
THE DUBLIN REVIEW.
Dear Sir,

I am preparing a biography of Lionel Pigot Johnson (1867-1902), the English poet-critic, and I shall be most grateful to any of his friends or acquaintances who can loan me letters or furnish me with reminiscences.

Sincerely yours,
(REV.) RAYMOND F. ROSELIEP

*Loras College,
Dubuque, Iowa.*